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LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: A DILEMMA FOR POLICYMAKERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
SECURITY AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIBYA'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

FEBRUARY 19, 1986

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CONTENTS

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page

Denton, Hon. Jeremiah, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama, chairman, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism 1

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont 6

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania 9

McConnell, Hon. Mitch, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kentucky 11

  Attachment: Letter to Senator Durenberger, January 24, 1986 12

DeConcini, Hon. Dennis, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona 14

  Attachment: "Libya's Band of Thugs," article from the Wall Street Journal, January 3, 1986 14

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Ikle, Hon. Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense 16

Oakley, Hon. Robert B., Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, Department of State 36

Alexander, Dr. Yonah, member, senior research staff, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and director, Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York 71

ALPHABETICAL LIST AND MATERIAL SUBMITTED

Alexander, Dr. Yonah:
- Testimony 71
- Prepared statement 77
- Responses to written questions submitted by Senator Denton 113

Ikle, Hon. Fred C.:
- Testimony 16
- Prepared statement 26
- Responses to written questions submitted by Senator Leahy 33

Oakley, Hon. Robert B.:
- Testimony 36
- Prepared statement 52
- "Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression," U.S. Department of State, Special Report No. 138, January 1986 63

LIBYAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: A DILEMMA FOR POLICYMAKERS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senators Leahy and Specter.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Richard D. Holcomb, general counsel; Kenneth E. Fulp, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEREMIAH DENTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

Senator DENTON. The hearing will come to order.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Welcome to this hearing of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, on the subject of "Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma for Policymakers."

The hearing will examine specifically the nature and extent of Libya's direct involvement in international terrorism—the terrorist groups and factions the State of Libya supports, the manner in which it supports them, the instruction and training facilities it provides to terrorists, and, on the other hand, the support and assistance Libya receives for these activities from other states, both in the Middle East and from the Soviet Union and its surrogates.

In overall context, this hearing will deal with Libya as a case study of the interrelated nature of international terrorist activities, the coordination of the terrorist movement among a number of radical states, and the role of the Soviet Union as the ultimate sponsor of a critically large proportion of the total of terrorist acts directed against the United States and its democratic allies around the world.

The opening statement will offer a chairman's update on terrorism which I present to our highly qualified witnesses for comment. It is lengthy, but reaching a better understanding of the subject is urgent, and such opportunities for progress are all too rare. Also, since our last hearing, much has transpired and faster progress is needed for policy development based on better understanding.

We are fortunate indeed to have our three distinguished witnesses today, all of whom have appeared before us on previous occasions and have been of invaluable assistance to the subcommittee and its staff through the years. Each of them is among a rather small number of knowledgeable people from whose knowledge foundations of antiterrorist policies can be built.

Our witnesses will be Dr. Fred C. Ikle, already seated at the witness table, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy of the Department of Defense; Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning of the Department of State; and Dr. Yonah Alexander, a member of the senior research staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

Welcome and thank each one of you gentlemen for appearing today. You are, indeed, key to solutions so urgently needed.

This subcommittee has held more than 60 hearings on terrorism and related subjects, and those hearings have yielded abundant and conclusive evidence of a network, a global unity in the sources of support, strategy, tactics, and goals of international terrorists. The thrust and power of this network amounts to a new, highly effective form of low-intensity warfare, which is being waged by a varied collection of nation-states with a combined effect being the erosion of the influence and power of the United States and Western democracies, and enhancing the power of the Soviet Union, its client states and allies.

Collectively, the hearings of this subcommittee have provided a reservoir of information sufficient to inform the Congress and the American public of the nature of the interrelationships between terrorist activities and to show the nature and extent of this network's new threat to humanity, freedom, and U.S. economic as well as security interests. But the reservoir has not been tapped sufficiently.

I am not saying that the reservoir is in itself adequate to all needs, but I am saying that there is great frustration accompanying the awareness that what we have revealed has not been used, is not public knowledge, and is not known widely enough among the Congress or within the executive branch. Against such ignorance, informed policymakers, such as those with us today, face impediments. In policy development, what should have been chess has remained checkers, one move at a time.

For too long, our policy toward terrorism has been fragmented, reactive, defensive and ad hoc, dealing with each incident as though it were an isolated occurrence, entirely unrelated to other terrorist acts. This approach to the problem ignores the voluminous record developed by this subcommittee and, also, ignores the significance of what terrorism is doing to the United States in terms of the publicly declared policies and intentions of terrorist groups and the states, such as Libya, which support them.

The joint hearings held last May by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary disclosed, graphically and comprehensively, the interrelated nature of the international terrorist network. But few Senators seriously attended those hearings and fewer seriously studied the disclosures. Since those hearings, the

American people have witnessed further the handiwork of the terrorist network as we have suffered through some depraved and outrageous episodes of international barbarity.

The shocking hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the *Achille Lauro*, TWA Flight 847, EgyptAir 648, and the airport massacres in Rome and Vienna were not isolated incidents. They were only 5 of the more than 705 terrorist acts that were committed in 1985, at a cost of death or injury to nearly 150 Americans and countless others. They are among only the most recent of the thousands of terrorist acts undertaken since 1973, except that the hijackings and the airport massacres have served to heighten American awareness of the cold, calculating nature of those persons or groups who use international terrorism to advance their political and ideological objectives.

Those incidents have starkly revealed how little regard their perpetrators, strategists, and financiers have for human life and the values that are the core of our Western democratic world.

The highly publicized incidents to which I just referred do not include the tens of thousands of terrorist acts being perpetrated in Central America, in Southeast Asia, and in Africa, where they are a matter of routine in a low-intensity-type warfare, with psychological effects already having done great damage to United States interests as well as to the interests of humanity.

These incidents have revealed more clearly with each occurrence the existence of a multinational support system for such terrorist activities. The airport massacres in Rome and Vienna were perpetrated by terrorists of the Abu Nidal faction who were able to cross international borders with the assistance of phony passports reportedly issued by Libya. The Libyan connection was established more firmly by statements made by Libyan leader Qadhafi describing the murders as "heroic" acts and pledging continuing support for such abominations.

The U.S. Government reported that it had hard evidence that terrorists of the Abu Nidal and other factions were being harbored and trained in Libya.

This hearing will focus on Libya's connection with such incidents. The history of Libya's involvement in international terrorism was summarized by the U.S. Department of State in its white paper issued in January of this year, and, hopefully, will be addressed further at this hearing by the State Department's representative, Ambassador Robert Oakley.

We will also examine Libya's connection with what has become a radical entente of nation-states, including Libya, Syria, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea, an entente which, since the early 1980's, has attempted to coordinate a worldwide strategy coldly designed to expel United States military, political, and economic presence from key areas of the world. The design of the larger network is as unrecognized by our side as it is successful on the other side.

Terrorist acts are but one part of a strategy which plays heavily with politics, media, and psychological warfare. This radical expulsion strategy includes efforts, first, to decouple the United States from its allies; second, to force the United States to abandon key military and diplomatic outposts; third, to stretch thin U.S. military forces over the world by coordinating the occurrence of terrorist incidents and other crises simultaneously or in succession in different parts of the world; and, fourth, and this is most important in the overall look we should take at the effect of terrorism, to deny the United States and other free nations access to trade vital to the survival of the free world's economy.

The activities of the radical entente, only part of a global network, are nonetheless especially relevant to the Brezhnev, clearly stated Soviet goal of expanding Soviet hegemony into developing countries by fostering so-called wars of national liberation, an ultimate end of which is to deprive the United States of trade in those key areas of the world.

Krushchev first said, "We will bury you." And we have learned since then that he did not mean necessarily by nuclear weapons. Brezhnev more recently said, in 1973:

> Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends, the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa.

Mideastern oil and African metals and minerals should be in the forefront of our minds as we examine the entente's activities in these areas, especially when linked to the Communist-controlled African National Congress and SWAPO in Southern Africa.

In the case of Libya, as in other cases, this hostile strategy is directed primarily at the United States because of its leadership position in the Western World, the ideals and culture of which the radical entente considers to be inimical to the values both of its Muslim and Communist members. Additionally, the Arab members of the entente can be persuaded to direct hostility toward the United States partly because of our longstanding support for the State of Israel.

The Soviet Union supports the entente's operations with military hardware, the arrangements for terrorist training and other assistance, and encourages the core radical countries of the entente to focus their hostility more exclusively against the United States.

Soviet stick-and-carrot intimidation discourages Third World countries from moving to maintain closer ties with the United States for fear of incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union and the radical entente.

While the Soviet Union does not actually control the core countries of the radical entente, Moscow does foment hatred of the United States, is responsible for the support I previously mentioned, and clearly benefits from the entente's anti-United States strategy and Soviet-sponsored tactics. The important point for the United States to recognize is that the Soviet Union does control a substantial amount of terrorism and does support all of it. The totalitarian nations do not suffer from terrorist groups; only free nations do.

An understanding of the international support structure for terrorism is essential to developing a policy to combat it. After all, the commission of the terrorist act itself, although important, is only the tip of the iceberg. We must attack the iceberg system. We must understand the system, the core reason for the formation of the icebergs, and their destructive drift.

We must have the intelligence capability to interdict and/or to discourage terrorist acts from occurring in the first place, and to find other means by which to discourage Soviet support for terrorism, because that is the mother lode of support.

If prevention of a terrorist act is not possible in a given case, we must be quickly able to identify and punish the terrorist group or groups involved and the nation-states which have facilitated their acts. We must develop a set of principles, a code of ethics, as well as tactics, with a national consensus on the application of those principles in the choice of how we retaliate or pursue or punish.

With the notable exception of our response in the *Achille Lauro* incident, we as a nation have rarely demonstrated an ability to prevent or effectively respond to terrorism, and it is a major purpose of this hearing to determine what factors prevent effective responses by our Government.

We will seek to determine in this hearing whether there are institutional impediments within our governmental system which prevent the United States from effectively responding to terrorist threats and actions. In this regard, we will examine whether the executive and legislative branches of Government are working together or at cross purposes.

We will also examine the legislative or other impediments which may inhibit the United States from developing a coordinated antiterrorist policy with our allies. Without the cooperation of our allies, we may be deprived of critical intelligence which can help us to prevent terrorist acts.

Also, the cooperation of our allies may be essential to the success of any diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions we might choose to impose in response to a terrorist act or to discourage further sponsorship and support for terrorism by the Soviet Union and other states.

I believe that one of the most valuable initiatives our Government has so far undertaken in the development of a counterterrorist policy has been the formation and work of the Vice President's task force on terrorism. We have been asked to work closely with that task force, and we have tried to give them the benefit of what this subcommittee has uncovered over the past 5 years.

Recently, I have been briefed in some detail by task force representatives on their analysis and conclusions, and I am encouraged over the task force's progress in a number of vital areas. I believe an unclassified version of its recommendations will be coming out in the next few weeks.

I believe that U.S. interests require that the task force's function be institutionalized in the National Security Council, because I believe this issue urgently requires full-time staff work for the indefinite future. Moreover, I believe the President should have an in-house authority upon whom he can rely both for day-to-day situations as well as for the development of policy.

Finally, this hearing will address whether new Federal legislation is needed to assist in either the development of counterterrorist policy or to enhance our ability to respond to a terrorist threat.

In that regard, I have recently introduced five bills in the Senate designed to combat international terrorism, including S. 1940, S.

1941, and others. I am hopeful that the Senate will act quickly on S. 1940, the International Terrorism Control Act.

Also, Senator Leahy and I have worked closely with Senator Specter to perfect S. 1429, introduced by Senator Specter to authorize the prosecution of terrorists who attack Americans abroad.

I note, with pleasure, that my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania is here, and I want to welcome him to this hearing. I also want to welcome my longtime friend and coworker on the subcommittee, the distinguished Senator from Vermont, Senator Leahy.

I hope that this hearing will once again focus the attention of the Congress and American people on the urgent need to develop a policy to combat international terrorism.

The American people are justifiably alarmed and frustrated by what they perceive accurately to be an apparent inability of the United States to prevent or effectively respond to international terrorist attacks. Maybe we cannot stop them all, but we can do a whole lot better than we are doing right now. We in government owe that to the American people.

We must develop a consistent policy to deal with terrorism on a continuum, not with "fire engine diplomacy."

I believe that this hearing can make a great contribution toward the development of such a policy, and I invite my colleagues and the witnesses at this hearing to join in that endeavor in the same bipartisan spirit of cooperation that has characterized all of this subcommittee's work.

I hope we have earned the trust of the national media. The news media have done perhaps the greatest work on this issue, independently and with some sense of proprietary right. They sometimes suspect those in government because they feel that we may be acting for political purposes or for personal aggrandizement. I did not serve that way for 34 years in the Navy, and I am not serving that way here.

Moscow's progress toward denying the United States access, as Brezhnev said and as I quoted, to previously available trade has already cost the United States more in annual budget deficit terms than any other factor.

So, in this Senator's view, the common predictions about, and general acceptance in Congress of, gross reductions in appropriations for Armed Services, foreign operations, intelligence and counterterrorism funds in the current security/international trade environment, is unworthy of Government's prime function, to assure the survival of our people, our freedom, and our chance to prosper.

Let me ask my distinguished friend and colleague from Vermont if he has an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Senator **Leahy**. Mr. Chairman, I do, and I again compliment you for holding these hearings.

Terrorism is a major concern of mine. Unfortunately, I will have to leave because the Intelligence Committee is presently meeting and I would assume that, as often happens, discussion of these issues may also take place there. I think that while we are restricted by the very nature of this subject to have our hearings behind closed doors, you should be complimented for addressing a number of these issues, and I know you do so in a very careful fashion, in these public hearings. I think that is important because there are still people naive enough to think that terrorism is simply a concern of those who confine their reading to some of the serials of the fifties. These hearings should disabuse them of that. I think you do a service in bringing out the fact that terrorism is real. Certainly, the recent atrocities at the Rome and Vienna Airports have given new urgency to the U.S. response to international terrorism.

Despite Government efforts, there has been a steady increase in acts of terrorism. In 1985, international terrorist incidents totaled 768, an increase of more than 100 over 1984; 912 people were killed; 1,282 were injured.

I think state-sponsored terrorists pose the most serious threat. vest threat to the United States, other than the constant threat of nuclear war, of anything possible. They drive our diplomatic responses, often military responses, foreign policy responses, and very often we find ourselves at a disadvantage.

The most deadly terrorists operate from the Middle East and Libya. Middle Eastern terrorists are involved in nearly half of terrorist incidents worldwide, many of which occur in Western Europe. They are mainly radical Palestinians who often have the direct support of Libya, Syria, and/or Iran, or Shiite zealots from Arab countries, such as Lebanon, who are often armed and trained by Iran.

I think State-sponsored terrorists pose the most serious threat. They have access to sophisticated weapons, intelligence, and technical expertise. They strike frequently and they target large numbers of people. They play on a world scale and design their terrorist activities to get the most attention.

They operate with the communications and intelligence that only a state can provide, and they operate often with diplomatic immunity, a form of terrorism that is most difficult to combat. Their targets are most often Israel, the United States, Great Britain, France, or moderate Arab governments, such as Egypt. They attack policies and actions which are intended to bring moderation and peace to the Middle East and to destroy relations with the West.

International terrorism is not simply a plague of mindless violence by individuals. If that were true, it would simply be a police problem and the police could handle it. Unfortunately, it is a weapon used by hostile governments, Libya, Syria, and Iran, and organized groups, like factions of the PLO. They are trying to win political goals.

Even though terrorists are often random in choosing their victims, we know of some instances when they have been thwarted by going after one particular group of victims. They simply move to another. And, while that may seem random, their purpose is not random. They want to force either humiliating deals or indiscriminate retaliation which injures the innocent as well as the guilty. Either way, they think they win. When we negotiate with murderers, we lose confidence in our ability to resist.

But if we do nothing, terrorists have no incentive to stop their attacks. I think the worst thing possible we can do is respond to terrorism with strong rhetoric and no action.

I would hope that this ongoing public debate between the Department of State and the Department of Defense about the best way to deal with terrorism would stop. I would hope that we might have one unified response. I would advise the administration that there would be strong bipartisan support for that. This is not a thing where Democrats or Republicans can stand up and say there is a Democratic solution to terrorism or there is a Republican solution to terrorism. We are in this all together as Americans, and the public debate over the divergent views of how to deal with it does not help.

I think that we must resort to the Teddy Roosevelt idea of talking softly and carrying a big stick. Let's talk about our successes in dealing with terrorism after the fact, not what we might do before the fact.

As the chairman knows, I plotted our actions in the *Achille Lauro* incident. But, while it is a comforting thing to be able to say afterward that they can run but they cannot hide, terrorists have run and hidden very well. The terrorists who engineered the bombings of our Embassy in Beirut, the murder of numerous Americans, the killing of 241 marines, the kidnaping and assassination of diplomats, the holding of hostages of TWA, the continuing holding of diplomats there, every one of those people have run and hidden very well. We have got to realize that, so we can go after them or find a better way or better intelligence so we can stop them before they strike.

Mr. Chairman, I am particularly pleased that you have chosen Libya to lead off the subcommittee's business this session.

I have a number of questions and I would ask that I be permitted to submit them for the record. I do not want to delay further. I would leave only with this statement: There is, I sense, and, Mr. Chairman, I think you feel the same way, there is a feeling, certainly in the Senate, that we want to have a unified policy on terrorism. The potential is there to have one that would unite Democrats and Republicans across the political spectrum. And I would strongly urge the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, each of whom I have urged privately to take note of our feelings here and coordinate our intelligence, our diplomatic abilities, our military abilities and our work with other countries in law enforcement to attack terrorism. As terrible as it is when terrorists strike abroad, let us consider what happens if they come to this country—the most open, free nation history has ever known. We face the potential of a handful of terrorists in the United States being able with a few terrorist acts to do more to damage the constitutional and democratic evolution of this country than all of the armies that fought against us in World War I and World War II.

So that is also part of the stakes here. As a leader of the Western World, the leader of the non-Communist world, we have a responsibility to combat terrorism. We also have grave responsibilities to people within our own borders, because we will face those kinds of terrorist attacks here if we are not successful in stopping them abroad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having these hearings.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator Leahy. Your welcome spirit of cooperation, an essential ingredient to progress, has been with us a long time. We need it for the future. And, apart from that, the expertise, talent, and "up-to-dateness" which you provide as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee is of great value to us, and I want to acknowledge your contributions.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. I note, as I said before, that Senator Arlen Specter, my distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, is here. He has been waiting patiently for some time. I imagine he will not stay for the entire meeting. He is not a member of the subcommittee, but he has been active in the fight against terrorism, and we do not turn away any help.

Senator Specter, indeed, is the author and sponsor of S. 1429, the Terrorist Prosecution Act, on which Senator Leahy and myself have worked with Senator Specter in order to reach a consensus bill. It is not an easy subject to clearly address by a bill. It is my hope that S. 1429 will be passed by the Senate with the same bipartisan support which the subcommittee gave it.

I welcome Senator Specter, and ask him if he cares to make any remarks or an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say just a few words. I, like Senator Leahy, left the Intelligence Committee because I wanted to join you, albeit briefly, here. I would first commend you for your leadership on this very important subject, and make a few comments really on the topic which you raised, which I consider to be the nub of this issue, and that is the issue of effective responses to terrorists.

Although we have had some tough talk on terrorism, we have had very little tough action on terrorism, and it is my sense that there are some things that we can do.

I appreciate your comments about S. 1429, which this subcommittee held hearings on earlier in this session, and which has been marked up and passed favorably by the full Judiciary Committee, and may come to the floor of the U.S. Senate today for action. This bill would make it a violation of the laws of the United States to have a terrorist attack, assault on a citizen of the United States anywhere in the world. As of this moment, that kind of conduct is not prohibited under U.S. law—only if there is a hijacking does U.S. law reach that kind of conduct. A hijacking or a kidnaping.

The use of U.S. law in an extraterritorial sense is well established internationally. There are many of us who are waiting for the day when terrorists who assault U.S. citizens around the world will be extradited to the United States to stand trial.

The hijackers of the TWA plane are currently under indictment, those three hijackers, in the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia. The prosecution in the United States is one way that we can follow tough talk with tough action.

The method of extraditing to the United States is a complex issue. But the interception of the Egyptian airliner in the *Achille Lauro* case is one illustration of how terrorists may be taken into custody. And there may be other ways in a very carefully planned and carefully calculated way, with the reasonable use of force to bring terrorists to the United States for trial in procedures which have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States, going back to the case of *Kerr* v. *Illinois*, which is a century old.

Mr. Chairman, later today, I plan to introduce a resolution which would express the sense of the Senate that our NATO allies cooperate with us on economic sanctions against Libya.

It has taken the United States, in my judgment, too long to move with economic sanctions, but we have done that, and I think the response by NATO allies has been totally insufficient, really disgraceful. There have been a variety of concerns about our support of NATO which is disproportionate to our responsibilities there. There has not been a sufficient shouldering of the burden by the NATO nations. That issue reached the Senate floor last year in the Department of Defense authorization bill, and some 41 Senators expressed concern and voted to curtail our support to NATO. It may be that the thrust of the resolution which I will introduce later today will be the subject of an amendment at the time the Department of Defense authorization bill is considered.

Senator Leahy has touched on the issue of diplomatic immunity. My own judgment is that it has been a disgrace that after the murder of the British policewoman by a Libyan diplomat, that he got away with murder and that Britain, for example, has not acted in a forceful way, at least to support U.S. economic sanctions.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding these hearings. You have distinguished witnesses today who can focus public attention on Libya. And, if we cannot be effective and tough with Libya, there is hardly anyone we can be tough with, because Libya is the leader in terrorism in the world today. Again, Mr. Chairman, you have started with the right focus and I commend you for your action and you have my support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, Senator Specter. You have our support in the great work you have done on the Terrorist Prosecution Act.

Senator McConnell could not be with us today, but he asked that a copy of his statement be placed in the record at this point and, without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator DeConcini, who is a member of the full Judiciary Committee but not of this subcommittee, has also submitted a statement and has asked that it be placed in the record and, without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statements of Senators McConnell and DeConcini, and a letter from Senator McConnell to Senator Durenberger, follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH MCCONNELL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM: POLICY OPTIONS

Mr. Chairman, Libya is not a new problem or policy question for the United States. The problem seems to have erupted in 1979, when 2,000 Libyans stormed and set fire to the American Embassy in Tripoli. As the Embassy burned, Libyan authorities failed to respond to our requests for protection. I believe this incident cemented Libyan resolve to challenge and threaten the U.S. at every opportunity. In 1979, Libya declared itself our enemy in a dangerous war of subversion and terrorism.

In response, we have struggled to bring to bear democratic values and inclinations against a shadowy, moving target. Qadhafi's murderous hand has not always been visible which has made it difficult to develop our counter-terrorism plans and strategy. We are a nation bound by our Constitutional heritage and respect for due process so the public debate always seems to center on how certain we are of the guilt of the sponsors of terrorism. In the case of Qadhafi, I think good intelligence, careful analysis and a bloody history have built an air tight case. Now the question is, will sanctions work?

As a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I have had a number of opportunities to pursue my concern about the terrorist problem Libya and other nations pose. I have been particularly interested in whether the policy makers think intelligence information on terrorism is timely, accurate, and useful. I noticed the State Department has just released a paper titled Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Agression. Many of the observations and conclusions seem to be based on data collected by the Intelligence Community. I am pleased to see their tireless efforts put to good use. I hope Secretary Ikle and Ambassador Oakley will address the relationship they have with the Intelligence Community and how intelligence contributes to prompt, sound policy.

I realize there is a great deal of information which convicts Qadhafi as the brutal assassin he is. I also realize much of it is extremely sensitive and classified. My colleagues may be interested to know, Senator Durenberger has agreed to my chairing a closed Intelligence Committee hearing on Libyan support to terrorism. I would like to include for this Committee's record a copy of the letter I sent to Senator Durenberger requesting the Intelligence Committee hearing.

While intelligence may provide the underpinnings for our policy if it is going to be effective it must be well coordinated within our government and with our allies. I was recently briefed by Admiral Holloway on his Commission's findings and recommendations on how well we are organized to combat terrorism. I hope you gentlemen will speak to this issue of coordination and cooperation. I am convinced we will not defeat Qadhafi until and unless everyone works together to isolate and restrain him. Thank you.

DAVE DURENBERGER, MINNESOTA, CHAIRMAN
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United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 24, 1986

The Honorable Dave Durenberger
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dave:

In response to the December 27 terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna, President Reagan imposed a series of economic sanctions on Libya. The President held the Abu Nidal group responsible but stated, "Col. Qadhafi's long standing involvement in terrorism is well documented, and there's irrefutable evidence of his role in these attacks.

The Rome and Vienna murders are only the latest in a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi's backing."

Today's newspapers confirm the United States has initiated a week of carrier flight operations within international airspace over the Gulf of Sidra. Whether or not this exercise is part of a long standing US policy to challenge the legitimacy of Libya's territorial claims or it is a provocative response to the December 27 attack is not a question the Intelligence Committee need address. However, there are important and compelling questions that demand the Committee's attention. I am particularly interested in what information the Intelligence Community has which links Libya with Abu Nidal and this attack and when were they aware of this shift in associations. As recently as November, I had thought Syria was considered Abu Nidal's primary patron.

A second issue of interest is the State Department has just issued a paper, Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression which chronicles a history of attacks. What intelligence information was used in preparation of this unclassified study?

Finally, I am interested in what the community's judgment is on Qadhafi's response to recent events, particularly given his newly acquired SA-5 capability. Has the intelligence community data regarding the deployment and operational status of the SA-5's been taken into account in the decision to initiate this week's exercise?

The Committee has an opportunity to play a useful role in the debate which may develop in the next several days over the merits of our actions. I, for one, would like to be able to reassure my constituents with family stationed with the battle groups, as well as my colleagues in the Senate that the Intelligence Community has definitive, well developed evidence of Libyan complicity in both past and future acts of terrorism.

I would urge you to schedule a Committee hearing on these questions at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

Mitch

MITCH McCONNELL
UNITED STATES SENATOR

rc/glm

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS DECONCINI, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak on this extremely important topic, Libyan-sponsored terrorism. It is essential that we focus our attention on the urgent need to develop a policy to combat international terrorism. We must decide on some course of action to deter terrorism in order to protect our citizens, our country and the citizens and countries of our allies. If we do not decide on some means of stopping terrorism, our credibility as a Nation devoted to the preservation of freedom and independence will suffer greatly.

Mr. Chairman, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi recently described himself by saying, "I am a terrorist." His self-assessment sounds right on the mark to me. The longstanding involvement of Qadhafi and his government in international terrorism—in particular, its support for the terrorist PLO—has been well-documented. As far back as 1972, it should be recalled, Libya provided sanctuary to those PLO members who carried out the murders of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games.

Qadhafi has threatened to send his squads to kill Americans in the United States and has publicly advocated and supported the elimination of the State of Israel—what he calls the Zionist enemy. Indeed, Qadhafi's government not only bankrolls the terrorist PLO, but has publicly admitted to abetting and supporting the PLO's most violent element, the notorious Abu Nidal gang. That gang's most recent success was its bloody terrorist attacks last December at the Rome and Vienna airports, attacks which resulted in the deaths of 19 innocent civilians—including five Americans—attacks which Qadhafi immediately hailed as heroic. Let it be firmly said: there is nothing heroic in killing innocent civilians or in supporting others to do so. Such support for terrorism is atrocious, and it, along with the terrorist act, must be deplored.

Two recent newspaper articles enumerate this connection with terrorism and discuss the meticulous methods in which Libyan students are trained in rocket launching, hand grenade tossing, and machine gun assembly. Judith Miller, a writer for the New York Times, visited a Libyan high school in January 1986. She reported that students are routinely trained to plot and fire rocket launchers. The range, trajectory, and direction are calculated by young students prepared to die for their cause. The target they plotted was clearly marked on their maps. It was marked with a symbol—the Star of David.

Mr. Chairman, this is abominable preparation and an atrocity. This only proves the Libyan proclivity for heinous acts of violence. If this is not reason enough for our European allies to support economic sanctions against these international terrorists, I would like to list twenty more reasons.

Mr. Chairman, these witnesses will have more to tell us about Libyan atrocities and how we must try and halt this international menace. Economic sanctions are one way of discouraging the spread of Libyan-sponsored terrorism without following in terrorist footsteps by inflicting injury on innocent citizens. This hearing provides another valuable opportunity to hear alternative ways of dealing with this growing problem.

Mr. Chairman, I request that the following article from the Wall Street Journal be printed at this point in the Record. This article boldly documents Libya's participation in world terrorism in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. I would only encourage our friends in Europe to seriously consider this litany of evil and act accordingly in supporting economic sanctions to future Libyan terrorism.

[The article follows:]

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3, 1986]

LIBYA'S BAND OF THUGS

This is excerpted from comments to a United Nations committee Nov. 29 by the U.S. delegation's Joseph V. Reed, formerly Washington's ambassador to Morocco. (A related editoral appears today.)

Libya's acts in the international arena have been and are an atrocity. Libya's leader is a dictator—an agent of hateful and evil acts. Libya's strongman is a modern day Barbary pirate . . . .

The litany of Libya's involvement in terrorist activities is unbelievably long, yet it continues to grow. Libya provided sanctuary to the perpetrators of the murders at the Olympics in Munich. Earlier this year, Col. Qadhafi called for the cutting off of our president's nose. That's quite a span of time from 1972 to the present in acts and words of hate.

London, April 11, 1980: A free-lance Libyan journalist was assassinated by two gunmen outside the Islamic center mosque. The gunmen were arrested by Scotland Yard. Two additional suspects characterized by Libyans were detained the following day.

Rome, April 19, 1980: A Libyan businessman was assassinated in a cafe. The assailant was apprehended a short distance away—a Libyan. Why had the businessman been killed? The assassin said the victim had been murdered because he was "an enemy of Col. Qadhafi."

London, April 25, 1980: A Libyan lawyer was shot and killed at an Arab legal center. The gunman and another man asked for their victim by name, walked into his office and fired several shots, killing him as other employees watched. The assassins were believed to be members of Libyan death squads that are assassinating opponents of the Libyan strongman.

Rome, May 10, 1980: A Libyan businessman was assassinated. The victim was lured to a hotel for an appointment and, following a few minutes of talk with two men, was shot twice in the head by one of them. The pair disappeared in a crowd at a nearby railroad station. Police arrested a Libyan suspect of being involved in the assassination.

Bonn, May 10, 1980: A Libyan businessman was shot to death in Bonn's city center. The former diplomat had received death threats prior to his assassination by a Libyan who had arrived in West Germany at the end of April.

Athens, May 21, 1980: A young Libyan was found dead in his apartment. Local authorities said the victim was known as an outspoken critic of Col. Qadhafi.

Fort Collins, Colo., Oct. 14, 1980: A Libyan graduate student was shot and wounded by an individual who had come to his home. The victim was known as an opponent of the Libyan regime.

Ogden, Utah, July 17, 1981: A body believed to be that of a Libyan student was found in the trunk of his car. A Libyan national, also a student, suspected of the murder was arrested at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago as he was deplaning from a flight from Utah. He was carrying a large amount of cash and tickets for travel to where? Tripoli.

Lebanon, December 1982: Libya sent armed contingents to north Lebanon to carry out attacks against the multinational forces in an effort to increase unrest in the zone.

Tripoli, February 1983: In a series of resolutions adopted in the Tripoli People's Congress, Libya's charlatan body politic called for spending part of Libya's oil wealth on arms for "all the revolutionary forces in the Arab and Islamic worlds." The resolution called for "suicide squads" to be formed to press attacks inside Arab territory occupied by Israel and against the symbols of treason in the Arab arena who "follow the imperialist camp headed by the United States, the leader of world terrorism."

Switzerland, April 1983: The Swiss government expelled the Libyan charge d'affaires for supplying weapons to two convicted Swiss terrorists.

Germany, April 1983: Libya took eight German technicians hostage in order to blackmail West Germany into releasing Libyans charged with violent crimes.

Jordan, June 1983: The Libyan envoy to Jordan defected. The ambassador revealed Col. Qadhafi's plan to use missiles to destroy the aircraft carrying King Hussein.

Sudan, March 1984: A Libyan bomber invaded Sudanese airspace and attacked a radio-TV station.

Chad, February 1985: The government lodged a complaint in this house of peace, the United Nations, claiming Libya had attempted to assassinate President Hissen Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the attache-case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence.

Chicago, February 1985: At a convention of members of the Nation of Islam headed by Louis Farrakhan, Col. Qadhafi, speaking over closed-circuit television, called for black Americans "to immediately leave the military and fight with his support for an independent black state. We are ready to give you arms," he proclaimed.

The U.S. May 1985: Our government uncovered a Libyan plot to assassinate anti-Qadhafi Libyans in the U.S. As a result, a Libyan diplomat at the U.N. was declared persona non grata.

Bangladesh, June 1985: A Libyan-trained Bangladeshi national who had received Libyan support in an earlier coup attempt was arrested for plotting to kill President Hossain Mohammad Ershad.

The plotting to assassinate modern Arab leaders has been going on since the '70's. Libya's plans to kill American ambassadors in several Middle Eastern countries and at least one European capital have been uncovered. What does the world think? Libyan "hit squads" have been sent throughout the world to murder exiled Libyans in an overall effort to intimidate dissidents. Libyan hit squads have reached out and attacked exiled Libyans in Italy, England, West Germany, Lebanon, Greece and the U.S. Where next? The dictator's efforts to use terrorism to eliminate dissidents whom he regards as a danger is a constant. The regime and its representative are terrorists.

May 1985: Col. Qadhafi threatened a terrorist campaign against "his enemies" by stating: "I am a terrorist. I would, if I could, behead the rulers of other Arab nations that oppose me."

November 1985: A group of armed Libyans were arrested by Egyptian authorities for again attempting the assassination of former Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Bakoush . . . .

When Libyan officials at the People's Bureau in London opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, killing a British policewoman assigned to protect that diplomatic establishment, it graphically pointed out the fact that the present Libyan regime and its diplomatic representatives have rejected all, I repeat all, international treaties and laws. Libya has in effect left the family of nations and has set itself apart from civilized governments. As a result of this position taken by the Libyan strongman, governments throughout the world are taking necessary precautions to protect their citizens and their overall national security against Libya's band of thugs masquerading as diplomats.

Senator **Denton**. I would just like to add to what Senator Specter said about Libya.

In this Senator's view, it is not quite as easy as saying that Libya is a relatively small state and undoubtedly guilty of crimes from the point of view of its leader.

The question before us, in considering whether to sanction or retaliate against Libya, is to what degree are we going to contend with any reaction from other states which have been supporting Libya? To what degree is there a commitment from other larger nations to Libya?

That may be manifest in what we learn about what Libya is buying and what Libya is being given by other large nations, and, of course, I have reference to the Soviet Union.

Dr. Ikle, I welcome you to today's hearing. I have tremendous respect for you as an official in our Government. As you know, in no other subject area do we need wisdom, judgment, and testimony. Your complete written statement will be placed in the record. You may summarize your testimony for purposes of this hearing in any way you desire.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. **Ikle**. Mr. Chairman, Senator Leahy, I will summarize my testimony.

I am delighted to appear again before this subcommittee, to discuss our efforts to combat terrorism. Your outstanding personal leadership, Senator Denton, as well as the constructive support of your dedicated subcommittee have inspired and guided new U.S. programs and policies to contend with this continuing and serious threat.

Organized international terrorism, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is one of the principal instruments of modern totalitarianism in its long-term campaign to destroy democracy.

Soviet reliance on the terrorist weapon is as extensive as it was in the days of Lenin and Stalin, but today Moscow takes greater pains to mask its involvement.

Libya, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, represents another somewhat less sophisticated practitioner of the art of terrorism.

Qadhafi employs foreign terrorist groups as surrogates in a war against countries he perceives hostile to his regime. He has offered assistance and safe haven to terrorists of many disparate, and sometimes even conflicting, ideologies. Palestinians, Iranians, Syrians, Armenians, Germans, Bulgarians, and even Irish.

His early massive financial and material support to the PLO, including the perpetrators of the Munich massacre, and his current protection and use of the Abu Nidal organization has received extensive media coverage. The tragedy at Malta and the recent massacres at the international airports in Rome and Vienna are the legacy of Abu Nidal and his Libyan sponsors.

As a matter of state policy, Qadhafi provides training, equipment, and refuge to terrorists of varied ideologies, whom he uses as surrogates to carry out vendettas with persons and governments he considers opposing his rule or his aggressive designs. The recent threats by Qadhafi to bring terrorism to the streets of America and his support for subversive groups in this country and abroad underscore the full dimensions of the problem.

There are, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, other sources of terrorism; for example, the present regime in Iran. The murder of 241 U.S. marines, the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut with the consequent death of 57 persons, and the attack against our Embassy compound in Kuwait have all been traced to this fanatic religion of violence emanating from Khomeini.

There are other developments that concern us on terrorism. For example, one new development that began in Europe in 1984, this is the move to integrate European terrorist activities, dubbed "Euro-Terrorism." It began in Paris with a series of violent attacks, extended to Belgium, and gained momentum when German, Basque, and Portuguese terrorists carried out bombings of NATO, other United States and other local military targets.

Portuguese terrorists used mortars to attack the United States Embassy, to attack NATO ships in Lisbon Harbor, and attack the NATO Iberian Headquarters in Portugal.

Only yesterday, Mr. Chairman, a powerful car bomb was exploded on the grounds of the United States Embassy in Lisbon. Fortunately, thanks to the protective measures, it appears that no one was hurt.

While terror may be generated by grievances, some real and some imaginary, successful and sustained terror ultimately requires state support or some other source of major financing. Yet, political terrorism is not the only form of terrorism that threatens us. A relationship has emerged between some political terrorist groups and international narcotics interests, the so-called Narco-Terrorists.

Why? Because the drug trade provides terrorists and insurgents a more lucrative source of financing than bank robberies or kidnapings.

Rural insurgents, in particular, have the opportunity and the motives to become systematically involved in the drug trade. And, on the other hand, insurgents and narcotics growers often colocate, being drawn to the same remote locations.

Well-armed insurgents originally provided traffickers a source of protection from the security forces or rival narcotics groups. But as the insurgents saw the enormous profits that could be generated in the narcotics trade, they have become active in all phases of narcotics production and marketing. This development is of particular grave concern to us in Latin America.

Mr. Chairman, the administration has taken several steps that enhance our capabilities to meet this threat. While some are highly sensitive, as you know, and cannot be discussed in open session, I would like to briefly outline the major initiatives, or areas of initiatives.

One: Much has been done to develop new relationships with friendly liaison services. These are a particularly valuable source of timely tactical information on intentions and capabilities of key terrorist groups.

Two: The administration has enhanced our unilateral HUMINT collection and analytic capabilities.

Three: Significant steps have been taken to upgrade the security of our diplomatic and military installations and personnel overseas.

Four: The administration has an active program to upgrade counterterrorist capabilities and assets that would be used to preempt a terrorist assault or to carry out rescue and similar high-risk missions.

Five: Finally, the Vice Presidential task force, chaired by Admiral Holloway, has conducted an indepth review of U.S. policies, programs, and capabilities. Their recommendations will provide further guidance for enhancing our ability to combat international terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, more can and more must be done. The extensive work by your subcommittee has educated all of us on the sustained effort and multiple programs that are needed to cope with the threat of international terrorism.

But let us be clear that none of the measures to counter terrorism, whether political, economic, military, or paramilitary, is without cost. Imposing economic sanctions for sponsoring terrorism, for example on Libya, inflicts some sacrifice on our own citizens.

Many friendly governments who oppose international terrorism are, however, reluctant to make the short-term sacrifice in the expectation, perhaps, of emerging the supporters of terrorism.

Similarly, a military action can risk not only the lives of our own citizens but sometimes those of bystanders among whom the terrorists may hide. For that reason, we must use the most discriminate military means available.

Police and paramilitary action, while less spectacular than a military strike, can often be more effective. Those who mastermind terrorism in airports are unlikely to be found in remote training camps. They are more likely to be moving clandestinely in a support network in the Western society.

To stop them, we need better cooperation between the intelligence agencies of many countries, and especially between intelligence and police forces.

Mr. Chairman, this leads to my last and perhaps most important point: without the wise guidance and sustained support by Congress, we cannot effectively combat international terrorism.

It does no good for Congress to react to every dramatic incident of terrorism by hastily calling for a vigorous, courageous U.S. response, but then later to lose all vigor and courage when the administration asks Congress to support counterterrorist programs. This is where your sustained support and leadership on this subcommittee has made a difference.

In particular, the reluctance of Congress to eliminate an obsolete piece of legislation, the prohibition of U.S. training and support for police forces in friendly foreign countries—section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act—has been troublesome.

Would any Member of Congress argue that the Federal Government should deny all assistance to State and local police forces just because there have been some police abuses, 10 or 20 years ago, in one or two countries? Yet, Mr. Chairman, this is the rationale for retaining this section 660.

Note the results here that this ill-begotten piece of Vietnam legislation brings us to this day. In June last year, four United States marines were murdered in a cold-blooded terrorist attack in San Salvador. These marines were protecting our Embassy, as U.S. marines are protecting every one of our embassies throughout the world.

The police in San Salvador lacked communications equipment, patrol cars, and training effectively to curb the danger of terrorist attacks in the capital.

We in the executive branch asked Congress in early October, inexcusably slow, in my view, to let us reprogram $2.3 million to help the police in El Salvador better to protect our marines and other United States citizens. Even though the guerrillas had announced that United States personnel in El Salvador would be considered prime targets, it took certain Members of Congress from October until February to release the funds to help protect our citizens.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot but wonder whether the constituents, perhaps, including parents of our U.S. marines serving U.S. embassies abroad, know what their elected representatives in Washington are doing here.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks.

Senator DENTON. Thank you for your expectedly insightful testimony, Dr. Ikle. Your remarks conjure up thoughts of 500-and-some-odd secretaries of state over here in the Senate and House, an impression I have had since about 1973.

When President Carter tried to tell Mr. Brezhnev that if he continued sending Cuban troops by the thousands on Russian ships to Angola, the President was going to do what he could to make it unpleasant for Mr. Brezhnev. That night the three major networks jumped all over President Carter and said, "What are you trying to do, start another Vietnam? Get back in your hole, Mr. President." And, next morning, Congress, reacting to that, said, "Jimmy, get back in your hole. What are you trying to do, start another Vietnam? If you think you have seen the War Powers Act, wait until you see what we will do to you about this."

Now, the black people in Angola are anteing up thousands of dollars per Cuban troop, and Angola is one of the places from which activities are being spread to deny the United States access to vital resources which we cannot afford to do without.

We can talk all we want about defense procurement abuses, or abuses in welfare, but we are blind in this country to what is happening to our economy because of the spread of denial to our economy of the resources overseas which we used to enjoy. We have got to think about that in reality as well as think about humanity, liberty, and so on.

I wish we could unite a little bit more bipartisanly in support of such initiatives as our executive branch undertakes with respect to terrorism. We do have well-informed people, like Dr. Ikle, Ambassador Oakley, and Dr. Yonah Alexander. So we should be able to make some progress toward better policies. I hope their remarks are covered by the news media.

Since the early 1980's, Dr. Ikle, we have witnessed the emergence of a pattern of terrorist activity on a global scale. The entente to which I referred appears to be united ideologically in its hostility toward us, and in its efforts to expel us in the manners which I mentioned. The activities of the core radical countries appear to be coordinated operationally to some degree with the intent of spreading U.S. forces thin and convincing the American public that it is too costly to maintain American presence in these key areas of the world.

Do you agree that such an entente of radical nations exists, and have you seen evidence of coordination among them in directing their hostility against the United States?

Dr. **Ikle**. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is coordination and there is an entente, I would say, of hatred, of opposition to an open, free democracy. And there is also a common training, a common practice, common understanding of the uses of violence for political ends. And we can trace that in the history of totalitarianism, the history of Leninism and Stalinism as the development, in essence, of the systematic and clever use of violence for political ends.

Terrorism is a special extension of that. And, as you stated, the Soviet Union finds terrorism not much of a threat to the tightly controlled regimes within its empire, but a useful tool to be directed throughout the world against the open democracies.

Senator **Denton**. An empire which has grown less concerned about ambiguity or disguise in aggression after Vietnam, witness Afghanistan, Nicaragua against El Salvador, that sort of thing.

Do you believe the Soviet Union and its Eastern European surrogates play a role with respect to the member states of the entente? How would you describe that role?

Dr. **Ikle**. The East European countries, we have clear information on that, have offered training facilities to terrorist organizations and individual terrorists. There are processes for recruiting likely candidates to become terrorists and they are brought to these places in countries in Eastern Europe, where they are schooled in the use of weapons, explosives, and other methods.

There is ample documentation of this from the interviews of terrorists that have been captured, or who surrendered.

Senator **Denton**. In your written statement you mentioned some things that are responsive to that question, and which we have found to exist all over the world, and I would suppose they are equally applicable to this radical entente.

You say:

> Moscow uses front groups as mechanisms to spot and assess likely candidate terrorists who can be sent for training to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. There, they are schooled in a variety of clandestine activities, including terrorism. It has been reported that the Soviets spend $200 million annually on these programs.

That was confirmed by CIA Director William Casey, who has stated that every year approximately 600 individuals travel to the U.S.S.R. for this purpose. This is in addition to the training camps and other activities that the Soviets sponsor in other nations. We have East German representation near the height of the hierarchy in Libya; we have a general from the KGB practically directing the DGI, the intelligence agency of the Cubans, and our people are unaware and apathetic about the unity of the program and the source.

What would you say, Dr. Ikle, about Americans who are perceptive enough to say, "Look, Libya is one country doing this; Nicaragua is another, but is not most of the terrorism support coming from the Soviet Union? Yet we never mention the Soviets when we talk about states that we might identify as terrorists." How do you respond to that?

Dr. **Ikle**. Well, the administration has mentioned the role of the Soviet Union. In the first Reagan administration, when Alexander Haig was Secretary of State, a report was issued on the role of the Soviet Union in terrorism. Director Casey, to whom I referred in the opening statement, has, to the extent that it is prudent to do this in public, referred to the Soviet role on I think several occasions. So they try to make this case.

Senator **Denton**. I am going to ask others, probably the State Department's Ambassador Oakley, but do you have any feeling for the relativity of independence in Qadhafi's initiatives? Is he an independent nut, or flake, as the President called him, or is he, to some degree, a captive of the kinds of support that he might receive from the Soviet Union, or perhaps even to some degree intimidated by the Soviets, granting that he may not in every case act as sanely as they might want him to? How would you comment on that?

Dr. **Ikle**. A bit of both, Mr. Chairman. On the one hand, with perhaps up to two-thirds, or perhaps even more now, of his military supplies and equipment coming from the Soviet Union, he has slipped into a growing dependence on Soviet support. And he also, of course, recognizes that the Soviet Union is a major military power that can contest United States military power and, in this indirect sense, provides cover for his nefarious activities.

On the other hand, he is a neurotic individual, or a flake, as the President properly put it. I recall descriptions of him by the late Anwar Sadat and other statesmen who very much pointed out the strangeness and the split views and personality that he has exhibited in close contact with other political figures.

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

Some Senators favor a tightening up of the War Powers Act, making it even more restrictive on the President. It is my personal belief that this would create a climate making it even more difficult to deal with terrorism, in that it might delay a rapid commitment of U.S. military forces in order to respond to a specific event. More importantly, in my view, it would make more difficult a decision to deploy troops as a chess move to deter the Soviets or some terrorist state from committing an aggressive act, even though such a deployment of our troops could prevent bloodshed rather than result in it.

Do you feel that the War Powers Act should be construed or amended to require briefing in advance of every action of this type by the executive branch? Do you think it should be tightened up, or should we leave it as it is presently drafted?

Dr. IKLE. I think it would be very damaging to our security to tighten up the War Powers Resolution in the sense that you described. That resolution, as you know, was worked out very carefully by Senator Javits and others in the seventies in part of a larger response to the experience people read into the history of our involvement in Vietnam. To impose additional restrictions on the ability of the President, officially elected by all the people in the United States, to impose further restrictions on him would be most unwise as it would be to create an additional role for the 535 Representatives elected by States and constituencies for different purposes, according to our Constitution.

Senator DENTON. I share your view, sir.

In your view, are there problems inherent in the administration's having to brief two select congressional intelligence committees in advance of covert action? How would you suggest that such briefings be conducted, or their format or timing changed so as not to impede timely and effective responses or preemptive actions by the United States to deal with terrorist threats? And, tertiarily, what can we do about leaks, and how important are they?

Dr. IKLE. Well, I wonder, Mr. Chairman, whether the last point in your question is not really the key question. How can we consult with Congress in accordance with our legal requirements or in accordance with the tradition we like to live up to in any event, apart from legal requirements, and at the same time protect operational secrets or technological secrets that must be protected in the national interest. It is a matter that requires discipline, both in the executive branch and in the legislative branch.

Permit me to digress here for a moment. I have had discussions with some colleagues of yours in both Houses about the need, in both Houses separately, on their own initiative to improve the security arrangements for protecting classified information. I do not aim this observation particularly at intelligence committees, because those two committees have done the most, and have been most effective, and I have had a very good response from all of your colleagues to whom I have talked about this, and I hope that something will be done. It is not something that the executive branch can do. We can only try to be helpful, but it is not proper for us to interfere.

Senator DENTON. Can you be more specific about what you think can be done about the problem of intelligence leaks from Congress and from executive branch agencies?

Dr. IKLE. Again here, I am not referring to, in any particular way use the word "intelligence" to mean the intelligence committees, as I said. I meant general leaks of sensitive operational information.

Senator DENTON. Intelligence leaks from Congress.

Dr. IKLE. Right.

Senator DENTON. Or the executive branch.

Dr. IKLE. Right. All the way from the way in which classified information is kept physically; documents that are being kept by Members or staff members, from the question of indoctrination of people working for Congress that need clearances, from the supervision of the flow of information, the destruction of formal documents, from the investigation in the event of leaks. It is the whole gamut of activities. It is not easily done. As you well know, we have great difficulties in the executive branch as well.

Senator DENTON. How would you address the good reasons or bad reasons for the U.S. failure to undertake military action in response to the recent Abu Nidal terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna? Even though the administration stated it knew the location of terrorist training camps in Libya, would you say that our decision not to respond militarily depends on legal impediments? What other cause might there be for not having done something?

Dr. IKLE. Let me respond to this question in two ways:

First, specifically, to make just one very short point regarding Libya in particular, and this recent terrorism act. That it is desirable to keep Qadhafi guessing, as the President pointed out, and none of us want to spoil that beneficial effect by forecasting or speculating about possible actions. But then, let me now shift more generally to a point I have already made in my opening testimony, that it is not always clear that you can combat or deter or retaliate against terrorism by going into certain training sites in an effective way.

Terrorists, as I mentioned in my opening statement, may slip into the open society, really, particularly the Euro-Terrorists travel on between Frankfurt and Paris, and their training may be long behind them. They may have been trained years ago in Prague or someplace. Of course, basically, we would like to wipe out all training sites, or to have them abolished, whether they are in Eastern Europe or in Libya or any other place.

A second consideration you have to keep in mind is that you try to minimize the killing of innocent bystanders.

Third, you have to think about the larger political consequences.

You yourself mentioned the chess game. What is the next move, the move after that? What if the sponsors of terrorists strike again? Will we then still have the will and the support of the people and the Congress should things escalate? These are the kinds of questions we have to examine.

Senator DENTON. To what degree do you think our allies are cooperating with us in developing counterterrorist policies?

Dr. IKLE. I can give you a one word answer: inadequately, insufficient. We would like to get and we expect better cooperation from our allies than we are getting in most cases.

Senator DENTON. What factors are in the way of their cooperating with us on antiterrorist activities policies?

Dr. IKLE. In some areas, we have very good cooperation in sharing information and taking police action. In protecting our embassies in Europe, of course, the cooperation is superb. And some of what the governments have done, the Italian, German, and other governments, in tracking down terrorists has been outstanding. But the question arises of acting against a government sponsor of terrorism, such as Qadhafi, that is where the difficulties begin.

The commercial considerations of wanting to continue a lucrative trade, fear of the second and third move on the part of the terrorist sponsor, besides the considerations I mentioned before that also affect us, these have an inhibiting impact on governments as do their moral and political conviction.

Senator DENTON. Some of what you said applied, apparently, to economic sanctions. There is self-interest in any nation.

Dr. IKLE. Right.

Senator DENTON. We ourselves had oil coming out of Libya. We finally faced that. We might have a little oil coming out of Angola, but I think anyone would be a fool to believe that that oil coming out of Angola represents that which we would have coming out of there if it were not Communist controlled by a bunch of folks from Cuba.

What about the spontaniety with which our allies coordinate with us in terms of intelligence sharing? Are there any unique U.S. laws which would inhibit our allies from sharing intelligence with us?

Dr. IKLE. I am not aware of any particular obstacle that ought to be changed.

Senator DENTON. I will be asking the Justice Department officials that respecting the Freedom of Information Act type——

Dr. IKLE. You referred about the sharing.

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Dr. IKLE. If your question is about protecting information, I have a long list of things I would like to have changed.

Senator DENTON. Well, they are not going to share if they think they are not protected.

Dr. IKLE. Inhibiting the sharing, in the psychological sense, I understand the sense of your question. I thought you meant by our own laws we were prohibited from sharing.

Senator DENTON. No.

Dr. IKLE. Yes, indeed, that gets back to the question of leaks and also the question of the Freedom of Information Act that has partially been limited by Congress, fortunately. But there is still an impediment to establishing the necessary confidence with friendly organizations.

Senator DENTON. A final question: Did you find anything in my opening statement, which was intended to be a chairman's update, that was notably in error?

Dr. IKLE. No. I just wonder, since you made all of these points that summarize really what can and must be done, whether I should not excuse myself. There is nothing left to say, Mr. Chairman. You said it all.

Senator **Denton**. On the contrary, you have——

Dr. **Ikle**. I totally agreed with the emphasis you gave the role of the Soviet Union and the Soviet system, and I think you highlighted more than I have seen it done before, and it stimulated me in that we should analyze it further, the possible long-term plan.

Senator **Denton**. Terrorism in a slightly escalated form might have been what North Vietnam would have done to South Vietnam had we not come in there. What they did do to Cambodia and Laos is somewhat linked with lower forms of conventional warfare, but the wool of the fabric is still terrorism, intimidation. If you read any of the ancient Chinese philosophers, whom they follow so closely, it is the psychological influence which they wish to obtain by a minimum of application of force and risk and sacrifice on their part, as you, I am sure, well know.

It is that context of terrorism which I wish that our people and our Government understood better. As you are aware, there are two bills currently pending in the House and Senate which would authorize the expenditure of funds by our Government to assist certain countries in Latin America and Central America in strengthening the ability of their own forces and law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism. I refer to S. 1915, Senator Lugar's "Central American Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement Professionalization Act," and H.R. 3463, Congressman Fascell's "Central American Counter-Terrorism Act."

Dr. Ikle, do you believe that such legislation would help us to coordinate our antiterrorism policy with our allies, thereby improving both our and our allies' ability to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents?

Dr. **Ikle**. Yes, we would be very much helped by both the necessary funding and legislative authority to strengthen the counterterrorist capability in Central America. And these new pieces of legislation, without commenting on every detail of the proposed acts, would move in this direction as well as a point I made earlier about removing the old Vietnam-born restriction against police training. I think it would be useful not to try to fix the problem only for Central America, which the bills you mentioned would do, but also to enable the executive branch in future years and future administrations to step in where it is prudent and wise and to work with police forces to combat terrorism in other parts of the world.

Senator **Denton**. Well, you may be sure, sir, that we will undertake to focus upon the need to eliminate that restriction.

Thank you very much, Dr. Ikle.

Senator Leahy has indicated he might have questions, and you understand that we might submit further questions to you in writing. We thank you very much for your testimony and for the important part you play.

Dr. **Ikle**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. Ikle's submissions for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to appear again before this subcommittee, to discuss our efforts to combat terrorism. Your outstanding personal leadership, Senator Denton, as well as the constructive support of your dedicated subcommittee have inspired and guided new US programs to contend with this serious and continuing threat.

In addressing the problem of terrorism here, we are not concerned with criminal acts that may use terror tactics but are carried out by some isolated individuals, without political objectives. To be sure, these isolated acts are of concern in preventing airplane hijackings, in protecting our President from assassination attempts, and in many other contexts. Like other acts of irrational or criminal violence, they are a serious issue for public safety; but they are random events--"accidents," in a sense.

By contrast, organized international terrorism is not a random phenomenon. It is one of the principal instruments of modern totalitarianism in its long-term campaign to destroy democracy. The essential feature of Leninism is the systematic use of violence for political ends. Acts of terrorism, therefore, have always been part of the central strategy of Leninism. And terrorism is an instrument that serves other totalitarian movements as well.

Moscow uses front groups as mechanisms to spot and assess likely candidate terrorists who can be sent for training to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. There, they are schooled in a variety of clandestine activities, including terrorism. It has been reported that the Soviets spend $200 million annually on these programs.

This Soviet training program for terrorists has been confirmed by CIA Director William Casey, who has stated that every year approximately 600 individuals travel to the USSR for this purpose. These charges are supported by testimony provided by defectors, and by information developed by friendly intelligence services.

Soviet reliance on the terrorist weapon is as extensive as in the days of Lenin and Stalin, but today Moscow takes greater pains to mask its involvement. As a result, hard evidence is difficult to develop and then is quickly forgotten by a public that suffers from a short attention span and a poor appreciation for the lessons of history.

Libya represents another, although less sophisticated practitioner of state terrorism. Mu'ammar Qadhafi employs foreign terrorist groups as surrogates in a war against countries perceived hostile to his regime. He has offered assistance and safe haven to terrorists of many disparate, and sometimes conflicting, ideologies. These include Palestinians, Iranians, Syrians, Armenians, Germans, Bulgarians, and even Irish. His early massive financial and material support to the PLO (including the perpetrators of the Munich Massacre) and his current protection and use of the Abu Nidal organization has received extensive media coverage. The tragedy at Malta and the recent massacres at the international airports in Rome and Vienna are the legacy of Abu Nidal and his Libyan sponsor.

As a matter of state policy, Qadhafi provides training, equipment, and refuge to terrorists of varied ideologies, whom he uses as surrogates to carry out vendettas with persons and governments considered to oppose his rule or his aggressive designs. The recent threats by Qadhafi to bring terrorism to the streets of America and his support for subversive groups in this country and abroad underscore the full dimensions of the problem.

Another well-spring of terrorism is the present regime in Iran. The murder of 241 of U.S. Marines, the destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut with the consequent death of 57 persons, and the attack against our Embassy compound in Kuwait have been traced to this fanatic religion of violence.

Pro-Khomeini Iranians were responsible for two European-based hijackings. Both ended violently, the first with the destruction of an Air France aircraft and the second with the death of the hijackers at the hands of Iraqi security personnel. Radical Shia elements carried out the June 1985 seizure of TWA 847 which commenced in Athens and ended in Beirut more than two weeks later with an American serviceman murdered and others tortured.

Geographic dispersion of the Shia, who are amenable to Iranian influence, has made Khomeini's terrorism more difficult to fight. Iran uses its embassies, cultural centers, and student associations as conduits, and through these mechanisms keep their terrorist operatives supplied with money, weapons, and intelligence. We believe that with each perceived success the ranks of the Shia terrorists will grow, and with their swelling numbers the threat to U.S. interests will increase.

Another development that deeply concerns us began in Europe in 1984. This is the move to integrate and coordinate European terrorist activity, which has been dubbed "Euro-Terrorism." It began in Paris with a series of violent attacks, extended to Belgium and gained momentum when German, Basque, and Portuguese terrorists carried out bombings of NATO, U.S., and domestic military targets.

Its prime constituents are the German Red Army Faction and the French Action Directe, which in January 1985 announced formal collaboration and the creation of a joint "political-military front." These groups have carried out car bombings, assassinations, and numerous attacks against NATO related targets. The attack against the Rhein-Main air base on 8 August, which killed two Americans and wounded 19 others, was jointly claimed by the Red Army Faction and Action Directe, which further underscores the linkage between the two groups.

Elsewhere in Europe, a similar pattern of activity and targetting has emerged. Portuguese terrorists using mortars have attacked the U.S. Embassy, NATO ships in Lisbon harbor, and NATO's Iberian-Atlantic Command Headquarters. Similar operations have occurred in Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

While terror may be generated by grievances, some real and some imaginary, successful and sustained terror ultimately requires state support or some source of major financing. Yet, political terrorism is not the only form of terrorism that threatens our nation's security. A symbiotic relationship has emerged between some political terrorist groups and international narcotics interests. This has given rise to the appelation, "narco-terrorism."

The drug trade provides terrorists and insurgents a more lucrative source of financing than bank robberies or kidnapings. Rural insurgents, in particular, have the opportunity, motive, and capability to become systematically involved in the drug trade. Insurgents and narcotics growers often co-locate, being drawn to the same remote isolated areas--far removed from effective government control.

Originally, well armed insurgents provided traffickers a source of protection from the security forces or rival narcotics groups. But as the insurgents saw the enormous profits that could be generated, they have become active in all phases of narcotics production and marketing. Now insurgents run laboratories, grow the crops and, in some instances, are involved in distribution as well.

In the development of narco-terrorism, Latin America is of greatest concern to us. In Colombia, for example, the oldest and most effective guerilla organization, "The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is reported to receive funds, weapons, and other services from its narcotics contacts. A second Colombian group, the M-19, is also reported to be involved in narcotics trafficking. And in Peru, the "Sendero Luminoso" insurgents reportedly extort war taxes from growers and narcotics traffickers.

Traffickers themselves also practice terrorism. In Colombia, they have threatened the life of our Ambassador and other key

U.S. officials. In Mexico they kidnapped, tortured, and ultimately murdered U.S. narcotics agent Camarena. These events make our newspapers. Yet rarely does the American public learn of the almost daily acts of terror and atrocity committed against the local government and police officials who dare to challenge the drug kingpins and the narco-terrorists.

The Administration has taken several steps that enhance our capabilities to meet the terrorist threat. While some are highly sensitive and cannot be discussed in open session, I would like to briefly mention the following initiatives.

- o Much has been done to nurture and develop new relationships with friendly liaison services. These are a particularly valuable source of timely tactical information on plans, intentions, and capabilities of key terrorist groups.
- o The Administration has enhanced our unilateral HUMINT collection and analysis capabilities in regions critical to US security interests. The calibre and depth of such reporting has shown a marked improvement.
- o Significant steps also have been taken in the anti-terrorism field to upgrade the security of our diplomatic and military installations and personnel overseas.
- o The Administration has an active program to upgrade counter-terrorist capabilities and assets that would be used to pre-empt a terrorist assault or to carry out rescue and similar high risk missions.
- o Finally, the Vice-Presidential Task Force, chaired by Admiral Holloway, has conducted an in-depth review of U.S. policies, programs and capabilities. Their recommendations will provide further guidance for enhancing our ability to combat international terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, more can and must be done. The extensive work by your Subcommittee has educated all of us on the sustained effort and multiple programs that are needed to cope with the threat of international terrorism.

First, our foreign policy has to address the international sources of terrorism and has to deter, or where appropriate, defeat, the government's sponsorship of terrorism. Second, the U.S. Government must have cohesive management to cope with terrorist incidents and to carry out effective programs of prevention. Third, the American people and Congress must support the multiple policies and programs against terrorism in a sustained fashion.

None of the measures to counter terrorism, whether political, economic, military or paramilitary, is without cost. Imposing economic sanctions for sponsoring terrorism, for example, on a country like Libya, inflicts some sacrifice on our own citizens. Many friendly governments who oppose international terrorism are often reluctant to make the short-term sacrifice in the expectation of appeasing the supporters of terrorism in the longer run. Similarly, a military action can risk not only the lives of our own citizens but sometimes those of bystanders among whom the terrorists may hide. For that reason we must use the most discriminate military means available. For paramilitary and police actions as well, to prevent or respond to terrorism, we must stress the need for precise and detailed information.

Police and paramilitary action, while less spectacular than a military strike, can often be more effective. Those who mastermind the murderous acts of terrorism in airports are unlikely to be found in remote training camps. They are more likely to have embedded themselves, or to be moving clandestinely in a support netowrk in the West. To stop them we need better cooperation between the intelligence agencies of many countries and especially between intelligence and the police forces or counter-terrorist forces of those countries which are targetted by terrorists, or where American citizens are targetted.

Mr. Chairman, this leads to my last and perhaps most important point: without the wise guidance and sustained support by

Congress, we cannot effectively combat international terrorism. It does no good for Congress to react to every dramatic incident of terrorism by hastily calling for a vigorous, courageous U.S. response, but then later to lose all vigor and courage when the Administration asks Congress to support counter-terrorist programs. It does no good to express outrage at terrorist murders of Americans, but then to preserve obsolete pieces of legislation that tie our hands in preventing such murders.

I have in mind here, in particular, the reluctance of Congress to eliminate an obsolete piece of legislation, the prohibition against U.S. training and support for police forces in friendly foreign countries--Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Would any member of Congress argue that the Federal government should deny all assistance to State and local police forces just because there have been some police abuses, 10 or 20 years ago, in one or two counties? Yet, Mr. Chairman, this is the rationale for retaining Section 660.

Note the results that this ill-begotten piece of Vietnam legislation brings us to this day. In June last year, four U.S. Marines were murdered in a cold-blooded terrorist attack in San Salvador. These were Marines protecting our Embassy, as U.S. Marines are protecting every one of our embassies throughout the world. The police in San Salvador lacked communications equipment, patrol cars, and training effectively to curb the danger of terrorist attacks in the Salvadorean capital. We in the Executive Branch asked Congress in early October--inexcusably slow, in my view--to let us reprogram $2.3 million to help the police in El Salvador better to protect our Marines and other U.S. citizens. Even though the guerillas had announced that U.S. personnel in El Salvador would be considered prime targets, it took certain members of Congress from October until February to release the funds to help protect our citizens.

This, Mr. Chairman, concludes my prepared remarks.

RESPONSES OF DR. IKLE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LEAHY

Senator Patrick Leahy: According to a recent State Department report, Libya is engaged in a on-going war of terrorism against Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. What have these countries done to combat Libyan Terrorism?

Respondent: Egypt has worked very hard to thwart Libya's attempts to assassinate Libyan dissidents living in Egypt, capturing the would be terrorists and tricking Qadhafi into taking credit for "assassinations" that did not occur. Tunisia has shared information with us allowing us to link Libya with terrorist events and to take effective action to avoid attempted terrorist acts. Lebanon remains preoccupied with internal turmoil. Saudi Arabia is clearly on record as opposing terrorism and has shared useful information with us, but as a matter of policy does not comment on specific instances.

Senator Patrick Leahy: What is the U.S. doing to encourage these moderate Arab states to denounce Libyan terrorism and join in combatting it?

Respondent: We have clearly informed all of these governments that we strongly desire that the circle of violence in this region be broken. We have discussed this with each country seperately, and repeat the message at every appropriate occasion. We have offered information, intelligence and computer assistance to help control passports.

Senator Patrick Leahy: What if any evidence do we have that the Soviet Union is encouraging Libya to commit acts of terrorism?

Respondent: With the exception of selling the required equipment to carry out certain violent acts, we have no direct evidence that the Soviets are encouraging these acts. We are quite sure that the Soviets aren't discouraging the acts either. They have made statements which support the rationale for certain atrocities which could be viewed as supporting the act.

Senator Patrick Leahy: What has the administration concluded about the economic sanctions against Libya -- have they been effective, and if so, what way?

Respondent: That assessment should be made by the State Department.

Senator Patrick Leahy: Are you aware of any evidence that Libya was either directly or indirectly responsible for the breakdown in recent peace talks between Yasser Arafat, Jordan and and Israel?

Respondent: No.

Senator Patrick Leahy: Do any of our allies currently sell arms to Libya?

Respondent: Yes. But most of them have agreed to slow this activity if not cease it completely. Italy, for example, has recently ceased the sale of lethal equipment. France has slowed the sale of equipment, but continues to perform services for Libyans.

Senator Patrick Leahy: According to a recent article in the Washington Times, Mr. Qadhafi continues to obtain weapons from Brazil. What efforts are we making to persuade the Brazilians to stop selling arms to Libya?

Respondent: Brazilian sales to Libya include small arms, armored vehicles and 46 training aircraft. They have discussed naval equipment but no contract has been signed. We have asked them not to sell to the Libyans and the government of Brazil has indicated it will curtail such sales.

Senator Patrick Leahy: Wilson and Terpil provided paramilitary assistance to Libya in the mid-70s. Prior to the President's embargo, were any other Americans assisting the Libyan army or security forces? Where is Frank Terpil now and what is he doing?

Respondent: We have information about 4 individuals who are allegedly tied to Libyan subversive activities. The following information is based on newspaper accounts:

George Gregory Korkala, a New Jersey man, pleaded guilty in 1984 to running guns for Libya in Uganda.

Douglas M. Schlacter, Sr., was indicted in 1981 along with Wilson and Terpil in connection with a plot to train terrorists for Libya.

Waldo Dubberstein, (now deceased) ex-intelligence officer (CIA and DIA) was accused of selling data to Libya in 1983.

Eugene Tafoya, an ex-Green Beret, was hired by Terpil and Wilson to assassinate an anti-Qadhafi Libyan student in Fort Collins, Colorado in 1980. The Libyan, Faisal Zagallai, was seriously wounded in the attack; Tafoya is serving a jail sentence.

Press reporting puts Frank Terpil "somewhere in the Middle East".

We have no further information on this subject.

Senator Patrick Leahy: How many terrorist incidents occurred in the Middle East and Western Europe in 1985, and how many of these can be attributed to Libya?

Respondent: Our preliminary data indicates that 381 international terrorist incidents occurred in the Middle East in 1985, although including spillover into other areas, principally Western Europe, we count nearly 450 incidents of Middle Eastern origin. We also recorded 210 international terrorist other incidents in Western Europe. Libya was directly involved in 15 international terrorist incidents in 1985, down from 25 the previous year. Most of these incidents involved attacks against Libyan dissidents: exiles were attacked in Athens, Rome, Vienna and two locations in West Germany.

Senator Patrick Leahy: What kind of evidence is there and how convincing is it?

Respondent: The evidence for most attacks is very good. Libyan assailants were apprehended in several cases; in other aborted incidents, the perpetrators confessed to their plans. The evidence linking Libya to the Egyptair hijacking and the Rome and Vienna attacks is far less concrete. In the Egyptair case, the only known involvement is the assertion by Kuwait that the Libyan chargé there wrote and secretly distributed a statement that looked as if it were written by the hijackers. A later statement, taking joint credit in the name of the "Egyptian Revolution" and the "Arab Revolutionary Brigades" (a name used by Abu Nidal) probably also was written by Libyan diplomats. Although the Libyan Ambassador was at the airport in Malta, Maltese officials say he never spoke to the hijackers directly and it appeared that Maltese officials had requested his presence, not that the Libyan was there by a prearranged plan.

In the Rome and Vienna shooting, we have only the assertion by Tunisian officials that two of the passports used by terrorists in the Vienna attack were seized from Tunisian nationals by Libya when Tripoli expelled some 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya last August. The third passport used in that attack, Tunisian officials said, was lost in Libya by its Tunisian owner.

Senator Patrick Leahy: To what extent is Syria also involved, as in the Rome/Vienna incidents?

Respondent: There is no direct evidence linking Syria to the incidents in question. However, Syria continues to support the Abu Nidal faction, which is widely known to engage in international terrorism.

QUESTION: What concrete actions can you point to that demonstrate that the U.S. and our allies are cooperating more effectively against terrorism?

ANSWER: Following the Achille Lauro incident and the Navy's successful interception of the aircraft carrying the hijackers, the United States has provided the Italian government a wealth of diplomatic, intelligence, and legal support. This cooperation, which has been quite positive, is directed toward the successful prosecution of the terrorists responsibile for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro.

The hijacking of the Egypt airliner to Malta and the subsequent murder of innocent American and Israeli passengers has resulted in an improved level of cooperation with the governments affected by this tragedy.

With the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports last December, the world was shocked by the trauma associated with the ruthless murder of innocent civilians, including an eleven year old American girl. The State Department dispatched Deputy Secretary Whitehead to the major European capitals seeking their support in our efforts to combat terrorism. The United States is looking for long term multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements to achieve this end. On a one-to-one basis our endeavors has been successful. There is an improved level of cooperation on the exchange of terrorist-related information to cope with and deter this threat to the free world.

QUESTION: How would you rate the degree of exchange of law enforcement and intelligence information between the U.S. and our allies on this subject--are we getting the cooperation we need?

ANSWER: Currently, the United States is actively involved in the timely exchange of law enforcement and intelligence information on terrorist related matters. Given the transnational nature of terrorism and the ease with which terrorists can move from one country to another, these government to government cooperative efforts are essential to preventing acts of terrorism. Without discussing issues that cannot be discussed in open session, I can assure you that we have achieved improved cooperation with a number of countries on the timely exchange of terrorist informtion.

As indicated in the recently released report of the Vice President's Task Force on terrorism, we are concentrating on establishing a corps of qualified intelligence analysts to enhance our efforts in the timely and accurate production of terrorist-related intelligence. Additionally, an intelligence fusion center will be established to serve as the central focus of terrorist information.

QUESTION: Why won't the European community cooperate formally with third-party allies like the U.S.?

ANSWER: Our efforts to obtain the cooperation of friendly governments on this serious issue have not been limited solely to bi-lateral agreements. We have initiated a number of proposals with multi-national organizations in our effort to combat terrorism. These efforts, including positive exchanges with the EEC, have achieved some success--one example was the United Nations' vote to condemn acts of terrorism last fall. While we are striving to improve multi-lateral cooperation, it must be understood that many of our efforts in this area are not and cannot be conducted openly. We are discretely exploring a number of areas of mutual cooperation to contend with the terrorist threat.

Senator DENTON. The next witness is the Honorable Robert B. Oakley, Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning of the Department of State.

We welcome Ambassador Oakley to this hearing, and appreciate his willingness to testify before us again.

Ambassador Oakley, you may summarize or expand your prepared testimony in any manner you wish. Your complete written testimony will be placed in the record.

Ambassador Oakley.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT B. OAKLEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND EMERGENCY PLANNING, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador OAKLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to not just express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify today on our subject of mutual concern, but I would also like to associate myself with what Dr. Ikle has had to say, and the two other Senators who have been here today, in applauding the work that you have done. Systematic, thorough, determined, and it has helped a great deal to educate the public, other Members of Congress, it has helped the administration, and we hope that it will also help us with foreign governments, because we are not getting enough cooperation.

If we had that much support, as well as the degree of cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches as we have with you and your subcommittee, I think that we would be farther along in developing policies and programs to combat this growing threat of terrorism. We in the executive branch have appreciated very much the work that you have done and the opportunity to work with you in doing it.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me acknowledge the excellence of my staff, especially including Mr. Lisker, and the degree to which the executive branch has absorbed, indeed solicited, input from us. We know we are not omniscient by any means. But we think we have presented information at these hearings which has not been adequately aired through the media to the public, and we regret that.

We also feel that there is no great constituency for really getting into the issue of terrorism. So, some of our colleagues in the Senate and the House have not availed themselves of the opportunity to the degree which the executive department has, and that remains a frustration which I hope will begin to be diminished today.

Proceed, sir.

Ambassador OAKLEY. I'd like to make one other comment on something that Mr. Ikle had to say; that is, it is still possible, despite Senator Leahy's statements about bipartisan support, for action. As you summed it up, we still have frustrations because two or three people, for example, can still block very important legislation.

We had a special program for countering terrorism in Central America, which almost got through Congress before Christmas, but two or three people managed to thwart the will of the overwhelming majority of both Houses and, in effect, derail it.

The terrorists do not have to worry about bureaucratic procedures. They do not have to worry about hearings. They operate swiftly, they operate secretly. As you well know, from the time we start a program, that is, requesting permission from Congress until the time we implement it in the field, is sometimes a question of years, and in the meantime, the terrorists are having a heyday and the countries that are dependent upon us for support are wondering where we are. And, again, I would say I wish we had the same degree of cooperation and support elsewhere that we get here.

I will not go into this very long except to say that the many recent highly visible incidents of terrorism, the ones you have cited, unfortunately, reflect the overall terrorist situation. In 1985, the number of incidents went up from about 600 in 1984 to over 800. The number of casualties jumped, roughy, from 1,279 to 2,223, of which 23 killed and 139 wounded were Americans.

Most of this major jump came from Middle East terrorism, aided and abetted by state support. Over the past 3 years, terrorist incidents in or caused by groups from the Middle East have gone up from 109 in 1983, to 286 in 1984, to 378 in 1985.

It was this pattern of rapidly growing Middle East terrorism, with greatly increased casualties, more frequent targeting of U.S. citizens and interests, and stronger state support which caused the Reagan administration to draw the line for Qadhafi and Libya's direct involvement in terrorism. Libya is not the only state in the Middle East supporting and using terrorism: Syria and Iran remain very much involved. And, as you have pointed out in your very thoughtful statement, there are the Soviets and others supporting those who are supporting terrorism. And, without them, there will be much less terrorism.

But, over the past 6 months, Libya's has been far and away the most active, especially against Americans and Europeans, which is why the President decided, once again, it was time for the United States to exert its leadership and take unilateral action to do something.

During the last half of 1985, for example, we know of Libyan money in the millions of dollars going to Abu Nidal; of Libya providing and buying arms for Abu Nidal; of Abu Nidal and his top lieutenants living in Libya; of training there, and travel documents and other facilitative assistance being provided by Libya for their travel to commit terrorist acts abroad.

By this new terrorist resource, Qadhafi believed his limitless ambitions and wild dreams could become true. The West as well as the Arab world would be so intimidated they would accept him as a major power on the regional and world scene.

This is unacceptable to the United States. So we moved cut off the to remaining United States-Libyan commercial and financial relations, as you pointed out, with some cost to ourselves. And we called upon other countries to join us in sending Qadhafi and other governments this clear signal.

If we did not take the lead, others would not have done so. In the trip that Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I took to Canada and eight European countries, and to NATO, we found people saying, "Why did you not consult us?"

We said, "Because we knew what the answer would be in advance. Therefore, we had to show leadership. We hope that you will do something and follow it. But, if we consulted you in advance and hoped to find unanimous consent, nothing would ever have been done."

And this is a problem which we feel tends to inhibit the Europeans. For example, on economic sanctions, they said, "We could not take economic sanctions unless the European community unanimously agreed to do so." So, as a matter of principle, economic sanctions or participation in what we are trying to do in terms of economic sanctions was ruled out.

The Deputy Secretary very adroitly, I think maybe he should be a politician, shifted his stance. He said:

> Well, in that case, we challenge you to join us in taking peaceful measures to send Qadhafi a message. And we do not believe, as a matter of principle, you can be opposed to peaceful measures, no matter how broad they may be.

So we were able to get over the opposition in principle to even talking about putting the pressure on Libya.

Our overall policy is to obtain this long-term cooperation of the world community against the use of terrorism for political ends. We are improving, as Dr. Ikle has pointed out, the things that we can do at home. We have improved them substantially.

We are providing a lot more training to other governments in addition to the other things he has cited. Our ability to react by improved security, by improved intelligence, is substantially enhanced.

Last year, there were over 100 planned terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens or installations abroad which did not take place, either because of better cooperation from other governments in the intelligence area, or intelligence of our own or better security.

The discovery of the bomb at the Embassy in Lisbon yesterday is just the latest example. There were some 23 additional incidents which were deterred here in the United States. This was good work for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. But the amount of terrorism is still growing. Although there were no international incidents, that is, connected to other countries, within this country last year, there were over 800 abroad. We must do something about it. We cannot afford to just sit back and wait until it gets here. The problem is, indeed, how to get others to work more actively with us since they have their own interests and their own perceptions. And we are exerting a tremendous amount of effort in doing this.

We notice that Members of Congress and groups like the Parliamentary Union, NATO parliamentarians are also joining us, and we appreciate that. We think there is a lot more that needs to be done.

It is our judgment that in most of the European countries, the public opinion is ahead of the government's. They understand they are being hurt. They understand they are being hit. They want more vigorous action.

The tourist business is also being badly hit in countries like Greece and Italy and, of course, others. They recognize that there is a significant cost, and an increasing cost, not just political, but also economic, from this policy of accommodation with terrorism. Therefore, it may be that governments will sooner or later get the message that it is more costly, even in financial terms, for them to allow this thing to go on than it would be to take some financial sacrifice and join us in increasing the pressure on states that support terrorism.

Some governments have begun to move. The Italians, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony, have gone a great length here in a very short period of time, since they are the ones that had the greatest stake involved in trade and other relationships with Libya. They have cut a lot of it off. They stopped delivery on existing arms contracts. They have imposed visa requirements on all of the North African States, which upset them a great deal.

Other countries in Europe have not been so forthcoming, so courageous or so wise. But, in private, at least, the signals reaching the Libyan leadership from Europe and elsewhere are negative.

The Soviet Union has been stridently supportive in its rhetoric. It has continued its very dangerous policy of supplying weaponry, but there are some signs of unease and caution by the Soviets, and they appear no more eager to bail out Libya economically than the Arab governments.

It is our judgment that the economic actions that we are taking and which we are encouraging others to take, combined with the falling oil market, will have an impact in Libya over the long run.

Senator **Denton**. If I may interject, Mr. Ambassador, I was told by a man I respect as an authority that in that respect of withholding our judgment about nonmilitary sanctions against Libya, some of which you have listed, we should think about some of the effects on the Nicaraguan economy which took place when we imposed some restrictions there.

One could then say, "but the Soviet Union will help out Nicaragua," which is true, and one could say, "the Soviet Union will help out Libya," which is true. However, one then gets to the real core interest, which is that the Soviet Union is facing a dollar crunch, because their own military is saying, "We have got to modernize our heavy industrial production capacity, and that is going to take dollars." With the price of oil down, the Soviet Union might well have to conserve or to mitigate or militate against a further escalation of adventures around the world.

So I am persuaded that those economic considerations are not to be taken lightly.

Ambassador **Oakley**. Well, we are not, of course, saying that our only reaction will be an economic reaction. We have a number of things that we can do. And the President has made it clear to all that he is prepared to continue to exercise the responsible leadership role of the United States should Qadhafi not heed the voices of reality; should he again unleash his agents to commit bloody terrorist acts, or should other governments not understand the broader message that we want them to join us in putting pressure on states that support terrorism. The President made it clear that a careful consideration of the use of force has not been ruled out, in accordance with our view that we have a right to defend ourselves and our citizens abroad.

Senator **Denton**. In some cases, force should be used if it can accurately respond to force.

Ambassador **Oakley**. That is right.

Senator **Denton**. However, I certainly agree with the media and with academia when they say we should undertake diplomatic measures short of military force when appropriate and equal to the need. That has been my whole life's philosophy. But, if you put your head in the sand about when military force is really needed, or when the resolution to use it is lacking, or the perception is that that resolution is lacking, then is when you have to shed blood.

Ambassador **Oakley**. I agree. And there are a whole combination of things that need to be done. And, as you have pointed out and as Dr. Ikle said, it is a chess game and one needs to think very far ahead. And we are trying to do that.

The whole antiterrorism effort is a long and complicated one, and it has to be pursued by a combination of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures. There are no magic weapons, particularly since so much of terrorism takes place abroad where our ability to operate is severely constrained.

We have an enemy which is clever, determined, ready to die. They have got support mechanisms in a number of other countries who do not do nearly as good a job as the FBI and our law enforcement agencies here in either uprooting them or putting them under surveillance. And this is an area I know where the Justice Department has some ideas about where we could perhaps have stronger legislative support, building upon the things which this committee has already done.

An example is the bill that Senator Specter has introduced. We managed to work out something that is very acceptable, and we would hope to do the same with S. 1940. The actions that you took in 1984 have been very, very useful; the rewards legislation; the extending of the authority of U.S. law to those who violate international conventions. It has all been very, very helpful.

On that side, Dr. Ikle said we are working very, very hard to improve our unilateral intelligence and also to work with other governments so that we have a more cooperative approach. They have reservations, as you pointed out, both in terms of possible exposure from leaks and things of this sort. Let me say in this respect that when one is considering quiet, covert activity against terrorist organizations and all of a sudden you find that your plans are spread on the front page of the newspaper, it certainly does not encourage those whom you are trying to get to help you to continue to work with you. As a matter of fact, they tend to draw away.

Senator DENTON. Could you undertake to explain, in terms of international law and other mitigating circumstances, the advantages of covert aid over overt aid, when the public asks, " Why not make it overt? Why all this coverup?"

Ambassador OAKLEY. They are different problems, but when you are dealing with terrorists who operate in secret, to me, it is like getting ready for the Super Bowl and sending the other team your play book.

Senator DENTON. You are playing poker with your hand open.

Ambassador OAKLEY. That is right, because they know what you are going to do, and they react accordingly. And we have already had this problem, and we find that not only has it caused consternation to other governments that you are trying to get to assist you, but it inhibits very severely the ability to deal with the terrorists because they know what you are up to, and they choose not to go that way; they go a different way.

Senator DENTON. Are there not other considerations? For instance, let us consider the case of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is already in Afghanistan, and some have analogized the Soviet involvement there to ours in Vietnam. Be that as it may, the Soviets have their hands full in Afghanistan trying to subjugate some very ideologically strong people who are willing to subsist off the terrain. I would think there would be good reasons not to make overt everything we might do to help the Afghans, both in terms of refugee assistance and other aid. Is that not a consideration?

Ambassador OAKLEY. Indeed, it is. You have several considerations. One is that governments can work with you if they are doing it privately. And they cannot work with you if they are doing it publicly. Look at Pakistan. The Soviet Union is quite close; the United States is very far. What assurances do they have that if we begin to work in a very overt way and the Soviets respond that we are going to come to their help. This is a consideration.

Senator **Denton**. Well, I implore the media to mention Ambassador Oakley's statements in that regard because I have colleagues who state categorically that they will never go for any more covert aid, because they feel that it just "ain't" the U.S. way. We do things openly. That is simplicity that is counterproductive.

Ambassador **Oakley**. That is right. It sounds like the politician who says, "I don't care what my constituents think, I will tell them what I think even if it costs me the election," because you are not going to get cooperation or support that way. It is just a fact.

In any event, Qadhafi is just part of the problem. We are not losing sight of that.

The Secretary of State, 2 years ago, said one had to develop a national consensus. With the assistance of people like yourself, we think we have that consensus. We now have to put it to work and we have to develop an international consensus.

The thorough review of security chaired by Admiral Inman, and comparable work being done in the Pentagon, has brought us to a much better position there. The implementation of those recommendations is underway.

The Vice President's task force, of which you have spoken, has finished its work. The unclassified report will be out within a week. There are a number of recommendations, which are being implemented, and bring us greater cohesion, greater solidarity within the administration.

Every week there is a meeting between the senior officials directly responsible for counterterrorism of the FBI, the Defense Department, CIA, the State Department, and the NSC. We meet every week because it does require a combination of all agencies working together, both domestic and foreign, if we are going to get the job done.

Senator **Denton**. Mr. Ambassador, if I may interject. You have heard Dr. Ikle's emphasis on the need not to make a commitment of American military personnel as a quick response to satisfy a popular perception of the need to do so, without also measuring the consequences of Congress not supporting such a commitment down the line.

Ambassador **Oakley**. Indeed.

Senator **Denton**. That is what happened in Vietnam. That is what has happened in almost every case since then. That is why the media and academe are almost more important in forming the consensus upon which a leadership is based than are people like me.

Ambassador **Oakley**. Well, the President and his principal lieutenants, I think, have been very cautious, very wise, very intelligent in the way in which they have looked at the use of force in all of these events, despite the pressures of the media and the temptation to do something that will show the United States is big and tough. If it is going to be counterproductive, and there are a number of ways in which it could be, it is better not to act, particularly if you act on the spur of the moment or out of just some sort of emotion.

Senator **Denton**. Television becomes a great part of that. To the media, what is interesting is the spectacle of the moment, the incident-by-incident thing. I do not blame them for that. I just say that I would hope to encourage a more in-depth, continuing approach to the elements of the problem, rather than merely focusing on each incident, pressuring for a response to that incident, and then backing away from such a response when it gets down to the nitty gritty because we have not looked three chess moves ahead.

Ambassador **Oakley**. Right. We agree completely, sir.

Senator **Denton**. Excuse me, sir.

Ambassador **Oakley**. I have nothing more. Any questions that you may have.

Senator **Denton**. Yes; you mentioned in your written testimony that,

> It is our guess that if spot oil prices stay under $20 per barrel by the end of this year Libya's annual revenues will be in the range of 6–7 billion dollars whereas five years ago they exceeded $20 billion, and two years ago they were over 10 billion dollars.

Is that still your guess?

Ambassador **Oakley**. It is. And it is our expectation that this is going to begin to bite. That, coupled with the freeze of Libyan assets in this country has already, we think, put the Libyans in a situation where they do not have as much money to waste in supporting terrorism abroad and where they have to pay more attention to their own people. And this is the sort of message we are trying to get through to our European friends. Whether we succeed or not, to the degree which we hope, time will tell. But we are going to be very, very persistent in this campaign. It is going to be a very long campaign. It is not a one-shot deal on the part of the administration.

We have been worried about Libya for a long, long time. It is too bad that Senator Leahy is not with us still. He could attest to that.

There are things that we need to do, and we are going to move to do them as best we can, and get as much support as we can, but this is going to be a very long-term effort to get the message through very clearly to Qadhafi and to get it through to other governments that the time has come to put a stop to state support for terrorism.

Senator **Denton**. There is a larger context in which that should be addressed, in my view. International affairs has been my lifetime study. I have learned something during that time, and I did live in a nation for almost 8 years in which I saw terrorism being used to rule and subjugate its people. I also know that in the case of the Soviet Union, with the KGB and the commissars ruling through the army and among the people, they still have to consider what the people will take in terms of austerity and the like. The government in Vietnam has pressed its people close to their limit. The Libyan leader and government are liable to press the people close to the limit in Libya, and the Soviet Union is facing that kind of crunch.

After Congress promised the President the continuation of his buildup in our armed services—which are now taking up one-half as much of the annual budget as social programs are, whereas in President Kennedy's time it was the reverse, we were spending twice as much on defense as on social programs—if we let the Soviets off the hook by decreasing our defense, foreign operations, and intelligence-related expenditures by 18 percent or more, as is predicted for 1987, instead of giving the President a 3-percent increase, as Congress promised him before Gramm-Rudman came along, I say that that would be the height of lunacy in economic terms as well as in terms of defense strategy, national security, and survival.

Ambassador OAKLEY. Well, I particularly want to tell you how impressive I think your own statement was in terms of seeing these linkages between terrorism, political action, subversion, guerrilla warfare, propaganda. It is all part of one big long-term battle, and we have to look at it in that way, because the enemy does.

Senator DENTON. I deeply appreciate your remarks.

I do have some more questions.

We have heard testimony today regarding the Soviet Union's support for terrorism in various nation-states which sponsor or engage in terrorist attacks. This is the key question regarding the chess game. In the case of Libya, how much military hardware is it receiving more or less gratis from Moscow? How much is it buying with its oil money? To what degree is Qadhafi and the Libyan Government dependent on the Soviet Union, and to what degree is Libya able to operate independently by its own financial means?

Ambassador OAKLEY. The Soviets have provided very substantial amounts of military hardware to Libya, much more than they will ever need. And they know that some of this is destined for export. We guess the value to be in excess of $15 billion worth of weaponry since Qadhafi assumed power.

The Soviets are pressed for hard currency payments, but most of the payment has been made with oil and barter exchange. In some cases, the Soviets have allowed a considerable debt to run up, expecting Libya sooner or later will pay off.

The drop in the price of oil is not going to help them very much, because they have been, strangely enough, oil exporters. So this will increase the pressure.

To what degree are they dependent upon the Russians?

Senator DENTON. To what degree would the Soviets support Libya if we undertook any particular action against Libya?

Ambassador OAKLEY. That is always difficult to judge accurately. Different people will have different opinions. We think that they will be careful.

You can take the example of Syria in a sense, or of Egypt previously, where they refrained from direct confrontation with the United States or Israel, even though there were periods of high tension. On the other hand, they were willing to supply arms and, in the case of Syria in 1982, they put in a lot of Soviet advisors. There was a lot of new hardware, which has made Syria more potent. Also, I would suspect that they consider President Assad to be a much more reliable, steady asset than someone like Qadhafi. I suspect, although they would never say it publicly, their opinion of him is somewhat similar to President Reagan's. And they do not like that. On the other hand, they see certain advantages in Libya. They are willing to go a certain distance. How far they would go, I do not know. The more they put in there, the more dangerous it becomes and they know very well our views of what happens when they put themselves in a situation like that.

One thing is very clear, they could stop Qadhafi in terms of most of his support for subversive actions, terrorist actions, military actions, such as in Chad, if they wished, because they control the military hardware. They obviously do not. I do not believe they tell him what to do in each instance.

There has been a similar pattern with the PLO, other governments around the world, whether it be in South America, the Far East. They let them have a certain margin of maneuver as long as they do not get too far out of line, even though they do some things which are uncomfortable. Because they recognize that if they try to impose too much authority, it could be counterproductive. But they could certainly stop it, if they wished to stop it. They see this as somehow helping them by creating instability in areas of the world which are not theirs, so they can perhaps extend their control over those areas of the world, which is a reason, in addition, somehow it has to be brought to an end.

Senator DENTON. There is a tremendous parallel between what you just discussed regarding the Soviet Union and Libya, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Ambassador OAKLEY. Absolutely.

Senator DENTON. We have had testimony from defectors who held high positions in Cuban intelligence to the effect that Castro enjoys a free of reign from the Soviet Union if he stays within the following parameters:

Whatever he undertakes in Latin America for his own pleasure, gain, or whatever, has to have as its ultimate objective the destabilization of the United States.

That testimony has been repeated and corroborated over and over again. For our people not to see the unity of the terror network around the world is not their fault. But we have articulated this network over and over, and the message is not getting out to them.

The news media are as essential and as healthy to our Government and way of life as the Senate or the Congress. I just hope we can work not only bipartisanly, and with cooperation between the administration and the Congress, but I also wish we could get the kind of media-governmental unity on major issues that existed when President Kennedy said to Khruschev, "Get those missiles out of Cuba."

That was brinksmanship of the ultimate degree. At that time, I happened to be on the carrier from which I was shot down in Vietnam, and I had a target in Cuba, planning one day to hit it with nuclear weapons and the next day changing to hit it by conventional means. When that was portrayed by our press, both electronic and print, it was not portrayed in a way critical of our Government, but showed the missile sites opening out in the Midwest. The media showed the B-52's taking off fully loaded with nuclear weapons. And nobody here blinked. But Khruschev blinked, and out came the Cuban missiles. We won on the issue, but it has been a long time since we have had that kind of mutual trust and unity between the news media and the Government. I pray to God that we get it back soon, because I think it is key to defeating terrorism and preserving our way of life.

To the extent that the ability of Libya and other radical countries to obtain Soviet arms is dependent upon their ability to pay for them, what sort of economic sanctions would be most effective in stemming the supply of arms from the Soviet Union to those countries?

Ambassador OAKLEY. We do not see any particular economic sanctions that would be effective against the Soviets. This is something we tried, as you well know, on several occasions without any notable success in terms of getting others to join us in taking effective economic action. The Soviet Union is too big and others are too inhibited.

Libya is quite a different story. They have one export, oil; and it is a glut on the world market. Therefore, those who say, as a matter of principle, that economic sanctions are not effective, are shutting their eyes to the Libyan situation. The Soviet Union is quite a different problem, I do not see, frankly, anything effective that we can do to stop them from providing arms.

Senator DENTON. Well, I have a generic question: Certainly the Soviets are dependent upon our grain, and our farmers resent the fact that, in response to some diplomatic crimes or international crimes on the part of the Soviets, we chose one commodity, grain, with which to enforce a boycott, thereby placing the load on the farmers, alone. Why could we not have extended the boycotts to other commodities or technologies? Are you sure that your statement is entirely correct? Could we not put the squeeze on the Soviet Union short of making them so desperate they would have to go to war, as we did Japan in 1941? Is there nothing in terms of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union to dissuade them?

Ambassador OAKLEY. I am not an expert on this, Senator Denton, but we tried with respect to the Soviet pipeline. We tried with respect to Afghanistan. We tried on any number of occasions and it just has not proven effective. There is always someone else who is ready to step in.

Senator DENTON. They supply what we cut off.

Ambassador OAKLEY. That is right.

Senator DENTON. Suppose we had NATO-wide cooperation?

Ambassador OAKLEY. That would be quite different, but we certainly have not been able to get it. And that was the reason I said I do not see at the moment anything that is effective that we could do.

Senator DENTON. I just make the suggestion.

Ambassador OAKLEY. Not that we should not ourselves do what we can, but I do not think it is going to have the effect unless we get a lot more support than we have been able to get.

Senator DENTON. That is a key point, Mr. Ambassador.

We have been bewailing and protesting for years what we perceive as NATO members' lack of responsibility in devoting a certain percentage of their gross national product to our common defense. They perceive the likelihood that this body is ready to cut 18 percent in 1987, as Gramm-Rudman is predicted to require. That is the fact that, painfully, I know. If our European allies are looking at that possibility here, would they not become a little more interested in unity with respect to economic sanctions?

Ambassador **Oakley**. They should.

Senator **Denton**. There is a vote that was expected at noon which has just been called and, after asking you this question, I will have to go vote. We will take a recess and then resume about 8 minutes later.

Ambassador Oakley, the Johannesburg Sunday Times reported in its January 5, 1986, edition that the PLO has embarked on the acquisition of East African duty-free shops. Intelligence sources have confirmed separately that the PLO has invested US $500,000 in the duty-free shop in the Dar es Salaam Airport in Tanzania. As you know, these shops are normally located airside, and the goods are supplied by trucks which are not usually searched. By the time passengers can buy duty-free items, they have already passed through security screenings and they are given their purchases in sealed bags which are not searched before embarkation.

Without wanting to ascribe to the PLO or to Arafat any ultimate homogeneous evil, nonetheless, I have to ask how, in your judgment, will airport security be affected by these developments?

Ambassador **Oakley**. It could be, and something we will take very, very seriously. We have not actually confirmed the PLO running such a shop, but they might be running such a shop. There are any number of concessionaires and, as you say, it could be a very clever device to do some things that would be very dangerous. We will just continue the very tight security inspections that we are giving airports overseas, the FAA and the other agencies of the U.S. Government are looking very carefully at all airports overseas. If we find there are troubles, we issue an advisory, quietly. And, if they do not comply within 90 days, we have to take more serious action. And we will continue to do that.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Rather than recess, I will ask Mr. Lisker, as is consistent with committee rules, if he will continue questioning you. I will ask Mr. Lisker to pause before the opening statement by Dr. Alexander. I would like to be here for that.

[The chairman leaves the hearing room.]

Mr. **Lisker**. Ambassador Oakley, to what degree, if any, did the U.S. allies cooperate with us in the imposition of sanctions against Libya?

Ambassador **Oakley**. Well, as I stated in my written testimony, we had different degrees of cooperation from different countries. Some of them, such as the United Kingdom, said:

> We have already taken a lot of action against Libya. On the other hand, there is an awful lot of British trade and commerce with Libya, despite the fact they closed down Libya's People's Bureau.

The Canadians have imposed measures very similar to ours. They have cut off almost all trade. There are a few Canadians still working in Libya, but they have promised to do what they could to bring them home slowly, but they are not going to allow any Canadian companies to undercut what the United States is doing. They promised, although it is costly to them, not to sell sophisticated oil field equipment, which they produce just as we do, in order to take the place. They will not do that.

The Italians are cutting back a great deal of what they have been doing with Libyans. They have canceled some contracts. They are reviewing other big contracts.

By and large, most of the governments said they would try not to replace the Americans. We have not had a great deal of serious economic action taken by other governments so far. But we are at the beginning of a process, they have all told us they are going to see what more they can do. We intend to go back to them and press them on very specific things: Air travel to and from Libya; the presence of Libyan People's Bureaus; the allowing of Libyans to run around freely in the host's country. It was becoming increasingly dangerous. Most of them are aware of that.

Libyan oil; we do not see any reasons why countries should continue, as a matter of principle, to buy Libyan oil when there is so much other oil available at a similar price.

There are a couple of countries that have real problems.

The Turks have allowed themselves to get in a difficult situation in which Libyans owe Turkish contractors about $3 billion, of which $1 billion is guaranteed for the Turkish Central Bank. And the Turks explained to us that they have no choice but to import Libyan oil because they are allowed to sell the oil and use the proceeds to pay off the debts owed to Turkish citizens. We said that given the importance of Turkey to the United States, and the economic problems they are already having, and the fairly small amount of oil, that everyone can understand.

When it comes to the Federal Republic of Germany, which is buying a lot of Libyan oil, and which certainly is not economically dependent in any way, shape, or form upon Libya, and is not exporting anything to Libya, that is a different case. We have talked to them about that.

This is the sort of thing we are going to do country by country, looking at each one specifically in terms of their own situation.

Mr. LISKER. What is happening to those United States persons who married Libyans when they leave Libya? Are they permitted to bring their spouses with them? Are they eligible for permanent residence status in the United States?

Ambassador OAKLEY. They probably could, if they applied. But they have been granted an exemption. If they wish to stay in Libya, they can, for humanitarian purposes. We estimate there may be 100 to 150 people in that category. And the administration has granted them an exemption from the assessed fee of no longer doing business or staying in Libya.

Mr. LISKER. In your opinion, Ambassador Oakley, which of the terrorist groups pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests both abroad and here in the United States, through the importation of their violence, in the foreseeable future?

Ambassador OAKLEY. Well, I would cite the Shia groups, supported by Iran, and there are several different ones operating in the Middle East; the very radical Palestinian groups, such as Abu Nidal and some of the others, such as the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Liberation Force of Abu Abbas; other

Palestinian splinter groups. Some groups, such as the PLF that are affiliated with the PLO, are a threat.

Libya itself, Syria, Iran to some degree pose threats to their own citizens, using their own agents. And here in this country we have about 10,000 Libyans and hundreds of thousands of Iranians. I do not know how many Syrians, maybe 100,000 of one sort or another. But this is always a potential threat.

Some Sikhs, for example, as you know, suddenly turned out to be a threat even though they had been living in this country as good citizens for decades. Suddenly, they got aroused and a small group within that community decided to conduct terrorist activities. Fortunately, the FBI managed to discover this before it was too late and take the necessary action. There is always this potential. And that is something we are worried about here in this country.

Abroad, the European terrorist groups, the Red Army factions, the Communist combattant cells in Belgium have just been struck a serious blow. That is not to say they cannot come back, but for the moment they seem to be pretty much out of operation.

Action Direct in France, the so-called FP 25 in Lisbon that has attacked our Embassy on several occasions; the Basque organization, the IRA, which is a threat to Americans and others because they are willing to blow up hotels and beach resorts in England. Americans could very well be there.

All of these groups pose a threat. But the most serious threat at the moment are the Middle East terrorist groups, operating both in the Middle East, where Americans can be targets, and up into Europe, where they certainly are targets.

Mr. **Lisker**. Recently, one of the television networks aired a very controversial fictional dramatization of a terrorist incident which never occurred. I watched that particular dramatization, and my overall impression was, although this has been denied by the network, that it was, basically, a blood libel against Arab-Americans which ran throughout that particular program. The network tried to deal with it intelligently, but the cat was already out of the bag and it was pretty hard to put it back in.

You testified that a great many Iranians, Libyans, and other Muslims live in the United States in enormous numbers. In terms of the threat, if there is a threat, can you state quantitatively what we are really talking about? I think we are getting into a mentality that we had in World War II regarding Japanese-Americans, with people looking at every Arab as if he is a potential terrorist. I think this really is not in keeping with our own traditions, and I wonder if there is not something that could be done to try to put this into some kind of perspective?

Ambassador **Oakley**. I think it should be put into perspective. The fact is, there have not been actual terrorist attacks with overseas connections and I and others, the FBI, keep saying we do not have at the moment a great deal of international terrorist activity in the United States. There were two potential incidents last year, and one was related to the Sikhs and one was related to the Libyans, where a group of Libyan agents were detected and detained before they could carry out some planned assassinations. Those were the two incidents which took place in the United States last year. And, given the very large foreign population that we have of one sort or another, I think it is great testimony to this country as well as to those people that we have not had more.

As you say, this seems to be a popular image that anyone who did not come over on the Mayflower is somehow a terrorist, and I think that is just untrue. We saw a few people in the Sikhs community last year, and there was a very strong negative reaction against this from the other Sikhs who said, "Wait a minute, we consider ourselves to be good Americans, and we do not want this. You are upsetting our life as well as our relationships with our neighbors."

I think you are absolutely right.

Mr. LISKER. One piece of legislation that Senator Denton has introduced is S. 1941, the International Terrorism Deterrence Act, which provides for sanctions against any country which provides support for the perpetrators of acts of international terrorism.

Do you believe that this legislation can be effective to combat international terrorism? Although we will have other legislative hearings on that specific bill, I ask the question in order to get your views on this particular piece of legislation at this time, which I think would be useful as a predicate for the future hearings.

Ambassador OAKLEY. Well, frankly, we are still looking at the legislation. But let me say that those countries who have been discussed here and identified as supporting international terrorism, either directly or indirectly, and that would include the Soviet Union, already are under sufficient restrictions from different legislation, either the Export Administration Act or something else. We do not provide foreign aid; we do not provide ex-im loans, many of the measures that are contemplated in S. 1941 already are being applied to the governments who would be affected, I think, under other pieces of legislation. There are perhaps some things in S. 1941 that go farther than that, such as import restrictions. And we need to look at that very carefully. There may be a good reason, in any event, to put everything into one package so that it is more orderly and more cohesive.

One has to look upon the other problem though of tying the administration's hands, which is something I know Senator Denton does not like to do in other areas. So we need to look at this very carefully as we go along. In general, most of the sanctions, if you will, are already being applied. We then get back to the question of the degree to which we can get other governments to join us, and that is the measure of efficacy of economic sanctions generally as well as in specific cases.

Mr. LISKER. Yes, but the bill also contains the element of setting up a fund with the fees that would be added on to the imports of those countries which support terrorism, and the bill would be in the nature of a mandatory injunction for the President to do that.

On behalf of Senator Denton and the committee and subcommittee, I certainly thank you for your testimony today. I know that if the Senator were here he would certainly do that, and I am sure we will be hearing from you in the future. I do not think this problem will be solved at the conclusion of today's hearing. But I want to thank you for the cooperation of your staff. Tom Bleha, of course, is the State Department's congressional liaison person that we normally deal with, and he has always been helpful. Also, Mike Kraft and Susan McCormick of your staff have been very helpful with our subcommittee staff, and we appreciate that.

Thank you.

[Ambassador Oakley's submissions for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. OAKLEY

Acting Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members:

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on our topic of mutual concern; international terrorism.

It seems that almost every day some new terrorist horror jumps at us from the screens of our televisions, the front pages of our newspapers and the covers of our magazines.

-- In Paris earlier this month, bombs were placed in popular shops and tourist centers, even in the Eiffel Tower. Middle East terrorists claimed responsibility for the bombs and the casualties. In Rome and Vienna on December 27, Abu Nidal's group of terrorists massacred 18 innocent people waiting at El Al and TWA ticket lines -- including 5 Americans -- and over 80 people were injured. Four terrorists are dead; three are being questioned.

-- A month earlier, the Abu Nidal group, again supported by Libya, hijacked an Egyptian airliner and began shooting passengers one by one, starting with all the Israeli and American citizens. By the end of the incident, 60 people including an American had died and 20 more were wounded; one terrorist survived and is being tried by Maltese officials.

-- In October, terrorists acting under orders from Abu Abbas hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, and murdered an elderly crippled American, Leon Klinghoffer. The four perpetrators were captured by the US and await trial in Italy. Abu Abbas is at large with a $250,000 reward out for his arrest and punishment.

-- Last June, there was the dramatic hijacking of TWA 847 in Athens, and the tragic killing of American sailor, Robert Stethem when the aircraft was on the ground in Beirut. Also in Lebanon, there is the prolonged agony of the Americans held captive there. A representative of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Mr. Terry Waite, has been shuttling to Beirut, meeting with the captors, but they remain hostages of the Iranian-influenced Hizballah organization.

Unfortunately, these highly visible incidents reflect the overall terrorist situation in 1985, a year when the total number of incidents went up from 600 to 800, and the number of casualties from 1279 to 2223, of which 23 killed and 139 wounded were American. Most of this major jump came from Middle East terrorism, aided and abetted by state support. Over the past three years, terrorist incidents in or caused by groups from the Middle East have gone up from 109 to 286 to 378 in 1985.

It was this pattern of rapidly growing Middle East terrorism, with greatly increased casualties, more frequent targetting of US citizens and interests, and stronger state support which caused the Reagan Administration to draw the line for Qadhafi and Libya's direct involvement in terrorism. Libya is not the only state in the Middle East supporting and using terrorism: Syria and Iran remain very much involved. But over the past six months Libya has become by far the most active especially against American and European travellers. If it can not be stopped, others can be expected to follow its lead.

Qadhafi's general support for terrorism is not new. He long has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. He has given support to a variety of groups around the world, from the IRA in northern Ireland to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. A more detailed description of Libya's activities is in State Department Special Report 138, January 1986, which I request be made part of the record of this hearing.

In summary, the most significant Palestinian groups Libya has backed are Abu Nidal, the Popular-Front for the Liberation of Palestine-general Command, the PFLP, and Fatah dissidents. Abu Nidal's beneficiaries in Europe include-- in addition to the IRA-- the FP-25 in Portugal, and anti-Turkish Armenian terrorist groups. Asian groups, aside from those in the Philippines, include Pakistan's All-Zulfiqar group, the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia, and Muslim insurgents in Thailand. In Central and South America, Qadhafi has provided training and funding to a variety of groups, including Colombia's M-19, Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and Manuel Rodrigues Patriotic Front, and insurgent groups in Guatemala and El Salvador. More Libyans arrived just last week in Nicaragua, via Cuba, to assist the regime there and other terrorist/revolutionary groups such as those just mentioned.

Closer to home, he has tried to undermine the governments in neighboring Egypt, Tunisia, the Sudan and invaded Chad. In Egypt, Abu Nidal operatives were caught last year trying to blow up the US Embassy in Cairo. Indeed, Qadhafi's own terrorist activities have been more wishful thinking and big talk, or largely aimed at Libyan dissidents, until he joined forces with Abu Nidal toward the middle of last year. Until that time, the group in recent years had been the beneficiary of almost exclusive Syrian support. The pattern of attack during that period focused upon mainline PLO and Jordanian officials and Jordanian Air Line offices.

There is still a connection with Syria, but for the major activities since mid-1985--Rome Vienna and Malta--the primary and more significant support has been Libyan. Some of the terrorists involved in the Rome and Vienna attacks may have been "trained" in the Bekka Valley of Lebanon controlled by Syria. But it doesn't take much training to fire sub-machine guns and throw hand grenades against civilian passengers in a crowded airliner terminal. Even in this, Abu Nidal shows his cynicism and cruelty. His group recruits young men, some of them still teenagers, for suicide attacks. They are the cannon fodder while Abu Nidal and his lieutenants remain safely in the shadows.

During the last half of 1985, we know of Libyan money in the millions of dollars going to Abu Nidal, of Libya providing and buying arms for Abu Nidal, of Abu Nidal and his top lieutenants living in Libya, of his killers being trained there and travel documents and other facilitative assistance being provided by Libya for their travel to commit terrorist attacks abroad. Some of this evidence, such as the use of confiscated Tunisian passports by terrorists in the December 27 attack, is in the public domain. Some of it is highly classified intelligence, and to reveal it would help the terrorists beat our defenses. But there is no question about the Libyan Abu Nidal connection or what Qadhafi hoped to accomplish. By this new terrorist resource, the fanatical Libyan leader believed his limitless ambitions and wild dreams could become true, that the West as well as the Arab world would be so intimidated they would accept him as a major power on the regional and world scene.

That is the basic reason for the strong reaction by the Reagan Administration to the massacres at Rome and Vienna. Against the background of the unmistakable imprint of Colonel Qadhafi and the Abu Nidal organization on a dozen attacks around the rim of the Mediterranean in the last half of 1985, and the previous unwillingness of most of those governments to join in collective measures to stop the threat, the airport attacks were seen as a clear call for action and leadership by the United States.

After careful deliberation, the President decided to take unilateral action against Libyan support for terrorism. He moved to terminate the remaining US-Libyan commercial and financial relations, called upon other countries to join us in sending Qadhafi and other governments the signal. The decision required still further economic sacrifices for the United States which has already given up a multibillion dollar annual business with Libya to make clear our stand against terrorism,`but if we had not taken the lead no one else would have done so. Moreover, the moral issue was such that any Administration in this country would be bound to act.

There are a number of reasons why other governments in Europe and elsewhere have been reluctant to act, both in earlier years when we previously tried to exert pressure on Qadhafi to end his support for terrorism, and in the immediate wake of the Rome and Vienna airport attacks. These reasons include: concern for the safety of their citizens in Libya or elsewhere if they were to join the US in strong action; skepticism over the effectiveness of economic sanctions; and other foreign policy interests.

In the Middle East the initial reaction of the Islamic countries to President Reagan's decision to oppose Libyan terrorism shows just how dangerous the situation has become. A number of moderate governments, among them those who have been directly threatened by Libyan subversion and terrorism, consented to a resolution by the Organization of Islamic Countries supporting that country and opposing the United States. This was more than an expression of solidarity toward a fellow Islamic country which the media had depicted as about to be attacked militarily by the United States, although such a sentiment has strong popular appeal. It also reflected the fear of a number of governments at the potential political power exercised upon parts of their population by Qadhafi's brand of militant political ultranationalism -- particularly at a time when moderate Arab regimes are also worried by the potent religious-military-political power of Iran, and the continued agitation of the Palestinian people, present in substantial numbers in many Middle East countries.

Our friends were reassured when the President's decisions were explained directly to them, that we were seeking collective application over time of peaceful means rather than military action or immediate across-the-board sanctions. They also understood better our actions when they had an opportunity to study the detailed intelligence on Libyan activities which provided, identifying specific evidence and demonstrating the real seriousness of the threat.

Our overall policy is to seek to obtain long-term cooperation of the world community against the use of terrorism for political ends, no matter how worthy one may consider those ends. We have also concluded that while increased security, an essentially defensive action, is important and must be energetically pursued, there is also a need for more offensive, active measures if the spread of terrorism is to be stopped.

Although it is of course to soon to tell what the ultimate effect will be on Libya, there is no question in my mind but that the other governments in Europe and elsewhere share a growing recognition of the extreme gravity of the threat and the need to take action. Although some of them were reluctant to announce what they had done, there was a positive response, in public or private, by almost all the governments which Deputy Secretary Whitehead and I visited last month. Following the visit, the EC Foreign Ministers discussed terrorism at length and issued a positive statement. They announced a decision not to export arms or other military equipment to countries which support terrorism, a pledge not to undercut steps other states have taken to deal with terrorism, and the formation of a permanent working group to make future recommendations.

Some individual governments have gone further. For example, Italy has imposed a visa requirement for all visitors from North Africa, in view of the growing number of terrorist incidents involving falsified North Africans travel documents. Italy also has stopped all arms supply -- including deliveries on existing contracts -- despite the financial losses. Italy also is reviewing its overall relationship with Libya, and has intensified still further the very good work being done by its police and magistrates to fight domestic terrorism. Canada had already reduced the level of diplomatic ties with Libya, as had the UK. Canada also further agreed to stop shipping sophisticated oilfield equipment to Libya, despite the loss of sales and to discourage any Canadian business activity there. All governments with which we spoke said they would consider additional measures, and we intend to continue our consultations with them on how best to confront the common threat posed by Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

Those who say that this type of non-military action will not work against Libya should suspend their judgment until our efforts have had time to be tested, for it is a long-term effort rather than a one-shot affair. The private signals reaching the Libyan leadership from Europe and elsewhere are mostly negative, even if Qadhafi had had an initial upsurge in public support. Despite their rhetoric, the other Arab Governments do not appear willing to bail out Libya's badly faltering economy, nor taken any substantive economic or political actions against the United States.

The Soviet Union has been stridently supportive in its rhetoric and has continued its very dangerous policy of supplying weaponry to a regime known for its erratic, reckless behavior. (We all recall the strong evidence that Soviet-supplied mines were used by Libyan ships in the Red Sea in 1984. Soviet supplied aircraft additionally were used in bombings in the Sudan in 1984 and this week in Chad.) Yet there are also signs of unease and caution by the Soviets; and they appear no more eager to bail out Libya economically than the Arab Governments. [It is our guess that if spot oil prices stay under $20 per barrel by the end of this year Libya's annual revenues will be in the range of 6-7 billion dollars whereas five years ago they exceeded $20 billion dollars, and two years ago they were over 10 billion dollars.]

Will the Libyan people accept this kind of austerity on behalf of such a widely detested figure as Qadhafi? Will Qadhafi continue to finance terrorism with such largesse if his own people badly need food and other necessities which the mismanaged economy can not produce?

There are signs that these efforts by the US and the Europeans are getting to Qadhafi. This is indicated by his frantic efforts to reach out to both the international media and several European and Middle East governments to try to pursuade people that he isn't really such a bad guy at the same time he strikes militaristic poses and threatens the US Sixth Fleet. I don't think anyone is really being fooled -- unless they want to be.

Should Qadhafi not heed the voices of reality, and again unleash his agents to commit terrorist acts, or should other governments not understand the broader message warning against state support of terrorism, President Reagan has made it clear to all that he is prepared to continue exercising the responsible leadership role of the United States. Consideration of the careful use of force in such circumstances has not been ruled out in accordance with our right of self defense.

The anti-terrorism effort is a long and complicated one, to be pursued by a combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures. However, there are no magic weapons, most terrorism takes abroad where our power is fettered, the enemy is determined and clever and ready to die. Qadhafi is only a part of the problem, and we are not losing sight of that. As Secretary Shultz and others have noted, terrorism is a form of a low intensity warfare. Nevertheless, we have achieved the national consensus called for two years ago by Secretary Shultz, we have completed a thorough review of security chaired by Admiral Bobby Inman and are implementing the recommendations, The Vice President's Task Force on more active counterterrorist measures has finished its work and implementation is beginning, and other governments seem to be awakening. I would like to assure you that with your support and continued help, we will continue to be in this effort for the duration.

We welcome the support and interest of this committee and its members, for the effort to counterterrorism can only succeed if it is a partnership. Previous legislation passed by this committee is being used vigorously, such as the rewards legislation. We support new legislation which is being considered to extend and strengthen the protection afforded US citizens abroad from terrorist acts. We would like to work with you on other measures -- including passage of the revised US-UK extradition treaty which will send a strong signal to other governments in the important area of extraditing terrorists rather than allowing them to escape proper punishment.

If you have any questions, I will be glad to address them.

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Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression

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Character of Libyan Policy

Mu'ammar Qadhafi seized power in a military coup in 1969. Since then, he has forcibly sought to remake Libyan society according to his own revolutionary precepts. Qadhafi's ambitions are not confined within Libya's borders, however. He fancies himself a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder Third World politics to his taste. His vision provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes and for undermining moderate governments by creating or supporting subversive groups and abetting terrorists. Qadhafi's aggressive policies increasingly have focused on undermining U.S. and other Western interests in the Third World, as he sees these as the main barrier to his radical and expansionist goals. Qadhafi's use of political, economic, and military resources in support of anti-Western activities worldwide may be surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea or Cuba. He is particularly hostile to Israel and the United States. His tactics include a mixture of threats and material support for terrorism, offers of cooperation, economic incentives and intimidation, and outright military aggression.

Libyan Involvement in Terrorism

Qadhafi has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy and supports radical groups that use terrorist tactics. Tripoli operates numerous training sites for foreign dissident groups that provide instruction in the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques. It also provides terrorist training outside Libya and abuses diplomatic privilege by storing arms and explosives at its diplomatic establishments, as demonstrated by the shootout at its embassy in London in April 1984.

The main targets of direct Libyan terrorist activities have been expatriate Libyan dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments. In almost all cases, the assassins kill their victims with handguns, often provided by the Libyan diplomatic establishment in their country. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for anti-exile operations; for other types of attacks he tends to employ surrogates or mercenaries.

The Libyan Government in 1980 began a concerted effort to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles. By the time the first phase ended in 1981, 11 Libyan dissidents living abroad had been murdered. Libya in 1985 sponsored five attacks against exiled Libyan dissidents. Targets of these attacks lived in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria.

Qadhafi has at least twice tried to murder Libyan exiles in Egypt only to have his agents intercepted by Egyptian security. In November 1984, Egypt fooled Qadhafi into believing that his hired agents had assassinated former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush. After the Libyan press acknowledged Tripoli's responsibility for the murder, Egypt revealed the sting: the four Libyan agents were in custody, and the pictures of the alleged victim were fake. In November 1985, another four-man Libyan team was arrested during an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near Cairo. After the arrests, Egypt released audio and video tapes incriminating Libya.

Libya also has plotted anti-exile attacks in the United States. A Libyan exile in Colorado was shot and wounded by a Libyan-hired assassin in 1981. In May 1984, the FBI arrested two Libyans near Philadelphia for attempting to buy silenced handguns—the usual Libyan assassination weapon. A year later, in May 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared *persona non grata* and a ring of nonofficial Libyans was broken up in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four states.

Qadhafi also targets moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. There is evidence of Libyan-backed assassination plots against President Mubarak of Egypt. For example, those arrested after last November's attempted attack on Libyan exiles in Egypt stated that Qadhafi's target list included Mubarak. Former Sudanese President Nimeiri has also been targeted by Libya. We believe that Qadhafi has added Jordan's King Hussein and Iraq's Saddam Husayn to his hit list because of restored ties to Cairo and Washington, respectively.

Qadhafi also has been implicated in plots to assassinate other moderate heads of state. In September 1984, the Chadian Government uncovered a Libyan-sponsored plot in which a briefcase bomb was to explode during a

Cabinet meeting chaired by Chadian President Habre. More recently, Zairian officials thwarted a Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu in September 1985.

Libyan Links to Middle East Radicals

Longstanding Libyan support for radical Palestinian groups is growing. Qadhafi has provided safehaven, money, and arms to these groups—including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the Fatah dissidents, and the notorious Abu Nidal group. Training for Palestinians and other radicals frequently takes place at several locations in Libya. These anti-Arafat Palestinians are widely engaged in terrorist activities and focus their terrorist activity on Israel and the occupied territories.

More recently, however, Libya's support has broadened to include logistic support for terrorist operations. For example, Libya provided passports to the Abu Nidal members responsible for the attack on the El Al counter in Vienna. The Abu Nidal group is particularly appealing to Qadhafi because of its track record of successful terrorist operations. Abu Nidal's targeting of moderate Palestinians and moderate Arab leaders is consistent with Libya's antipathy toward participants in the peace process. According to Libyan press reports, Abu Nidal met with Qadhafi in Libya at least twice in 1985. Abu Nidal also gave an interview in Tripoli to a German publication last year and met with Qadhafi's chief lieutenant, Abd al-Salam Jallud. In addition, Libya has provided sanctuary, training assistance, and financial support to the Abu Nidal organization, and there are reliable press and other reports that its headquarters has been moved to Libya. The evidence points to Libya's having been involved in the bloody hijacking of Egyptair 648 (see p. 4).

Libya is trying to improve ties to other regional terrorist groups. Qadhafi would also like closer links to Tehran's terrorist effort. He announced a "strategic alliance" with Iran last summer, which he hopes to use as a foundation for joint operational planning for terrorist attacks against various regional foes. He also supports Egyptian and Tunisian dissidents.

Libya also provided refuge for the notorious international terrorist Carlos, who has headed a network of terrorists for hire. His group was responsible for numerous vicious attacks including the hostage-taking of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil ministers in Vienna in 1975.

Libyan Terrorism Against the United States

During the past 18 months, Qadhafi has made several public references to expanding his terrorism campaign to cover U.S. targets. In a June 1984 speech, for example, he told his Libyan audience that "we are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America." During a speech last September observing the 16th anniversary of his takeover, Qadhafi remarked that "we have the right to fight America, and we have the right to export terrorism to them. . . ." Qadhafi recently threatened in a press conference on January 2 to "pursue U.S. citizens in their country and streets" if the United States takes action in response to Libya's alleged involvement in the Rome and Vienna terrorist attacks.

There have been several instances over the years of Libyan-sponsored attacks against U.S. interests. These examples include the sacking of our Embassy in Tripoli in 1979 and the discovery by Sudanese authorities of a Libyan plot to blow up the American Embassy Club in Khartoum by planting explosives in stereo speakers. U.S. personnel also have been on Qadhafi's target list, as indicated by the plan in 1977 to assassinate our ambassador in Cairo.

Radicalism in the Arab World

Qadhafi's foremost ambition is to dominate and unite the Arab world. He frequently compares himself to Garibaldi or Bismarck and has justified his use of violence and terrorism against moderate Arab regimes as necessary to achieve Arab unity.

Egypt, because of its peace treaty with Israel, is a special target. Libyan agents have been active in Egypt since the 1970s, and Qadhafi has offered support to various opponents of the Egyptian Government. In October 1981, immediately after President Sadat was assassinated, Qadhafi called on Egyptians to overthrow their government; within a week, at Cairo International Airport two bombs exploded that had been concealed in luggage unloaded from a flight originating in Tripoli.

More recently, Qadhafi has sought to embarrass the government of President Mubarak and undermine the Egyptian economy. In July 1984, a Libyan ship commanded by a senior Libyan naval commando laid mines in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez that damaged 18 merchant ships. In May 1985, the Egyptians thwarted a plot by radical Palestinians backed by Libya to destroy the U.S. Embassy in Cairo with a truck bomb. Last summer Qadhafi expelled over 10,000 Egyptian workers in Libya—confiscating their savings and most of their belongings—in what was, in part, an effort to place a greater burden on the strained Egyptian economy. Also during 1985, Cairo captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reported that their plan was to destabilize the Mubarak government through sabotage and inciting civil unrest.

Sudan also is a priority target. Qadhafi has long offered training and support to Sudanese dissidents and sponsored acts of sabotage against the government of former President Nimeiri. He was a major source of arms and money for southern Sudanese rebels who began a guerrilla war against the central government 2 years ago. In February 1983, the Sudanese, with Egyptian assistance, thwarted a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt, and in March 1984, a Libyan TU-22 bombed Omdurman, Sudan, in a failed attempt to destroy a radio station there that broadcast condemnations of Qadhafi's policies by Libyan oppositionists.

Since Nimeiri's fall from power, Qadhafi has exploited the resumption of diplomatic ties to Sudan to build a network for subversion inimical to Sudan's efforts to establish a parliamentary democracy. A number of known Libyan terrorists have been assigned to the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) and the Libyan airline office in Khartoum. Qadhafi also has provided arms, funding, training, and probably direction to the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, a small group in Sudan dedicated to establishing a government on the Libyan model in Sudan. In May, a planeload of these dissidents arrived in Khartoum armed with assault rifles.

Qadhafi also is working to expand his influence in the countries of the Arab Maghreb. Qadhafi refuses to negotiate with Algeria to determine the correct location of the Libyan-Algerian border. Perhaps angered over President Bendjedid's moderation, Qadhafi reportedly provides money to Algerian dissidents such as Ahmed Ben Bella.

In Tunisia, Qadhafi has long sought to bring down the pro-Western government of Habib Bourguiba. In 1980, Libyan-supported guerrillas attacked the southern Tunisian mining town of Gafsa; when France offered its support to Tunis, Libyan mobs burned both the French and Tunisian Embassies while security forces stood idly by. Following bread riots in Tunisia in January 1984, saboteurs originating in Libya dynamited a pipeline near the Libyan-Tunisian border. In an effort to exacerbate social tensions this past year, Qadhafi expelled over 30,000 Tunisian workers and confiscated their property. In September, when Tunisian newspapers attacked Qadhafi for the expulsions, a Libyan diplomat attempted to mail letter bombs to the critical journalists. Several exploded, wounding two postal workers and causing Tunis to sever diplomatic relations.

Libya is staunchly opposed to the Middle East peace process, and Qadhafi is doing all he can to subvert it. In Lebanon, Libyan arms and money have flowed to different militias and Palestinian groups actively opposed to the government of President Gemayel. Qadhafi has been especially eager to undermine the influence of PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] Chairman Yasir Arafat because Qadhafi perceives him as too willing to consider a negotiated settlement with Israel. As a result, Qadhafi has thrown his support to radical Palestinian groups—including the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Abu Nidal—that advocate continued war against Israel. Since 1981 Qadhafi has shipped these groups items as prosaic as uniforms and as powerful as tanks and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. In 1984, Libyan troops participated in the Syrian-backed assault on Arafat's forces in northern Lebanon.

The Persian Gulf also is an arena for Libyan meddling. Qadhafi has allied himself with Iran in its war against Iraq and has provided Tehran with T-55 tanks, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, ammunition, and even Scud rockets. In addition, Libya provides arms and money to Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq and to the antigovernment group, the "Union of Iraqi Democrats." In 1984 and 1985, Libyan agents attempted to disrupt the Islamic pilgrimage ceremonies in Saudi Arabia; in 1984 entire planeloads of Libyan "pilgrims" were discovered to be carrying arms. Libya continues to enjoy good relations with and has provided support to the National Democratic Front that operates out of Marxist South Yemen against the government of President Salih in North Yemen. Although Libya restored diplomatic relations with Somalia last May, Qadhafi has not severed his relationship with Somali opposition groups he has long supported.

Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Tripoli views black Africa as a principal arena for forging a group of anti-Western radical states that will strengthen Libyan influence in international forums and confer upon Qadhafi status as a world leader. Qadhafi's aggressiveness has been strengthened by the propensity of the international community to ignore his often blatant disregard for the sovereignty of small African nations.

Chad, of course, is the most egregious example. In 1973 Qadhafi forcibly annexed the northern portion of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. Throughout the 1970s, Libya supported various tribal and guerrilla groups in Chad in a bid to install a pliable regime in N'Djamena. Having failed to achieve this indirectly, in October 1980 the Libyan army entered Chad and attempted to impose a union between the two countries. The Libyan occupation force withdrew in November 1981, but returned in 1983 when the pro-Libyan Chadian leader Goukouni Oueddei was ousted by current President Hissein Habre. Only intervention by French armed forces confined the Libyan occupation to the northern 40% of Chad. French forces were withdrawn in the fall of 1984, but Qadhafi reneged on an agreement reached with President Mitterrand and continues to occupy northern Chad with an army of several thousand.

The drought-battered countries of the Sahel offer Qadhafi many opportunities for meddling. Qadhafi continues to provide arms and training to the nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in an effort to undermine the Governments of Mali and Niger.

Qadhafi also is determined to topple President Mobutu of Zaire. Qadhafi is motivated by hostility to Kinshasa's close ties to the West, its recognition of Israel, and its support for Chadian President Habre. Qadhafi also is aware of Zaire's role as a leading producer of cobalt and other strategic minerals. Tripoli provides training in sabotage and small arms to several different guerrilla groups including the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese National Movement. Libyan diplomatic facilities in countries bordering Zaire are centers of support for these groups.

Meddling in Latin America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi's determination to strike at U.S. interests and to spread his philosophy of revolution has led to a more aggressive Libyan posture in Latin America. Although many governments and groups in this region are wary of Qadhafi, some are willing to accept his financial and military support.

Tripoli views Nicaragua as its base in Central America and accordingly seeks to strengthen the Sandinista dictatorship in Managua. In addition to several hundred million dollars in economic assistance, Qadhafi's support to the Sandinistas has included antiaircraft guns, SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers, and small arms. At least several dozen Libyan military personnel are in Nicaragua. Libyan support has enhanced the Sandinistas' ability to subvert neighboring states. In addition, Libya has provided some arms and money to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. During the past year, Libya has provided training, guidance, and funds to a key far-left terrorist group to enable it to expand armed action against the Government of Chile.

Libyan agents have been increasingly active among the Caribbean islands, especially since the summer of 1984. The loss of its People's Bureau in Grenada following the collapse of the Bishop government in 1983 forced Tripoli to attempt to establish its centers for subversion in other diplomatic posts in the region. Qadhafi also has used religion as a cover for intelligence activities in the area, sponsoring Islamic conferences in which the Libyan participants often are intelligence officers or operatives of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees. Leftist leaders from the Dominican Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, the French Departments, and elsewhere have also been invited to Libya for "seminars" and paramilitary training. Particularly worrisome is Libyan urging of leftist politicians to undertake violent action rather than pursue legal means to replace moderate governments in the region.

South and Southeast Asia

As elsewhere, Libyan diplomatic missions in this region provide the infrastructure for Libyan subversion, disbursing funds, and arranging for the training of leftists and other dissidents.

In South Asia, Libyan activities are focused on the Islamic states. No doubt reflecting his dependence on Russian arms, Qadhafi is one of the few Muslim leaders who does not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Libya maintains relations with Pakistan, it has also been involved with the "al-Zulfiqar" terrorist group. Qadhafi, in addition, has provided training and money to opponents of President Ershad of Bangladesh.

In Southeast Asia, Qadhafi concentrates on Muslim minorities. For some time, he has provided paramilitary training to the small Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, Libya continues to send assistance to the Muslim Moro separatists on Mindanao, despite a 1976 agreement with Manila to cease such aid. New Caledonia, a French possession in the South Pacific, has no appreciable Muslim population, but Libya has, nevertheless, provided military training and some funding to the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the group responsible for most of the proindependence violence on the island. Libyan intelligence operatives are known to be active on other islands in Oceania.

The Erosion of International Norms

Qadhafi's subversion is not confined to those countries that are the direct object of his ambitions. The international community as a whole suffers from Qadhafi's disrespect for international norms of behavior and accepted practice. Qadhafi has abused diplomatic privilege for terrorist purposes, reneged on international agreements, and blatantly used terrorist violence against political opponents. In addition, Qadhafi's support of terrorism, regardless of his direct operational involvement in a given terrorist act, helps legitimize terrorism as an acceptable political activity.

THE ABU NIDAL GROUP

The Abu Nidal group is among the most dangerous of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It is probably the best organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups, carefully planning its operations and keeping its information tightly compartmented.

The group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to operate in any country it chooses. It has staged attacks in over 20 countries on three continents and operates throughout the Middle East.

Abu Nidal has conducted over 60 terrorist attacks during the last 8 years—at least 30 of them since the beginning of 1984. Two-thirds of the group's nearly 20 attacks this year have taken place in Western Europe, as innocent bystanders increasingly have become casualties of the group's assaults.

- The simultaneous attacks on airline offices in Rome and Vienna on December 27, which have the hallmarks of Abu Nidal, left more than a dozen dead, including five Americans. Three of the passports used in the Vienna attacks were traced to Libya; two were seized from Tunisians as they were expelled from Libya last summer, and the third was lost in Libya by a Tunisian worker there in 1977.
- The Egyptair hijacking in late November ultimately cost the lives of 59 passengers.
- The group bombed the British Air office in Rome in September, injuring 15 persons, many of them passers-by.
- Abu Nidal members threw grenades at Rome's Cafe de Paris in September, injuring 38 tourists—among them Americans, Germans, Britons, Italians, Argentines, and Brazilians.
- The group bombed two hotels in Athens—one in September that injured 19, mostly British tourists, and one in August that injured 13 Britons.
- In Spain, Abu Nidal attacks in July at the British Air office and the nearby Alia ticket office killed one and wounded 24 customers and employees.
- Also in July, the group was probably responsible for the bombing of two restaurants in Kuwait, killing eight and injuring almost 90.
- In April, an Abu Nidal terrorist fired a rocket at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking off from Athens airport. The rocket hit the plane but did not explode. Hundreds of casualties might have resulted had the operation been successful.

The official name of the Abu Nidal organization is "Fatah-the Revolutionary Council," which it usually employs when attacking Israeli targets. But it has employed a number of cover names for its operations. Originally, the group operated under the name Black June; more recently, the group has used the name Arab Revolutionary Brigades when it staged attacks against Persian Gulf targets. It also acts as Black September when it attacks Jordanian and Palestinian targets and employs the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM) as its signature for attacks against British targets. It added Egyptian nomenclatures when it hijacked the Egyptair plane in November.

Background

The group, which is headed by Sabri al-Banna (who uses the *nom de guerre* Abu Nidal), grew out of elements that broke away a decade ago from PLO Chairman Arafat's Fatah organization. The group is committed to the use of violence to destroy diplomatic efforts designed to reconcile Israel and the Arab states, especially those mounted earlier this year by King Hussein and Arafat's PLO. The Abu Nidal group also calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states and is critical of what it sees as Arafat's and the PLO's moderation and lack of revolutionary base and zeal. Consequently, the group contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to force the all-embracing Arab revolution which, in turn, would lead to the liberation of Palestine.

The group was formed in 1974 after Arafat instituted a ban on PLO involvement with international terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. Abu Nidal's radical views found favor at the time with the Iraqi regime, which helped him to create the organization that Abu Nidal called Fatah-the Revolutionary Council to promote his claim that his organization, rather than the one led by Arafat, was the legitimate Fatah. He has similarly duplicated other Fatah organizational titles to suggest a parallel structure with the original.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Baghdad suppressed activities of the Abu Nidal group out of Iraq. Elements of the group then moved to Damascus. Since early 1984, Libya began to provide increased support to the group, and Abu Nidal himself and many of the group's operations may have moved there within the last 12 months.

The group probably has several hundred members, although an accurate count is difficult. We believe the group has a number of cells throughout Western Europe and the Middle East and makes use of the large number of Palestinian students studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. These new recruits, for example, were involved in the five grenade attacks staged by the group in 1985.

Current Operations and Trends

Based on the style of Abu Nidal attacks, it is evident that the group is willing to cause indiscriminate casualties. Apart from assassinations of particular individuals, Abu Nidal operations through November 1985 resulted in nearly 70 deaths and 201 wounded among innocent bystanders—and the number could have been much higher if the Jordanian airliner attack in Athens had been successful. In the previous year, 111 died in the crash of a Gulf Air jet on which an Abu Nidal bomb may have exploded.

The Abu Nidal group has concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests since 1984. These attacks were provoked by the Jordanian agreement to host the PNC [Palestine National Council] meeting in November 1984 and King Hussein's February accord with Arafat to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. Abu Nidal operatives are thought to have assassinated former West Bank mayor and Palestinian moderate Fahd Qawasmeh in December 1984 shortly after his election to the PLO Executive Council. The anti-Jordanian/PLO campaign has not abated. As long as Jordanian and PLO efforts toward Middle East peace negotiations continue, attacks against both Jordanian and Palestinian targets probably will also continue.

Aside from the attack on Alia offices in Madrid in July and the attempt to down a Jordanian airliner over Athens in April, other incidents involving Jordanian targets in 1985 have included:

- The November 24 assassination of a Palestinian in Amman;
- The murder of a Jordanian publisher in Athens in September;
- A plot to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador to Greece in August;

- The murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara on July 24; and
- A rocket attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome in April.

The group has also targeted British interests. ROSM claimed responsibility for the kidnaping in March 1985 of a British journalist in Lebanon and the assassination of British diplomats in India and Greece in 1984. The purpose of the attacks probably is to force the United Kingdom to release group members imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982.

Even before the recent attacks on the Vienna and Rome airports, Abu Nidal had begun to concentrate his field of operations in Western Europe. Although his targets have been his usual enemies—for example, British, Israeli, moderate Arab—he has become very indiscriminate about injuring bystanders. The relatively relaxed controls in West European countries have been conducive to his operations there. The pattern of concentrating his efforts in Europe has coincided with the strengthening of his links to Libya. The likelihood of Libyan financing, safehaven, and logistic assistance should be very helpful to his future international terrorist operations.

CHRONOLOGY OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 1980-85

1985

December	Italy/Austria	Passports used by Abu Nidal terrorists in attack on El Al counter provided by Libya.
November	Malta	Hijacking of Egyptair airliner by Abu Nidal supporters may have involved Libyan support.
	Egypt	Four-man team of Libyan agents arrested shortly before attempting to attack gathering of Libyan exiles. Former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush was the main target.
October	Greece	Libyan merchant wounded in Athens by two gunmen; the victim had left Libya 5 years earlier.
September	Tunisia	Libyan diplomat smuggles about 100 letter bombs addressed to journalists into Tunisia. Several explode, injuring two postal workers and causing Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.
May	United States	A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata, and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a U.S. grand jury in connection with a plot to kill dissidents in several different states.
April	West Germany	Moroccan citizen resident in the F.R.G. since 1960 killed by a Libyan, who was arrested at the scene.
		Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed in Bonn by Libyan gunman who was arrested. The assassin also wounded two German passers-by, one seriously. The victim had been a target of the Libyan regime for at least 2 years.
	Cyprus	Libyan businessman assassinated in downtown Nicosia by an unidentified gunman. The victim was the director of an offshore holding company and was believed to be an opponent of the Libyan regime.
March	Italy	Libyan jeweler murdered in his shop in Rome. A silencer-equipped pistol was left at the scene by the assassin.
February	Austria	Former Libyan Ambassador to Austria severely wounded by two shots fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had supported Qadhafi's seizure of power in 1969, but he quit his post in disgust at the regime in 1980.

1984

November	Egypt	President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush had been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showing Bákoush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claimed Bakoush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."
September	Italy	A Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled in a hotel in Rome. The victim had been the subject of Libyan requests for deportation to Libya.
	Chad	Chadians discover plot to assassinate President Habre with an attache case bomb. Evidence of the plot, including photographs of the bomb, was provided to the United Nations the following February when Chad lodged a complaint against Libya.
August	United Kingdom	One of six Libyans awaiting trial for bomb attacks in London in March 1983 found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may have been silenced by the Libyan Government.
	Belgium	A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian Embassy in Brussels.
July	Belgium	A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire.
	Red Sea	Libya mined the Red Sea, damaging 18 merchant ships of varying nationalities.
	Greece	Two Libyan students found murdered in their apartment in a crime reminiscent of Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980 and 1981. The two were beaten, strangled, and gagged before being shot twice in the back.
June	Greece	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens killed by two men on a motorbike.
June (cont.)		A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qadhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee of Libyan Arab Airlines.
May	Libya	Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the Libyan masses have decided to form suicide commandos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically."
April	United Kingdom	A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's Heathrow Airport, injuring 25.
	Libya	A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure British Government during siege of Libyan People's Bureau in London.
	United Kingdom	British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy.
March	United Kingdom	Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.
	Sudan	One Libyan TU-22 bomber drops bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists.
February	Libya	Following annual Libyan General People's Congress, the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the death penalty." Libyan authorities take no action while a mob burned the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.
	Congo	Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Government of Chad threatened in Brazzaville, Congo.

1983

August	Burkina	Libya gave material support to coup in Burkina.
July	Chad	Libya invaded Chad for the second time. Occupation continues into 1985.
June	West Germany	Eight Libyan students in West Germany, all members of an anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are harassing and threatening them.
February	Libya	Libyan General People's Congress warns all Libyans in exile to return home or face the "anger of the Libyan people."

1982 No incidents known.

1981

November	Sudan	Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum.
October	Sudan	Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hissein Habre, failed when those sent to conduct the operation surrendered.
	Egypt	Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane coming from Libya via Malta.
August	Libya	Two Libyan SU-22s that fired at U.S. Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra shot down.
July	United States	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed in Ogden, Utah.
June	Sudan	Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.
February	Italy	Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent anti-Qadhafi exile was the target.

1980

November	United Kingdom	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in London.
		Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned by eating peanuts containing thalium.
October	Chad	Libyan forces occupied Chad. Qadhafi attempted to force a Libyan-Chadian union.
	The Gambia	Libyan subversion in The Gambia caused break in relations. Senegalese troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty.
June	Italy	Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome.
		Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expiration of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles to return home.
May	Italy	Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The arrested Libyan gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people."
May (cont.)	Greece	Libyan exile killed in Athens. His throat was slit.
	Italy	Libyan businessman found strangled to death in Rome.
	West Germany	Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
	Italy	Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots to the head.
April	United Kingdom	Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London.
	Italy	Well-known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested assassin said the victim was an enemy of Col. Qadhafi.
	United Kingdom	Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist.
February	Libya	Tunisian and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob while Libyan authorities took no action.

(Continued on page 8)

1979

December	Libya	An estimated 2,000 Libyans set fire to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The Libyan authorities did not respond to requests by the Embassy for protection.
November	West Germany	Two Libyans arrested with three suspected Palestinians for an unspecified terrorist operation.

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[A short recess was taken.]

Senator DENTON. The hearing will come to order.

Our final witness is Dr. Yonah Alexander, a member of the senior research staff of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University and director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism of the State University of New York.

Dr. Alexander has authored or edited more than 25 books on the subject of international terrorism. I have shared the platform with him on a number of occasions, and he has been of enormous assistance to us in helping us to understand the complexity and the details of the international terrorist network, and particularly the common threads that run through that network. Dr. Alexander is one to whom we look for advice, counsel, and information by which we benefit in our own subcommittee's work.

Dr. Alexander, we welcome you today, and you may make your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DR. YONAH ALEXANDER, MEMBER, SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Dr. ALEXANDER. Thank you very much, Senator.

I am grateful for the opportunity to participate at this morning's hearing. I would like to say for the record that as an academician who has tried to focus on this problem for many years, the work of your subcommittee has provided an important framework which helps us to deal with the problem seriously. The bottom line is that unless this Government and the free world will consider seriously the nature, scope, and intensity of the terrorist threat, I am afraid that we will remain hostages to the blackmailers for many years to come.

If I may, I would like to join Dr. Ikle and Ambassador Oakley in commending the work of the subcommittee and the leadership that you are providing. We are encouraged by your contribution because we believe that continuity and sustained efforts in this area are so critical for all of us.

In the interest of time, I would like to summarize my written statement. I would also like to report that for technical reasons, the footnotes of my written statement were not duplicated, and they will be submitted subsequently.

I think that it is clear to all of us that the past two decades mark a high point in our new age of terrorism with its frightening ramifications.

Ambassador Oakley mentioned some statistics focusing on the international terrorist incidents. We, in the academic community, obviously have a different kind of mandate and we include not only the international but also the domestic incidents. Just to cite one figure, from 1970 to 1985, some 24,000 domestic and international terrorist incidents have occurred. As Ambassador Oakley correctly indicated earlier, it is not only the human costs that we have to consider but also the political costs. For example, Qadhafi's statements promising to disturb the international system have influenced many people not to even travel to Europe, let alone the Middle East.

Although no catastrophic disruptions and casualties have resulted from single terrorist incidents, future incidents could be much more costly in terms of human life and property. In fact, Senator, back in June of last year, you gave a speech to a conference on the nuclear dimensions of terrorism. As a result of your contribution and the work that followed the conference, we established an international task force dealing with nuclear terrorism, including representatives from NATO, from the United States, and from nongovernmental organizations. This is clearly a step forward. We have found a great deal of information and guidance from the hearings that you conducted.

I would like to underscore the point that you and Dr. Ikle made regarding the Communist threat. More specifically, the Soviet Union and their proxies are exporting terrorism and terrorist techniques into countries whose governments they wish to injure or overthrow.

The record is very clear. These countries are trying to indoctrinate, train, and arm various substate groups throughout the world in order to create severe psychological-political conflicts in our contemporary life. It has obviously made an impact on the U.S. national security interests. We simply have to look at the record showing that between 1970 and 1985 there were 3,232 terrorist domestic and international attacks on Americans and American operations. The strategic cost was also enormous.

In one case, the attack on the U.S. Marine Base in Lebanon was largely responsible for U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon.

We have to underline this strategic cost again and again. Morever, recent events in Latin America and the Middle East have demonstrated dramatically how low-intensity conflicts can impact other strategic interests of the United States.

Although we cannot predict the future, it is very clear that state-sponsorship of terrorism will increase in the coming months and years.

On the basis of a study we conducted on state-sponsored terrorism we believe that U.S. adversaries will continue to utilize terrorism—"warfare on the cheap"—as a significant strategic tool of their foreign policy.

Yet, it seems that the American public and the American Government have not thus far addressed seriously the problem of terrorism and its strategic implications. The result is the United States has not developed the national commitment and backing which is necessary to deal with the problem effectively.

Senator **Denton**. Although Ambassador Oakley said we now have the consensus, I think he was referring to a sense of indignation and frustration which we all share regarding terrorism, and the consensus of feeling that we have got to do something about it. However, I agree with you that we do not have a consensus of understanding regarding the true nature of terrorism and how to deal with it.

Dr. **Alexander**. Absolutely. If you look at some of the public polls that were conducted recently, after the *Achille Lauro* and the

TWA hijackings, the consensus was that the United States should do something, perhaps even militarily. Today you will see that the percentage is much lower.

In other words, the American people do not seem to appreciate as yet their country facing a war, which is not characterized by sending divisions across borders. Thus, it is no longer man against man, or missile against missile. It is a different kind of war, and it requires different responses.

For example, today, Senator, there is concern in a country like Australia of terrorism. Why? Because Australia is in a position where the United States had been in the 1930's. Today the Soviet Union is establishing its infrastructure of the KGB in Australia. That is, the U.S.S.R. is planning its operations over decades, and the U.S. response has been reactive rather than preventative. Until U.S. policymakers and the public become more conscious of the broad strategic dangers, and become more skillful in anticipating and countering them, I am afraid that the rest of this decade and the 1990's will be catastrophic for the U.S. security interests.

Now, if I may, Senator, I would like very briefly to highlight the role of Libya, particularly, its involvement in some areas. Libya's policy and actions are manifestations of a clear case of state-sponsored terrorism. As you indicated, Libya does not act alone. It cooperates with other nations, the entente, and the Soviet Union.

In other words, the Soviet Union is providing the matches which can be used to start fires at democratic institutions, thereby challenging our value system. The Soviets therefore are using Libya as a tool, as an instrument to further their own policy objectives.

Libya, from their point of view, have their own agenda. Qadhafi is operating within three major concentric circles. First, in the Arab and Moslem worlds. Second in the African countries. Third, all the way from Central America to the Philippines. Unless we appreciate the foreign policy objectives of Libya, we wold not be able to understand the strategic thinking of Libya which calls for the manipulation and exploitation of terrorism as a convenient tool of politics in the struggle for power.

In other words, terrorism is the great equalizer. Qadhafi cannot face the United States eyeball to eyeball, but he can humiliate the United States. He can challenge the capability of the U.S. Government to deal effectively with the problem. The major cost would be the American people, and people in other democratic societies who would lose confidence in the ability of their governents to protect them at home and abroad.

Qadhafi is establishing his infrastructure. I am not planning to go into details here because the State Department provided a record, and there are other records on these activities. I would like to say there is a very conscious and calculated approach to the problem in terms of organizational structure and in terms of recruiting. For example, the Libyan Secret Service is recruiting prisoners in Libya in order to provide them with weapons to send them abroad to eliminate dissidents of the regime.

We see that the Libyans commit their national institutions and their embassies to this end.

Senator **Denton**. Dr. Alexander, could you corroborate my understanding that an East German officer is involved in some direction of the Libyan recruitment program you just mentioned?

Dr. **Alexander**. There is no question according to open as well as other sources. I can offer my limited experience which is based on interviews with terrorists in the Middle East such as Palestinians, Syrians, Turks, others, some of whom had been trained in Libya. The record is very clear in terms of the involvement not only of East Germans, but also of the Soviets, the Syrians, and the Cubans in Libya itself and elsewhere in the region. Furthermore, funding has been an important element. Probably around $100 million annually is provided by Qadhafi to various terrorist movements.

Even if Qadhafi will find himself in financial difficulties due to recent developments in the oil world, I do not believe that he is going to stop his activities. You do not need a great deal of funding in order to sponsor terrorist operations.

Senator, we tried to provide some maps here, and indicate the location of some training camps. In my own statement I listed some 44 camps. I refer to mostly permanent camps which were set up in order to train terrorists from all over the world. For example, in the al-'Aziziyya Camp, which is south of Tripoli, you find members of the Polisario being trained.

In the al-Sa'iga Camp, you find members of the Italian Red Brigade or the Basque who are being trained there.

The list goes on and on.

We find Africans from Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire who are being trained there. Also Japanese and Latin Americans are being trained there.

The list is not really exhaustive. I believe that there are also temporary camps, in other words, camps that are being used for a week or two and being moved from place to place. Thousands of terrorists and so-called volunteers from different regions of the world have been trained in these camps by the Libyans, the Cubans, the East Germans, the Soviets, the Syrians, and the Palestinians.

Their involvement in the training of these people is very clear. They were trained in general terrorist tactics and they were trained for specific terrorist attacks. There is documentation to back it up.

Libya is also one of the major suppliers of weapons to terrorists. Ambassador Oakley cited a figure of about $11 billion of military supplies that the Soviets provide to Libya. The Soviets cannot deny accountability because they provide Libya with these weapons. They know precisely that Libya is not going to use these weapons just in the context of internal security. Libya is planning to provide some of these weapons to various terrorist groups. Also, providing safe haven to the terrorists has been an important factor in Libyan support.

All of us are familiar with the Libyan modus operandi, whether it involves attacks on Libyan dissidents, attacks on Arab leaders, attacks on African leaders, and attempts by Libya to perpetrate acts of terrorism and subversion in various other countries. At this moment Libyans are involved in Chad. Yet, as far as the French are concerned, business is as usual. After all, some of our allies consider that the oil is thicker than blood.

But what really concerns me, Senator, that a great superpower like the United States is being humiliated by a ninth-rate country like Libya. Over the years, Libya has made it very clear what is their policy vis-a-vis the United States.

Qadhafi made many statements that he must force America to fight on 100 fronts all over the world, in Lebanon, in Chad, in the Sudan, in El Salvador, in Africa, and that he must take the war to American borders, and so on and so forth. In fact, Qadhafi is able to realize some of his promises in trying to humiliate the United States and to perpetrate attacks on the United States indirectly. What concerns me, and you addressed the issue earlier this morning, is the so-called entente. I say so-called because the entente is composed of several countries each of which have their own national objectives. Nevertheless, they collaborate and cooperate with each other in order to force the United States out of vital strategic areas. They aim to deny the United States access to important minerals, such as those in Southern Africa. Qadhafi is indeed fishing in muddy waters. For example, he attempts to intervene in the domestic affairs in the United States. He is trying to develop relations with extremist elements of the American Indians as well as with the leader of the Nation of Islam in order to detach a portion of the United States and establish there a distinct racial black state.

So we find that the Soviet Union encouraged collaboration between Libya, Syria, and Iran. In early 1985 these countries reached an agreement to escalate terrorism against the United States and its interests all over the world. We find that in the first round an Arab organization, called an Organization of Arab Revolutionary Forces, with headquarters in Tripoli, is not only pledging to conduct the Arab struggle for the liberation of Arab territories, but also to fight American imperialism.

There are other umbrellas that Qadhafi established. In April 1985 the National Command for Arab Revolutionary Forces met in Tripoli, and the terrorists came from Syria and even from Iraq. Regardless of the conventional wisdom that many people have about Iraq, it is one of the countries that I think we have to consider as a terrorist state.

In March 1986 Qadhafi held a conference of radical Arab groups in Tripoli, which included not only George Habash, but also representatives from other groups, including the Abu Nidal group and the Syrian Baath Party as well as some Lebanese revolutionary movements.

I would like to call your attention particularly to a resolution of this meeting, which calls for the operation of revolutionary intervention groups and suicide squads to strike at American interests within the United States and throughout the world.

This is the strategic plan of Qadhafi and his supporters, particularly the Soviet Union, and some of the other wild cards in the international system, the Syrians and the Iranians.

Finally, if I may, Senator, I believe that the formulation of adequate strategic responses to counter low-intensity operations present a dilemma to all free societies. To be effective, the responses should neutralize terrorism, not only prevent terrorist attacks, but also impose some kind of a penalty or punishment on the successful terrorist in order to deter him from acting again.

The United States must be prepared to have a recourse to a full range of countermeasures. I would like to list them briefly:

(1) To upgrade intelligence.

(2) To develop cooperation with U.S. allies.

(3) To provide economic and security assistance to like-minded countries.

(4) To apply political and diplomatic pressures.

(5) To impose economic sanctions.

(6) To initiate information campaigns and foreign broadcasts throughout the world.

(7) To initiate clandestine counterterrorist infiltrations of terrorist organizations.

(8) To provide covert support for foreign counterterrorist military operations.

(9) To develop overt U.S. military, preemptive operations.

(10) Finally, to undertake overt U.S. military operations against terrorist bases.

In other words, if the United States develops a coherent and firm policy to respond to state-sponsored terrorism, coupled with effective countermeasures, then the administation will win public understanding and support. It is crucial for the United States to move vigorously in order to coup with the emerging strategic threats to free societies. I believe that if all segments of society, governmental and nongovernmental, will join forces then we will reduce the risk in the coming months and years. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Dr. Alexander. We will include your full written statement.

[Dr. Alexander's submissions for the record follows:]

LIBYAN TERRORISM: SOME STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

STATEMENT BY:

Dr. Yonah Alexander

Before the

United States Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism

February 19, 1986

I. INTRODUCTION: STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Terrorism, as an expedient tactical and strategic tool of politics in the struggle for power within and among nations, is not new in history. From time immemorial, both established regimes and opposition groups, functioning under varying degrees of stress, have intentionally utilized extra-legal instruments of psychological and physical force--including intimidation, coercion, repression and, ultimately, destruction of lives and property--for the purpose of attaining real or imaginary ideological, political, social, and economic goals.

Unlike their historical counterparts, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new breed of violence in terms of technology, victimization, threat and response. The past two decades clearly mark a high point in our new "Age of Terrorism" with all its frightening ramifications.[1]

Tragically, the failure of the international community to fully recognize terrorism as criminal behavior and as low-intensity warfare has encouraged the growth of terrorist activity in the last two decades. The statistics of terrorist violenced are, indeed, staggering. From 1970 to 1985, some 24,722 domestic and international terrorist incidents occurred. A total of 45,906 individuals have been killed and another 27,901 wounded with property damage estimated at billions of dollars.[2] The number of terrorist incidents involving fatalities has been increasing about 20% a year since the early 1970s.[3]

Although, at least thus far, no catastrophic disruptions or casualties have resulted from a single terrorist attack, future incidents could be much more costly. For instance, the prospect of the use of mass destruction weapons is seen by some observers as plausible and by others as inevitable.[4]

The main ingredient that singles out this new era is that state-sponsored terrorism, where governments support acts of violence designed to terrorize peoples and destablized governments of other nations, has become commonplace in many parts of the world.[5]

At present, communist states, especially the Soviet Union, their proxies, and a number of other militant totalitarian regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, are actively exporting terrorists and terror techniques into other countries whose governments they wish to injure or overthrow. They indoctirnate, fund, train, and arm sub-state groups of diverse national origins to act as their tools, using psychological warfare and propaganda to create severe psycho-social or political conflict in contemporary life.

Since the late 1960s, terrorism as a part of the conflict spectrum and the nation-state's use of terrorism against institutions in other nations have expaned enormously. The growth of international terrorism in scope, subtlety, and a variety of tactics poses an increasing threat to the United States and its allies.

During the past decade, the impact upon U.S. national interests of state-sponsored terrorism employing powerful technical means became obvious.

Looking only at U.S. targets, the record shows that 3,232 terrorist attacks against American individuals and took place between 1970 and 1985.[6] In particular, the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Beirut bombing of the U.S. Emabssy in two different sites, the destruction of the U.S. Marine Corps headquarters with casualties, the hijacking of the TWA 847, the Achille Lauro seajacking and the airport attacks in Rome and Vienna strongly suggest a strategic international dimension of anti-Americanism underlying this phenomenon.

More specifically, recent events in Central America and the Middle East have illustrated dramatically that low-intensity conflict can bring about major changes in the international environment by destabilizing or destroying regimes aligened with the United States. Often, the target is an advanced industrial nations' source of vital economic or strategic support such as oil and minerals. Terrorism can severely damage nations economically and destabilize them politically without necessarily leading to conventional military conflict.

Although it is difficult to predict the future, it is nevertheless clear that state sponsorhip of terrorism will increase. Operations have become more effective, wider in scope, more sophisticated, and with a higher destructive potential. It can be assumed that U.S. adversaries will continue to utilize terrorism--"warfare on the cheap"--as a significant strategic tool of their foreign policy.

Yet, the U.S. Government and the American public have not yet grasped the full implications of the scope and intensity of the terrorist threat. Americans tend to see terrorism as a mere nuisance or irritant, a series of isolated and soon forgotten incidents. The result is that the United States has not developed the national commitment needed to deal with the problem.

Until U.S. policymakers and the public become more conscious of the broad strategic dangers reflected in such anarchic developments and become more skillful in anticipating and countering them, the 1980s will be catastrophic for the worldwide security interests of the United States, its friends, and its allies.

In brief, the problem of expanding terrorism is serious and not well understood. Furthermore, the implications, both domestic and international, have scarcely been explored. Answers to terrorist problems are elusive and need much greater attention. For these reasons, a U.S. national comprehensive response to terrorism with a view toward improving legislation, policy formulation, plans, and procedures for the defense of the basic national security and industrial infrastructure of the United States and other liberal democracies is urgently recquired in order to cope with this difficult problem.

II. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: A DEFINITIONAL FOCUS

The semantic and moral confusion over the definition of terrorism, particularly the subset of the species that can be identified as state-sponsored, has hindered formulation of a coherent national policy on initiatives to combat state-sponsored terrorism.

The debate over the meaning of terrorism is linked to national perspectives. Every state reserves to itself the moral and legal authority to determine what is and what is not terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs. Similarly, the numerous smaller and newer countries of the the third world apply the term "freedom fighters" to "liberation" movements because their mindset is formed by their recent emancipation from what they view as racial and colonial regimes.

It is essential to clarify this confusion because contemporary terrorist attacks have assumed the character of a covert or proxy form of low-intensity warfare against the United States, its friends, and allies abroad. There is nothig to suggest these attacks will not also be pressed home here in the continental United States if the present climate of illegal violence persists.

In the U.S. context, it is now possible to derive a working definition that reflects American social and political values and has useful policy and operational benefits for democratic societies. It is suggested that state-sponsored terrorism is:

> The deliberate employment of violence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states or sub-national groups encouraged or assited by sovering states to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.

It is further suggested that recent history indicates:

> The main goal of this state-sponsored terrorism now at the end of the twentieth centruy is to undermine the psycho-social stability and political governability of pluralist states with representative governments.[7]

To be precise, state sponsorship is the direct or indirect instigation, by a government, of official and non-official groups to exercise psychological or physical violence against political opponents, another government, or other entities for purposes of coercion and widespread intimidation to bring about a desired political or strategic objective. What distinguishes state sponsorhip of terrorism is the extent to which the groups carrying out violence are furthering the policy of an established government outside the territory in which the conflict occurs. It has the option of plausible denial and lack of public accountability.

A terrorist group acting in conjunction with or for a foreign government can be used to affect a target country's political stability, commercial ties, and diplomatic relations in ways which direct military confrontation cannot or will not achieve.

III. AN ANATOMY OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: THE CASE OF LIBYA

The alleged Libyan connection to the hijacking of the Egyptian Boeing 737 to Malta and the attacks on the Rome and Vienna Airports, have once again focused our attention on the role of Tripoli in the globalization and brutalization of contemporary terrorism.

Libya's policy and actions are a manifestation of state-sponsored terrorism in the Middle Est and the international arena. Under the leadership of Col. Moammar Khadafi, Libya sponsors and provides substantial assistance to terrorist groups in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In pursuit of Khadafi's objectives of expanded state power and influence, Libya employs tactics of assassination and violence against opponents of its regime and against other targets. Khadafi sees himself as inheriting Nasser's mission to unify the Arab world and, indeed, carries the task one step further--he dreams of uniting the Islamic world. Khadafi believes that the "national liberation" of any group can be achieved only through "revolutionary armed struggle." This translates into armed attcks against civilian targets throughout the world.

Khadafi's anti-American, pro-violence philosophy is clear. Referring to the most costly incident in terms of American lives, the destruction of the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut on Octobr 23, 1983, Khadafi concluded, "The lesson is that America was kicked out of Lebanon when an individual Arab was able to kill 300 Americans.... An armed people will never be defeated, but regular armies are unreliable."[8]

In sum, the strategic thinking of Libya calls for the manipulation of terrorism as a suitable substitute for traditional warfare, which has become too expensive and too hazardous to be waged on the battlefield.

By overtly and covertly resorting to nonmilitary techniques, and by exploiting low-intensity operations around the world, Khadafi is able to pursue domestic and foreign policy objectives.

A. INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Organizational Structure and Recruitment

Libya supports terrorism on two levels, by creating its own groups and by aiding those already in existence. Khadafi has restructured Libya and institutionalized the place of revolution within the bureaucracy. Since 1977, the formation of supervisory "revolutionary committees" has been encouraged in practically every institution of Libyan society. Committees are also formed by pro-Khadafi Libyans living or studying abroad. Domestically, these groups help keep Khadafi in power and abroad they help silence ex-patriot opponents of the regime. Libyan People's Bureaus, as its embassies are known, also serve as operational bases for revolutionary activity.

Mention should be made of the three bodies operating under Libyan auspices: The National Arab Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (active in the early 1970s against American airliners); the Revolutionary Arab-Palestinian Committees (based in Lebanon and currently operating against Israel); and the National Command for the Arab Revolutionary Force (an organization whose aim is to coordinate terrorists from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and various radical factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization). Moreover, Libya's secret service Mukhabarat (under East German management) recruits Libyan prisoners for terrorist operations outside Libya. The regime also places advertisements in Middle Eastern and European papers seeking foreign mercenaries for hire to join Tripoli's struggle for the "liberation of peoples."[9]

2. Diplomatic Support

Libyan diplomatic support of terrorist groups is extensive and diverse. Libya's diplomatic service was used, for example, to assist the Palestinian terrorists involved in the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. Libyan diplomatic pouches are used to smuggle money and weapons to Palestinian terrorists operating in Western Europe. Forged passports, cash, and counterfeit documents are provided by Libyan authorities to international terrorists. Libya has also sent arms, by diplomatic courier, to many revolutionary groups that engaged in terrorist acts. For example, the PLO attack against the Saudi Embassy in Sudan was perpetrated with weapons received through Libya's diplomatic pouch and the Libyan Charge D'Affaires in Switzeriand was expelled when he was accused of transferring arms to local terrorists in April 1983. Also, Libyan agents endeavoured to bring weapons into Saudi Arabia via a special flight of Libyan pilgrims to Mecca in the summer of 1984. Diplomats aboard the plane declared "diplomatic immunity" and attempted to obstruct the search of the cargo that led to the discovery of the weapons. Some sources have theorized that the weapons were to be used aginst Libyan dissidents living in Saudi Arabia.

According to some reports, Libyan embassies also serve as arms warehouses. Even terrorists organizations based in Indonesia have received money and weapons from Libya. In these cases, the Libyan Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, serves as the contact for the Asian terrorists and Libyans. The involvement of Libyan embassies is not limited to the role of supplier. Two Libyan diplomats were forced to leave Spain in December 1985, following the discovery of evidence that they had been planning an attack.

3. Propaganda Campaigns

The Libyan regime has launched a media campaign calling for the "physical liquidation of enemies of the revolution." For instance, on October 7, 1982, Tripoli radio broadcasted a speech by Colonel Khadafi during which he warned Libyans abroad, as he had in 1980, to return home or face liquidation by the masses. In official pronouncements on October 10,20 and December 25, 1982, Colonel Khadafi renewed his call for the continuation of the campaign to eliminate his opponents. Moreover, diplomatic messages of support are broadcast from Libya to encourage terrorist organizations in their activities. The Libyan secretary of information, Muhammad al-Zuwayy, has confirmed Libya's support of terrorism by prolcaiming that "We are proud to be used... We assert to the whole world that we provide material, moral, and political support to every liberation revolution in the world."

4. Funding

Aided by its oil revenue, Libya provides substantial financial support to terrorists groups worldwide. Allocations for the funding of various terrorism organizations have been reported at $100 million annually. The PLO, for example, received Libyan funding for specific terrorist acts such as the 1972 Munich Olympic murders, the 1975 Vienna Kidnapping of OPEC ministers, and the 1976 attack on an Israeli jet at the Instanbul airport. In 1978, Tripoli committed grants to the PLO of $39.3 million annually. A "Palestine National Fund" was established by Khadafi for the purpose of deducting 6%

of the monthly income of Palestinians employed in Libya to be used for the revolution.

Testimony of the massive scale of Libyan financial aid to the PLO can be found in the statement by Ahmed Jibril, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command Wing of the PLO, in an interview with the Beirut Daily, As-Safir, July 19, 1981: "Libyan aid is such that there is no need for further Arab aid... Libyan aid to the Palestinians amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars." More recently, Abu Musa, the head of the pro-Syrian Fatah faction, who received a total of $800,000 support, stated: "Our brothers from Libya are also helping us and this is nothing to be ashamed of."[10]

Also, Libya funds have become available to leftist elements throughout Latin America. In 1981, for example, Libya provided $100 million to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and, since May 1982, has made several deliveries of arms to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas. Consistent with its policy of combatting Westrern influence, Libya has also provided guerrilla training and almost $5 million in financial aid to the New Caledonian National Socialist Kanak Liberation Front. Among the other terrorist groups that received Libyan funding are Iranian terrorists during the Shah's rule, the Irish Republican Army, and the Moslem rebels in the Philippines.

5. Training

Instruction in terrorist tactics and weapons is provided by Libya to a wide variety of terrorist organizations. A series of 10-40 camps have been set up in Libya for training in terrorist tactics and operations. According to various reports the Libyan training camps consist of the following facilities:[11]

1. al-'Aziziyya Camp (south of Tripoli): training members of the POLISARIO Front and "international terrorists."

2. al-Jada'im Camp: training Sudanese and Arabs.

3. al-Kashaf Camp (in Tripoli): training for the "destruction of installation."

4. al-Ma'had Camp ("the institute"): training "Libyan terrorist."

5. al-Mard Camp (east of Tobruq): training Tunisians, Egyptians, and Yemenis.

6. al-Sa'iqa Camp (no location given: ("lightning bolt")): Africans, Palestinians, Italian Red Brigades, and members of "the Basque Organization", presumably ETA.

7. al-Shahid Maqarief Camp: training Libyans.

8. al-Takbali Camp (in Tripoli): training for desert warfare.

9. al-Tamimi Camp (E. of Derna): training for desert warfare.

10. Aouzou Camp (in the Libyan-occupied strip of northern Chad): training Chadians.

11. April 7 Camp (south of Tripoli): training "African Sudanese", Tunisians, and Algerians.

12. Baab Aziza Camp: training terrorists.

13. Bir al-Ghanem Camp (about 50 miles SW of Tripoli): training Tunisians.

14. Code Region "476" (some 476 km. from Benghazi): training terrorist.

15. Elzavia Camp: training Morroccans, Sudanese, and Tunisians.

16. Ghadames Camp (at Ghadames on the western border): training "African mercenaries."

17. Green Mountain Camp (in Cyrenaica): training Algerians and Tunisians.

18. Jaghbub Camp (at the Jaghbub Oasis near the Egyptian border): training "extremist groups."

19. Joud Eldaim Camp: training terrorists.

20. Jurman Camp: training "extremist groups."

21. Kaddas Camp: training Africans from Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire.

22. Khums Camp (at Khums on the Tripolitanian coast): training Tunisians and other NW Africans.

23. Kufra Camp(at the Kufra oasis in SE Libya): training Sudanese and Arabs.

24. Mazda Camp (southest of Tripoli): trainng Sudanese.

25. Misurata Camp (at Misurata on the coast): Military College for training foreigners and Palestinians.

26. Sabrata Camp (near Tripoli): training Chadians, Palestinians, Tunisians, Iraquis, Japanese, and Latin American groups.

27. Sayyid Bilal Camp (S. of Tripoli): POLISARIO. Training Palestinians, Tunisians, Lebanese, and Yemenis.

28. Sebha Camp East (at Sebha Oasis in the south): Training assassins.

29. Sebha Camp West: training terrorist.

30. Sinouin Camp: training terrorists.

31. Surt Camp (at Surt or Sirte on the Gulf of Sirte): training assassins.

32. Tajura' Camp (on the coast of E. of Tripoli): training assassins.

33. Tarhuana Camp (SE. of Tripoli): training extremist Arab groups.

34. Taybmi camp: training extremist Tunisian groups.

35. Tobruq East Camp: training "agents of various Arab nationalities."

35. Tobruq East Camp: training "agents of various Arab nationalities."

36. Tobruq West Camp: training "agents of various Arab nationalities."

37. Tukida Camp: training Palestinians, Omanis, Chadians, and Iranians.

38. Umm al-Aranib Camp (25 miles South of Sebha Oasis): training assassins.

39. Uqba bin Nafi' Camp (presumably near Uqba bin Nafi' Airbase, the former Wheelus, AFB): training Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans, Venezuelans, Chadians, and Argentines.

40. Wahat-Ja'abub Camp (in the desert region near the Egyptian border).

41. Walid Camp: trainng Egyptians and Yemenis.

42. Zinjor Camp: training Africans from Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire.

43. Zouara Camp: training terrorists.

Thousands of terrorists and "volunteers" from different regions of the world have been trained in these camps by Libyans, Cubans, East Germans, Soviet, Syrians, and Palestinians. The guerrillas participate in short and extended training periods that include the use of small arms, explosive material, anti-aircraft missiles, and suicide pilot and naval courses. After six-months of basic training, terrorists are capable of forging documents, sabatage, kidnapping, hijacking and assassination.

Some training at Libyan camps were provided for specific terrorist attacks. For instance, the hijacker of an Indonesian airline in April 1981, told the hostages that he had received training in Libya. Moreover, Libyan military personnel have been sent to train PLO members in Lebanon.

6. Supply of Weapons[12]

Libya's huge acquisition of weaponry, primarily from Communist sources, enables Tripoli to supply terrorists groups throughout the world. Massive quantitites of weapons have been provided by Libya to different factions of the PLO for many years. An air and naval bridge has been established from Libya to Lebanon, supplying a variety of Eastern bloc weapons including BM-21 122mm. rocket launchers; SA-9 surface-to-air missiles; ZSU anti-aircraft artillery; 130mm., 122mm., and 57mm. guns; and naval boats. In addition to the PLO, numerous Lebanese militias (such as Murabitun and Druze) benefit from Libyan arms supply. Also, terrorists in other areas in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been provided with Libyan weapons.

7. Safe Haven

Libya has served as an important safe haven for many terrorists over the years. In 1971, a member of Fatah was released in Libya after he forced a plane of Jordan's Alia airline to land there. In the following year, Tripoli provided shelter to the Palestinian terrorists who had perpetrated the Munich Olympic murders. In 1975, Libya provided safe-haven for the Japanese Red Army terrorists who took over the U.S. and Swedish consulates in Kuala Lumpur. In the same year, Tripoli gave refuge to Carlos who had taken 60 hostages at the Vienna OPEC meeting.

B. TARGETS AND MODUS OPERANDI: SELECTED CASES

1. Libyan Dissidents[13]

Direct Libyan terrorist activity is focused upon Libyan dissidents living in exile and involves Libyan embassies as operational bases. Continuing his campaign to silence the opposition, in February 1984, Khadafi once again ordered all Libyan exiles to return home or to face death at the hands of Libyan Revolutionary Committee members. In Egypt, two assassination attempts against former Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Bakkush were uncovered as well as the attempted murder of another exile. Dissidents in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Austria were attacked in 1985, as Khadafi's instructions were implemented.

Libya's campaign against dissidents is illustrated by events occurring in Britain in 1984. A series of bombings were followed by an attack on protesters in front of the Libyan Embassy in April, resulting in the death of a British policewoman. The embassy was the source of the shots and apparently the embassy received its orders to use force against the protesters from Libya.

Also, Libyan agents endeavored to bring weapons into Saudia Arabia via a special flight of Libyan pilgrims to Mecca in the summer of 1984. Some sources have theorized that the weapons were to be used against Libyan dissidents living in Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, an external opposition group to the Libyan government, sent a letter to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi in July 1984, warning him that "terrorists groups are ready to persecute and kill Libyan residents in Italy considered opponents of the Khadafi regime."[14] The group cited evidence of previous murders in Europe and charged that the Libyan Embassy in Rome, the Libyan national airlines, and Libyan firms and finance companies abroad all operated as covers for terrorist activities.

2. Arab Leaders and Countries.

Moderate Arab leaders and countries Khadafi deems as insufficiently dedicated to the armed struggle against Israel are an additional target of Libyan terrorism. Egypt, the Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, and Tunisia all fall into this category. According to the Lebanese pro-Libyan daily As-Safir, the Libyan General People's Congress, Libya's parliament, passed resolutions in February 1983, calling for the formation of "suicide squads" that would attack targets in Israeli-occupied territory and "the symbols of treason in the Arab arena who follow the imperialist camp headed by the United States, the leader of world terrorism."[15]

Assaults against Egypt include an attempt on the life of President Mubarak and assassination attempt against Libyan dissidents residing in Egypt. Libya was implicated in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to Mala and the May 1985 car-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. Additionally, in July 1984, a Libyan MIG-23 pilot who defected stated that he was trained in Libya for a mission to bomb the Aswan High Dam. Through these types of attacks on Egypt, Khadafi hopes to weaken both the integrity and stability of the Egyptian government.

Before the deposition of the Sudanese President Nimeiri in 1985, Libya was involved in numerous operations against the Sudan. Khadfai was one of the primary sources of support for the anti-government forces in southern Sudan and intervened militarily as he felt necessary. In March 1984, a war plane flew over the Sudanese radio building and an administration building with Sudanese radio reporting five dead and two wounded. The Sudanese later claimed that the plane was a Libyan-owned Soviet TU-22 bomber.[16] Furthermore, in July 1984, Sudanese security discovered and arrested members of a terrorist group called the Sudanese Socialist Popular Front-Revolutionary Committees Movement. The men admitted that their group was based in Tripoli, they were trained under Libyan intelligence supervision, and they received their weapons from Libya. They stated that they had planned to assassinate Nimeiri and his first vice president in addition to blowing up the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, the supposed headquarters of Libyan dissidents, and several Sudanese military and economic establishments. Since Nimeiri's removal, Libya has made overtures of cooperation towards the new government although subversive activity remains a possibility if Khadafi is unhappy with the progression of Libyan-Sudanese relations.[17]

Among other activities againt Arab moderates, Libya attempted to assassinate Jordan's King Hussein in 1982, by firing SA-7 man-portable missiles at his plane. Khadafi supports non-Arab Iran in its war against Iraq, supplying large amounts of arms to Iran. Libya also fosters internal Iraqi opposition, of which the Kurdish rebels are numbered, to the Sadaam Hussein regime.

Moreover, Khadafi has continually operated against the Bourguiba regime in Tunisia, which he considers too moderate. Libya attempted to send letter-bombs to Tunisia and the discovery of this venture resulted in the severance of Tunisian-Libyan relations. In the southern mining town of Gafsa, Libyan-backed Tunisians attempted to stage a coup in January 1980. Libya sought to exert economic pressure on Tunisia through the summer 1985 expulsion of several thousand Tunisian workers from Libya. Also in 1985, Libyan planes violated Tunisian airspace on several occasions.

3. African Leaders and Countries

Khadafi's ambitions are not limited to the Arab World, he also views Africa as justifiably within his sphere of interest. He tries to gain influence in African states and, if his efforts are resisted, he counters with subversive measures. Libya uses receptive countries as bases from which to operate against other states. For example, Libya sends weapons to Somali rebels via Ethiopia and had used this same conduit to channel arms to Sudanese rebels.

Chad provides a classic example of Libyan intervention. The Libyan army went into Chad to counterpoint French influence in both 1980 and 1983. Khadafi signed an agreement with France in September 1984, for the removal of foreign forces. France complied with the agreement while Libyan troops remained visible in Chad. Additionally, the Chad National Liberation Front guerrilla group uses Libya as a staging poing for its operatons and Libya was connected to assassination plots against the Chadian president. Nigeria has not been immune from Libyan plotting. In February 1980, Nigerian security agents apprehended a group of Libyan-recruited terrorists, mostly from Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Libya, whose mission was to operate against the Buhari government. The group had been trained in the Libyan-controlled area of Chad.

Similarly, in January 1981, a five-member Libyan-trained international terrorist team was discovered in Kinshasa, Zaire. The terrorists were linked to an explosive shipment that had exploded accidentally in the customs section of the Kinshasa airport. The explosives, intended for use in a number of terrorist operations, were sent directly from Libya aboard a Soviet Aeroflot plane. The Zairian president was yet another target of a failed assassination attempt.

In Uganda, Libya had been one of the major supporters of the Uganda Popular Movement, which opposed the Obote government before its overthrow. One of the tactics of Libyan-backed terrorist groups was the sabotaging of financial institutions contributing to the development of

Uganda and the maintenance of the regime. A British and three Swiss World Bank employees were shot outside of Kampala in one such operation.

Khadafi is involved in activities against South Africa in Namibia through his support of the Southwest African People's Organization. Libya also reportedly offered the African National Congress aid in its struggle against the South African regime and has encouraged, through financial help, the Zimbawean government to do the same. Finally, the Ivory Coast and Kenya have also been targeted for terrorist activity, in part because of their Israeli connections.

4. Israel

Libyan attacks against Israel are mostly indirect, primarily taking the form of support for other terrorist groups, such as Abu Nidal, who actually perform the operations. Libya assisted the Palestinian terrorists who perpetrated the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. Libya also financed the Entebbe operaton in the summre of 1976, that Israel partially foiled with its rescue of the hostages. An unsuccessful assassination attempt against the Israeli Ambassador to Britain was made in June 1982. Most recently, Libya was implicated in the December 1985 terrorist attack against the El Al counters in the Rome and Vienna Airports. In Israel proper, Abu Nidal has targeted public transportation and other civilian targets, including a bus that was blown up in December 1983.

5. The United States

The United States has been a primary target of Libyan terrorism. Khadafi has articulated his policy numerous times. The following statements, selected at random, are typical:

> "Escalating the (Arab) national counterattack against U.S. imperialism represented in the form of American military bases in Egypt, Somalia, Oman, and Palestine, means we have to establish bridges with the liberation movements in these countries and prepare to fight together againt this imperialist tide."[18]

> "We must force America to fight on 100 fronts all over the earth...in Lebanon, in Chad, in Sudan, in El Salvador, in Africa."[19]

> "When we ally ourselves with the revolution in Latin America, and particularly Central America, we are defending ourselves. This satan (the United States) must be clipped and we must take war to the American borders just as America is taking threats to the Gulf of Sidra and to the Tibesti Mountains."[20]

These policies have translated into terrorist inspired and/or directed actions levelled against U.S. interests at home and abroad. In this connection, let it suffice to mention a number of relevant incidents:[21]

> Libyan diplomats were charged with using diplomatic pouches to smuggle weapons into Sudan that were later used by Black September terrorists to murder the U.S. Ambassador and an attache in Khartoum in early 1973.

> In December 1973, Libya's National Arab Youth for Liberation of Palestine carried out an attack at the Rome airport. Two thermite bombs were thrown into a Pan Am plane killing 32 and wounding 18. The terrorists eventually surrendered and said that Khadafi had personally ordered the attack. The airliner was a secondary target- Kissinger was the primary one in order to spoil chances for a

negotiated peace settlement between Israel and Egypt.

In 1976, Khadafi assembled a group of Iranian, Turkish, and Latin American terrorists whose targets were to be the 1976 Democratic and Republican conventions. Khadafi said, that his goal was "to stun the world and exact revenge against the pro-Zionists in both American parties." The plan failed.

On December 2, 1979, a Libyan mob burnt the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in protest of U.S. refusal to extradite the Shah.

On May 8, 1980, four Libyans were accused by the U.S. Department of State of taking part in a campaign to intimidate Libyans living in the States. Scores of the 3,000 Libyans living in the United States have been threatened with "extermination".

In 1981, a Libyan plot to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Italy, Maxwell M. Rabb, was discovered; General Haig expressed suspicion that it was Libyans who shot at the U.S. Charge D'Affairs in Paris; Law enforcement officials revealed that 5 Libyan-trained terrorists had been sent to the United States for the assassination of President Ronald Reagan and other top U.S. leaders.

May 27, 1984, Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nations of Islam, met with Khadafi to discuss Libyan support for the U.S. minority-based separatist revolutionary group.

During the past two years, Libya's policies and actions against the U.S. became clearer.

In January 1985, Libya, Syria and Iran agreed to escalate terrorism against U.S. interests and personnel on a worldwide scale. Khadafi formally formed and agreed to finance his first pan-Arab terrorist organization, called the Organization of Arab Revolutionary Forces. The organization, with headquarters in Tripoli, pledged to "conduct the Arab struggle for liberating all Arab territories" and "confront American imperialism."[22]

This umbrella organization, also know as the "National Command for the Arab Revolutionary Forces," met in Tripoli in April 1985. It included terrorists from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon as well as from anti-Arafat factions of the PLO. Libyan-backed rebels from Sudan and Chad also joined the Khadafi group, according to the official Libyan news agency (JANA). Khadfy proclaimed that "the mission in this command is to turn the individual suicidal operations and the aspirations of the Arab citizens in liberation and sacrifice into an organized civilized act. It does not matter how big or small the number of the party or front. The question is to launch a battle in an individual or suicidal action. There is no escape and no way but confrontation. That is to say to confront violence with violence." He also urged the "adoption and practicing of revolutionary violence for the liberation and unification" of all Arab lands.[23]

In February 1986, Khadafi held a two day conference of radical Arab groups in Tripoli. The participants list includes: George Habash, PFLP; Abu Musa; Ahmad Jibril, PFLP-GC; Abu Nidal's number two, Abu Nizal; and members of the Syran Baath Arab Socialist Pary and the Lebanese Revolutionary Committees.

The 11 point resolution which came out of the meeting said secret decisions were taken including "the creation of revolutionary intervention groups and suicide squads to strike at American interest within the United States and throughout the world...if the United States should dare to launch an aggression against...Libya or any other Arab country."[24]

IV STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

The formulation of adequate strategic responses to counter low-intensity conflict, especially when it involves state-sponsored terrorism, presents a dilemma to all free-world nations. To be effective, the response should neutralize terrorism not only by preventing the terrorist act, when possible, but also by imposing some kind of penalty or punishment on the successful terrorist to deter him from acting again. In practice, the response of the United States has been mainly passive, defensive, and reactive. Working out a strategy that imposes costs on the terrorist and the state sponsors, requires planning procedures and sensible decision-making systems, elements that have tended to be neglected in the field of terrorism for too long a time.

U.S. responsibility must be prepared to have recourse to a full range of countermeasures for state-sponsored terrorism, it includes:

1. Intelligence
2. Cooperation with allies
3. Economic and security assistance
4. Political and diplomatic pressures
5. Economic Sanctions
6. Information campaigns and foreign broadcasts
7. Clandestine counter-terrorist infiltrations of terrorist

organizations

8. Covert support for foreign counter-terrorist military operations

9. Overt U.S. military pre-emptive operations

10. Overt U.S. military operations against terrorist bases

In sum, a coherent and firm U.S. policy on responding to state-sponsored terrorism with effective countermeasures will be able to win public understanding and support. It is crucially important to move vigorously in this direciton in order to reduce gradually the emerging strategic threat to free democratic societies implicit in state-sponsored terrorism.

V. LIBYA"S INTERNATIONAL LINKS: Selected Cases

A. The Libyan-Soviet Connection

Khadafi's Soviet Connection is extensive. One source states that from 1973 until the end of 1984, the Soviet Union supplied Libya with approximately $11 billion in primary weapons. In September 1984, a new $8 billion arms agreement accorded Libya with the receipt of several dozen SS-22 missiles, the latest in the Soviet armory. Khadafi's October 1985 visit the Soviet Union apparently resulted in a new arms deal including acquisition for the Libyan Air Defenses and possibly the supply of surface-to-air missiles to Libya.

The technical nature of the Soviet arms received by Libya necessitates the training of Libyans in their maintenance and operation and use of Soviet and Eastern bloc advisers. Libya sends trainees to the Soviet Union for courses and the number of Soviet and communist bloc military advisers in Libya, found in virtually all levels of the army, is relatively high in proportion to the size of the Libyan military.

The Soviet Union has access to Libyan military and naval bases. The use of these bases allows the Soviet Union to monitor the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, gives Moscow the ability to act against NATO's southern flank, and enables support of Soviet activities in Africa.

In addition, Libya is a Soviet surrogate of sorts, performing activities that, while achieving Libyan policy goals, also satisfy Soviet needs. Accordingly, Libya has established strategic ties with other Soviet surrogates such as the Eastern bloc, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, and Mozambique. Libya has also been strategically involved with pro-Soviet revolutionary movements in Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Western Europe. An example of this type of activity can be illustrated through Libyan involvement in the internal affairs of the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius. Reportedly, Khadafi offered financial assistance to opposition leaders in the attempt to reinstate the former pof-Soviet government. Also, Libya worked with North Korea in Malta to ensure the island's peace in the Soviet Camp.

It would be impossible for Libya to absorb the vast quantity of weapons received from the Soviet Union. The weapons have been channelled to a number of countries, such as Iran and Ethiopia, and to a variety of terrorist organizations.

B. The Libyan-Syrian Connection

Due to their common interest, Libya and Syria have cooperated in their activities to further the cause of revolution in the Middle East. Both states have supported Palestinian terrorists groups such as Abu Nidal and both have assisted the leftist forces in Lebanon. Khadafi bolstered the Greater Syria ambitions of the Assad regime by calling on Syria to "annex" Lebanon in order to resolve that country's internal funding. "We fully support Syria to annex Lebanon in a unionist manner," Khadafi said, "We will leave the Lebanese factions and the Lebanese problem for the direct attention of Syria." This call was in accordance with Khadafi's desire to start pushing for Arab unity by "force and revolution."

Libya and Syria have also formed a working alliance between their secret services in order to assassinate opponents of both their governments. An opponent of the Assad regime living in West Germany was the target of such an attempt. He was unharmed but his wife was murdered and the killers we identified as a mixed team of Syrians and Libyans.

C. The Libyan-Iranian Connection

Libya has linked with other radical regimes such as Iran. Libya supports the non-Arab Iran in its fight against Iraq. Libya and Iran reportedly agreed to the formation of a powerful terrorist corps, an Islamic liberation army, to be financed by both states. Libya agreed to establish the training facility to house the recruits and Iran consented to provide instructors in the form of a cadre of revolutionary guards. The corps would take action against Israeli and American interests in the region.

VI. PLO

Libyan relations with the PLO have fluctuated in their degree of doseness depending upon how Khadafi evaluates the group's dedication to his "hard line" stance. Regardless of their periodic disagreements, Libya and the PLO maintain a high level of cooperation. For Libya, assistance to the PLO illustrates its support for the Palestinian cause and strenghten its position in the Arab World.

Libya's political support of the PLO is evident in both its statements and actions. Khadafi has called on the Libyan people to allot a portion of Libyan resources for the Palestinian resistance. He also said: "It is our duty to serve as a base for liberation. The Fedayeen must set out from Libya...(or) other bases that will be put at their disposal in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt." Numerous meetings have taken place between Libyan and PLO leaders to consult on a variety of topics and to coordinate the military and financial aid the PLO receives from Libya.

Libya funnels large quantitites of Soviet weaponry, acquired from various sources, to the PLO. Libya purchased multiple rocket launchers from North Korea and the Soviet Union specifically for the PLO's use in Lebanon. SAM-9 surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon were operated by PLO terrorists under the command and supervision of Libyan soldiers. Libya also gave the PLO SAM-7 "Strella" surface-to-air missiles. Libya also gave the PLO sophisticated weaponry Libya provides the PLO surpasses the self-imposed limits of Syria and other Arab states. This access to advanced weaponry that would otherwise be unavailable enabled the PLO's military strength to reach a new dangerous level.

Finally, Libya not only serves as a base and training ground for Palestinian terrorists, it also puts Libyan resources at PLO disposal for the recruitment of volunteers. Libyan embassies act as recruitment points abroad and, within Libya, the PLO uses the local media to broadcast its need for volunteers.

VII. ABU NIDAL

Libya has been increasingly involved with Abu Nidal since 1984; some sources state that the group's headquarters are now situated in Libya.

Abu Nidal was implicated in the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner with some reports stating that Libyan agents had met with the hijackers in Athens in order to complete the plans for the hijacking. On November 1985, Radio Cairo reported that, "Libya planned and financed the hijacking, which was carried out by a Palestinian splinter group, financially backed and encouraged by Libya, which is a known supporter of terrorists and which provides them with shelter."

Abu Nidal's strengthened Libyan ties have enabled it to operate in Western Europe with greater ease. According to British military sources, in December 1985, Abu Nidal's services were acquired by Libya's Khadafi for $12 million a year. The groups were to focus its attention on hijackings with Britain, the United States, Israel, and Egypt as its primary targets. These acts were to be implemented in conjunction with the Libyan intelligence. Perhaps in accordance with the arrangement, Abu Nidal sent a number of terrorists squads to Europe two of which were responsible for the December 1985 Vienna and Rome airport attacks. The surviving gunman from the attacks was quoted as saying, "There are 300 of us, all devoted to suicide actions. We have support from Khadafi and maybe Syria."

VIII. OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS

In April 1985, Khadafi established a "command" of revolutionary groups in the region. He stated: "Our mission in this command is to turn to individual suicide operations and the aspirations of the Arab citizens into an organized civilized act," and that Arab goals can be realized only through the use of revolutionary groups. Khadfi also said: "There is no escape and no way out but confrontation."

In addition to Palestinian terrorists, Khadafi has provided substantial assistance to terrorist groups in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. As a strong supporter of the hard-line "rejectionist wing" within the Palestinian terrorist movement, Khadafi has particular strong links with various European terrorist organizations. As early as 1976, - together with Algeria - he assumed responsibility for the logistical support (weapons, finances, training) of Basque, Corsican and Breton separatist terrorists in Spain and France. More recently, his nation has provided weapons and logistics aid to the Irish Republican Army as well as to Moslem guerrillas in the Philippines, Cyprus, Eritrea and Kashmir.

There are numerous examples of Libyan backing of a variety of terrorist organizations. Libya provided the Irish Republican Army's Provisional Wing and the splinter Irish National Liberation Army with funds, heavy automatic weapons, and rocket launchers. The weapons were to be used in attacks on British surveillance and troop-carrying helicopters patrolling the border areas between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Moreover, the Surinamese regime sold Libya the right to train terrorist for $100 million in aid. The terrorists were to take part in operations against other Caribbean nations. These are just two of many possible illustrations.

FOOTNOTES

For relevant work on different aspects of terrorism see, for instance, Yonah Alexander, ed. International Violence. (New York: Praeger publisher, 1983); Yonah Alexander, ed. International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976); Yonah Alexander, The Role of Communication in the Middle West Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects. (New York Praeger Publisher, 1973);Yonah Alexander, Marjorie Brown, Allan and Ann Nanes, eds, Control of Terrorism. (Crane, Russak, and Company, 1979); Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, Paul Wilinson, eds. Terrorism: Theory and Practice. (Bolder; Westview Press, 1979); Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger, eds, Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response. (New York, Praeger Publisher, 1982); Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Freidlander, eds. Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives. (Bolder: Westview Press, 1979); Yonah Alexander and John Gleason, eds. Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism: (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981); Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Kilmarx, eds. Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response. (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982); Yonah Alexander and Nicholas Kittrie, eds. Crescent and Star: Arab-Israeli Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict. (New York: AMS Press, 1972); Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers, eds. Terrorism in Europe. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Yonah Alexander and Alan O'Day eds. Terrorism in Ireland. (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1984); Yonah Alexander and Seymour M. Finger, eds. Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (Maidenhead: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1978); Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1986); Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexanders, eds. Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, 1984); Lawrence Z. Freedman and Yonah Alexander, eds., Perspectives on

Terrorism (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1983); David Rappoport and Yonah Alexander, eds., The Morality of Terrorism, (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1982); Eli Tavin and Yonah Alexander, eds., Psychological Warfare and Propaganda: Irgun Documentation (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1982); and Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume I-VIII (1977-1985).

2. These statistics are drawn from Quarterly Risk Assessment reports prepared by Risks International (Alexandria, VA) covering the years 1970 to 1985 (October). For other statistics see, for instance, United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984 (November 1985).

3. Report of the Rand Corporation, 1984.

4. See, for example, unpublished papers from the Conference on "International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension", held in Washington, D.C., June 24-25, 1985, and co-sponsored by the Nuclear Control Institute and the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York.

5. The latest research for analyzing this problem is found in Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: As State-Sponsored Covert Warfare, op.cit.

6. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Brief, December 21, 1984, and Risks International data base.

7. Cline and Alexander, Terrorism: As State-Sponsored Covert Warfare, op.cit., p.32.

8. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, April 1, 1985, p.Q4.

9. The Washington Post, April 7, 1985. For extensive reviews of Libya's role, see for example, Libyan Sanctions (U.S. Department of State, January 8, 1986) and Libyan Support for Terror and Subversion Throughout the World (Israel's IDF Spokesman, January 8, 1986).

10. Lebanese Phalangist Radio (February 10, 1984).

11. For information on Libyan Training activities see, for instance, AP News Agency, July 19, 1981; Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, April 18, 1983; and Akhar Sa'ad (Egypt), December 4, 1985.

12. For details see for instance, Libyan News Agency, May 29, 1980; Elrai Elaam (Kuwait), August 17, 1981; Radio Monte Carlo, august 27, 1981; AP News Agency, August 28, 1981; Reuters, September 2, 1981; ABC-News, September 12, 1981; and The Washington Post,, September 2, 1984.

13. See, for example, Violence as Reality: Assassination and Massacre in the Arab World, (Jerusalem: Carta, 1983).

14. FBIS, Rome NSA, July 3, 1984.

15. The New York Times, February 21, 1983.

16. Ibid. march 17, 1984.

17. FBIS, SUNA, July 28, 1984.

18. Quoted in The Washington Post, March 6, 1981.

19. FBIS, March 5, 1984

20. Focus on Libya (March 1984).

21. Sources for these incidents include governmental documents and the media.

22. The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1985.

23. The Washington Times, april 2, 1985.

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

Tunisia
ZAWARAH
AL-AZIZIYYA
TARHUNA
MISURATA
Mediterranean Sea
BAIDA
RAS EL HILAL
TOCRA
TUBRUQ
SIRTE
Gharyan
Darnah
Egypt
JAGHBUB
Misratah
UMM AL-ARANIB
Al Khalij
Sabha
Algeria
Libya
Niger
Sudan

★TRAINING CAMPS

RESPONSES OF DR. ALEXANDER TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DENTON

STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

Question. Dr. Alexander, would you identify terrorist groups which are primarily backed by Syria, by Iran, by Libya, by North Korea and by Cuba?

Answer. Syria and Libya primarily back the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), PFLP-General Command, Fatah Uprising (Abu-Musa group), As Saiqa, Palestine Popular Struggle Front (Samir Ghosheh's group), and the Palestine Liberation front (Talaat Yacub group). These six movements comprise the Palestine National Salvation Front.

The Lebanese National Democratic Front, which includes some 11 bodies, is also supported by both Syria and Libya. It consists of such groups as the Lebanese Communist Party, the National Syrian Social Party, the Nasserite Organization, and the Baath Party Organization in Lebanon.

Independent Palestinian groups, primarily the Fatah Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal group) and the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Nayef Hawatmeh) are also provided with Syrian and Libyan help. Additionally, Libya supports the Palestinian group led by Ahmed Jibril.

The Iranian "Islamic Revolutionary Council" oversees the activities of Islamic groups, such as Al Dawa, Amal Islami, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah that operate in Lebanon. Iran also lends some support to the PLO.

Beginning in 1967-1969, terrorist training centers were established in North Korea. The remoteness of the country originally helped maintain secrecy. The trainees eventually, however, have been traced to and in some cases apprehended in Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia), the Mideast, and Asia (Sri Lanka, Malaya, Indonesia, and Japan). Recent reports indicate that North Korea trains members of the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).

The role of Cuba in training terrorist groups is more extensive. Following the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, Colonel Wadim Kotschergine of the KGB built a number of training camps for freedom fighters in Cuba's mountains. Members of various groups around the world have been trained by Cubans in Cuba itself as well as in other parts of the world such as Algeria and South Yemen.

Groups that benefited from Cuban training include the Weathermen, the Puerto Rican FALN, the Basque of Spain, Argentina's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN), Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MLR), Columbia's M-19, Paraguay's National Liberation Front (Frepalina), and remnants of Uruguay's National Liberation Movement (MLN/Tupamaros), the Sandanistas of Nicaragua, and the PLO, among others.

TRAINING AND SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS

Question. What has your research disclosed with respect to the source of training and support of these groups?

Which countries are the primary suppliers and with whom, in your view, does the ultimate responsibility rest?

Answer. Libya aids various terrorist groups by assisting in the training, planning and execution of operations and by providing the terrorists safe haven. Concerning terrorist training, Libya has a "Liaison office" in Tripoli that is responsible for supervising foreign terrorists. The training camps are Libyan-operated but the instructors include Syrians, Palestinians, Cubans, and East Germans. As for the terrorists themselves, the PFLP provides the largest single category of recruits.

Syria, Tran, The Soviet Union, Cuba, Iraq, South Yemen, Vietnam, and North Korea are additional countries in which PLO members have received terrorist training. For example, in Iraq the instructors were known to be East Germans and in South Yemen they were Cuban.

As reported in my statement, Libya, in the past, has provided the funding for individual operations by Abu Musa, Black September, the Habash Front, and the PLO. A West German newspaper stated that Libya had agreed to finance Abu Nidal with $12.8 million a year. Syria, too, is instrumental in providing support for Abu Nidal. Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Libya also became involved in sponsoring Islamic Jihad, reportedly by providing Palestinian operatives to train Shiite guerrilla cadre in Iran.

Syria is also heavily involved in the training and support of terrorist groups. Syrian intelligence officers guided the operations against the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, facilitating contacts between the Shiite extremists and Syrians guerrilla operatives who provided the explosive and technical expertise for wiring the truck bombs. Before Islamic Jihad operations expanded to their present scope, Syria advised and assisted in the recruitment of terrorist personnel for Iranian efforts to mount Shiite guerrilla offensives against Iraq and some of the conservative Persian Gulf states. Syria apparently also acted as middleman in the Iranian-Libyan exchanges.

As for the Soviet Union, it supplies armaments from its own inventories to the PLO and trains Pallestinian guerrilla operatives at national military academies and schools. (The same relationship exists between Iran and Islamic Jihad.) Most of the weapons the PLO provides to other terrorist organizations are of Soviet origin. The PFLP is another Palestinians group with strong ties to the U.S.S.R. and its allies such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Cuba, and Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that the ultimate responsibility for the expansion of contemporary terrorism lies in the fact that states like the Soviet Union, their proxies, and the wild-cards of the international system in the Middle East violate basic principles of international law. Moreover, an international network or infrastructure of substates supporting terrorism contributes to ideological, religious, and political violence. This relationship covers different levels of collaboration, including financial support, training, supply of combat material, forging of documents, provision of safe houses, and proxy and coordinated operations.

STATE FINANCING OF PLO

Question. Which Arab countries support the PLO terror network with cash contributions?

What is the primary source of the money?

Is this money extorted or is it provided willingly?

Answer. The 1978 Arab Summit in Baghdad, Iraq, established a framework under which money was directed to the "confrontation states" and the PLO on an annual basis with direct aid to the PLO set at $250 million yearly. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Quatar, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq were party to the summit decision. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have largely honored their commitments while Iraq, faced with financial difficulties since 1982 due to its war with Iran, has not contributed the entire amount pledged. Similarly, Algeria has not paid its full pledge. Outside the summit framework, Libya has contributed directly to those Palestinian groups it supports (e.g. the Habash, Hawatmah, and Jibril groups) rather than to Arafat's PLO. Iraq finances the Arab Liberation Front and Syria supports As Saiqa.

According to one report (Washington Times, October 17, 1985), the allocations for 1985 were (in millions of dollars): Saudi Arabia: $85.7; Kuwait: $47.1; Libya: $47.1; Iraq: $44.6; UAE: $34.3; Algeria: $21.4; and Qatar: $19.8.

For Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, the most reliable contributers, the source of the money is largely oil revenues. The money is supplied willingly for the most part as proof of loyalty to the Arab world and the Palestinian cause.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Question. Dr. Alexander, what evidence have you discovered that the Soviet Union is involved in the coordination of overall terrorist policies among the countries of the Radical Entente or in the actual planning or training for a given terrorist attack?

Answer. Although some evidence exists in regard to Soviet encouragement of overall terrorist policies among the countries of the Radical Entente (e.g. propaganda campaigns), information regarding the actual planning or training for given terrorist attacks is much more limited. For example, an Iranian official in Iran's Lebanese embassy involved in the operation of developing contacts with Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon was also working as a double agent for the Soviet Union.

It has also been reported that Libya's secret service has been under East German management since 1974. The East Germans do not direct activities but suggestions are made which have been known to have been passed on with the Libyan intelligence chief taking credit for them.

Finally, in August 1984, I interviewed a Shiite attorney from Ansar, South Lebanon. A founder of Amal ("Hope"), he broke away from the movement because of policy differences regarding increasing Communist influence in South Lebanon and sought accommodation with Israel. He was, therefore, marked for assassination by a Shia Communist from South Lebanon who had been trained as a terrorist in the Soviet Union. In late 1983, the terrorist apparently obtained TNT from Shia Communists located in the Bekka Valley of Lebanon, which became a major center for hashish and opium growing since it was occupied by the Syrian army in 1976.

Equipped with these explosives, the terrorist attempted to place them at victim's house. He was apprehended by the local Lebanese militia and subsequently was imprisoned in Ansar's detention camp.

COOPERATION BETWEEN U.S. AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE

Question. How would you assess the extent to cooperation on terrorist intelligence matters between the U.S. and Israel in the wake of the Jonathan Pollard espionage case?

Answer. It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions as the Pollard espionage case is still in litigation.

HUMAN VS. ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE MEDIA

Question. What is your impression of the quality of available human intelligence as opposed to that which is collected by electronic or technical means?

Answer. My impression is that the quality of human intelligence is high but the number of personnel involved in this activity should be expanded particularly in the field.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

Question. Dr. Alexander, as you know, President Reagan ordered economic sanctions against Libya in January by reason of its involvement in the recent terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna.

Do you believe that those sanctions were the most effective response the U.S. could have given under the circumstances?

How could the effectiveness of the economic sanctions applied against Libya have been improved?

Answer. Generally speaking, when political and diplomatic options do not suffice, then embargoes on trade and the freezing of assets may be invoked to strengthen the U.S. pressure in the direction of reducing the terrorist action.

Thus, the U.S. had no other option but to impose economic sanctions on Libya. If the European allies will not cooperate fully in making the economic sanctions effective and if Libya continues with its acts of terrorism, then the U.S. should seriously consider as the last resort the military option.

DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTER-TERRORIST POLICY

Question. Given your extensive knowledge of the various terrorist factions operating in the Middle East and Europe, as well as the interrelationships between those factions and the countries of the "Radical Entente," what factors would you consider to be most important in developing a counterterrorist policy for the U.S.?

Please include in your answer, if you will, the types of responses to terrorism which you consider to be the most effective (diplomatic, economic, military, etc.), the order and possible combination in which they should applied, the degree of evidence we should require before concluding that a faction or state is involved in a terrorist incident, and the degree to which time is a factor in the effectiveness of a response to a given incident.

Answer. There are no simplistic solutions to the terrorist threats in the Middle East, Europe, or any other region. In general, the range of possible countermeasures that are fitting the threat should include the following approaches:

1. *Intelligence.*—Intelligence about menacing world situations, violence-prone groups in every conflict area, histories of regional resort to terrorist violence, and the record of sponsorship of terrorism by a nation or nations must be collected and analyzed more fully and effectively than the restrictive traditions of recent years have been permitted in the United States.

2. *Cooperation with Allies.*—The United States must create a feeling of harmony with its allies, whose security is essential to world order and, therefore, to U.S. interests. It must join with its allies in supporting international laws that condemn terrorist crimes and be willing to provide intelligence and other direct aid to friendly governments in the line of fire yet possessing fewer resources than American authorities can bring to bear.

3. *Political and Diplomatic Pressure.*—If specific countermeasures are required, the United States, as first steps, can withdraw recognition of the offending nation or nations, expel diplomatic personnel, reduce consular office staff, impose travel restrictions, and even send students home. Any or all of these options will cause discomfort and yet can be lawfully inflicted for cause. It is high time to make sponsor

states internationally accountable and impose some costs on them for their behavior.

4. *Economic Sanctions.*—These sanctions must be applied resolutely and kept in place for as long as needed to change the policies of the offenders. This countermeasure is severe but completely legal and appropriate, as well as non-violent.

5. *Information Campaings and Foreign Broadcasts.*—Information campaigns at home and foreign broadcasts that arouse world opinion on state sponsorship may assist in isolating those states practicing and fostering terror. At present, state sponsorship is virtually risk free and without cost to international reputation. Nations that do not engage in terrorism themselves but condone it should also be mentioned in comments on terror.

6. *Clandestine Counter-Terrorist Infiltration of Terrorist Organizations.*—The object is to neutralize terrorist acts by secretly sabotaging them on the spot or by revealing them in advance to law-enforcement agencies or paramilitary operations units.

7. *Covert Support of Foreign Counter-Terrorist Military Operations.*—U.S. training and logistic support of foreign commando strike forces are often indispensable.

8. *Over U.S. Military Pre-emptive Operations.*—Prevention of the loss of life by American civilian or military personnel is legitimate if no local protective forces can be relied on to preempt the terrorist attack in the foreign area where the lives are endangered.

9. *Overt U.S. Military Operations Against Identified Terrorist Bases and Forces Used Against American Targets.*—As a last resort, the military response may put a serious dent in terrorist ranks and capabilities. It will be especially effective if an extreme case of a terrorist outrage occurs and solid intelligence is available to link it with a terrorist base or force inside the territory of a sponsoring state like Nicaragua or Syrian or Iranian controlled Lebanon. A strong U.S. military response in such a case would put a real dent in state sponsorship of terrorism and may be the only way to do so.

The decision of the U.S. to adopt any or a combination of the aforementioned steps should be determined on a case by case basis. The most important element, however, in the strategy of counter terrorism is to mobilize U.S. national will—including congressional judgement—to support the various options available to the Government.

This requirement is valid whether it is a hostage rescue mission, a preemptive or post-incident attack on identified terrorists, or in the worst case protracted counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla military operations.

Senator DENTON. Dr. Alexander, you have located specific terrorist training camps on your chart. I think it was Ambassador Oakley who mentioned that insofar as they represent opportune targets to hit in retaliation, there is some limit on the relevance of those targets because the terrorists who performed the acts for which we would be retaliating might not be there. Also, innocent civilians might be killed during the retaliatory strike.

To what degree do you regard the camps that you have located on your chart as proper targets if we did choose to retaliate by military strike?

Dr. ALEXANDER. Senator, I believe that there are many variables that one has to consider related to U.S. responses to terrorism, ranging from policy to military responses.

On the basis of our study, Senator, we do not believe that the military response would be the first response, but rather the last resort. However, as a responsible Government, the United States as well as the free world should consider taking the military response. It is not the question, Senator, of tit for tat. In other words, there should be a strategic national policy which takes into account the need to get to the source of this matter. It is irrelevant whether terrorists were trained in this or that camp, or whether a specific incident is linked to a particular training camp. What is significant is that Libya is violating international law. It is a piracy, modern piracy. I believe that the international community has reached the moment of truth of whether it will tolerate this piracy in the skies or the seas, or whether it will draw the line in realization that the international system cannot function properly with this kind of atrocity.

It is a question of perception. In other words, if we attach high priority to counter terrorism, then a responsible Government like the United States would know what to do. Some steps have been taken in this direction. You mentioned before the Vice President's Task Force Report. It is only the beginning of the road and not the end of it. But, again, Libya must be held accountable, because there is a question of state responsibility under international law, not only to protect their own citizens, but also guarantee that their territory will not be used by terrorists launching attacks on citizens of other countries.

I think that the determination to attack specific camps is really the responsibility of the Department of Defense, or those who are responsible for the military response of the United States.

Senator DENTON. Of course, that would be a Presidential responsibility, and I agree with you that a military response should be the last that we undertake if other responses are available and can be equally effective.

Are the Libyan training camps which you have identified permanent or temporary facilities, to your knowledge?

Dr. ALEXANDER. Those that were listed, to the best of our knowledge, drawing from open sources or information that was available, are permanent camps. But if you cite a specific camp, then one would have to monitor to what extent that particular camp is still active today. Perhaps that specific camp was active 1 year ago or 2 years ago. But the main point, Senator, is not a question of counting how many camps are there. The principle is significant: Libya is providing its territory as a base from which it challenges our democratic system and the free world. Libya is serving the interests of the major adversary of the United States, the Soviet Union, in violation of law and, therefore, the United States would have to find those appropriate means to respond effectively to this threat.

Senator DENTON. We are continually confronted with minute-by-minute challenges, such as Qadhafi's threats regarding the Gulf of Sidra, in response to which we ask whether our fleet should sail into that area in defiance of Qadhafi. It seems to me that that is playing the game backwards in a way. We ought to have an overall evaluation of the international terrorist picture and arrive at principles by which we can operate on a consistent, long-term basis—principles which the public, following public discourse through the media, is prepared to back. At the same time, we must be able to act immediately and quickly where that is necessary to prevent terrorism.

It appears that Libya and other radical nations are spreading incidents around the world for the United States to have to confront. They are spreading thin our capacity for commitment. They are tempting us to undertake violent actions which, if we did undertake such actions, would subject us to worldwide criticism. Libya and other members of the Radical Entente have escalated philosophically to that global approach.

Dr. **Alexander**. Correct. And not only that, Senator, I think that particular event that you mentioned was a turning point, the beginning of the so-called entente of like-minded states challenging the United States. This form of cooperation continues today with greater intensity. If I may, Senator, I would like to share with you a few posters which I was able to find during my research in the Middle East.

This is a Shiite poster, conceived in Iran and printed in Lebanon, which says: The curse of God, of Allah lies upon you Americans. It shows the American flag being formed by the bleeding kamikaze terrorist. Although the Shiites bleed, but the United States and their friends like Israel will also bleed.

Senator **Denton**. You might let the people behind you see that.

Dr. **Alexander**. OK. This form of psychological warfare concerns me. I interviewed some terrorists in a prison in Israel, for example. One of the prisoners prepared this second poster; I can leave it with you so that you can see it more clearly. It is really fascinating as art. But what is very disturbing, as you can see, is a pregnant Arab woman, and before her child is even born he is carrying a gun. This particular poster anticipates the future. We are dealing with the future generations of unborn terrorists. The next poster shows a young child holding a gun. It is being distributed by the PLO all over the region to indicate that they are training children to resort to the gun because according to the PLO there are no other solutions. The last PLO poster relates to education in hatred. When the children grow and finally reach the university, they are taught revolution studies. This is very disturbing because Americans are really target No. 1. I am reminded, Senator, that we are forgetting those American hostages who are captive in Lebanon. You do not hear too much about them. Some people feel that in order to remind American people to the nature of this war, you have to put a sticker of the American flag on envelopes in order not to forget the captives in Lebanon. At one time there were seven, now there are six, maybe five, depending on what happened to Mr. Buckley. But the point is that the United States is perceived by terrorists, and probably over 80 percent of all the terrorist groups around the world that are leftwing oriented, as the major obstacle to their political, economic, and social development. And they are being encouraged today to resort to violence through propaganda and psychological warfare initiated by Soviet broadcasts.

For example, Turkey is being bombarded by Soviet propaganda to undermine the country as a major element in NATO defense.

So, I think what began in 1969 at the Tri-Continental continues to this very day.

Senator **Denton**. Thank you, sir.

Within the past few months, you interviewed a number of detainees of the Atlit prison camp in Northern Israel, and more than 2 years ago, you interviewed detainees at the Ansar prison camp in Southern Lebanon near Sidon. What did you learn from these detainees regarding recruitment into terrorist organizations, the provision of training and weapons and explosives and the provision of documents, weapons, transportation, and so on?

Dr. **Alexander**. Senator, as you know, the academic community is trying to monitor terrorist trends, accumulate the data and then present it in some academic fashion. We are really at the beginning of the road, but we clearly came up with some very interesting findings. For example, as recently as last year, the Soviet Union trained Shiites from South Lebanon in terrorist tactics, and then sent assassins to eliminate those who oppose a pro-Soviet posture. The terrorists were recruited by the Lebanese Communist Party. We find that terrorists have been recruited even outside Lebanon such as in Kuwait.

One individual I interviewed from Islamic Amal, a Shiite, was involved in Communist activity. Also, Syrians were trained in Libya, as I mentioned before. Some were trained in maritime commando activities for years. When the *Achille Lauro* hijacking was unfolding, people were surprised that terrorists were trained in this area of operation.

Our findings indicate that the Soviet Union, particularly, and countries like Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua were involved in the training and support of these groups.

Senator DENTON. Can you identify terrorist groups primarily backed, respectively, by Syria, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba, and, if so, would you do that for the record in writing?

Dr. ALEXANDER. Yes, sir, I will. We listed some of them on the map presented here. I would like to submit a specific list of the kind of support that the terrorist movements enjoy in these countries. Presently, Senator, the list is very long, and growing. The involvement of Libya recently should cause a great deal of concern to the United States Government and the free world.

Senator DENTON. Would you also submit in writing for the record the results of your research and disclosures respecting the source of training and support of these groups? Which countries are the primary suppliers and with whom, in your view, does the ultimate responsibility rest? If you can, please answer the latter question at this time.

Dr. ALEXANDER. Yes, we do know. But, as I said, unless we examine the problem in its broader strategic perspective rather than in terms of isolated cases, we will fail to fully understand the situation. In other words, we must see the forest and not only the trees. If we do not, then we will be able to develop those capabilities which are needed to deal with the problem effectively.

Senator DENTON. I want to congratulate and thank those media people who remained throughout this hearing. It is the first time I recall any perseverence to that degree, especially considering the other things of interest occurring around the Hill. In that regard, if any of the media are interested, at 9 o'clock on Friday in this very room, Dr. Alexander and others will be conducting a symposium on the subject of terrorism. I do not believe we can overdo our analysis and study of the matter. It will be a symposium conducted under the auspices of the National Forum Foundation.

Dr. Alexander, could you give us a list in writing of the Arab countries supporting the PLO terror network with cash contributions? What is the primary source of that money? Could you answer the latter question now?

Dr. ALEXANDER. Well, first of all, Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya have for years provided funding for various PLO groups, and they are continuing their support presently. Their financial assistance varies from time to time and from faction to faction. For example, the Abu Mussa faction received recently about $800,000, according to Abu Musa's own admission. But, over and above the direct support of Arab countries, you find that the PLO imposed a tax on its own people throughout the Arab world in countries such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. In fact, in Libya, the Government imposed 6 percent tax on Palestinians who work in Libya. The 6 percent is deducted in order to provide some funding of terrorist activities.

Also, I may mention that in the United States, the PLO is apparently involved in some illegal activity. Some PLO members were already convicted in insurance fraud and some other illegal activities. There are some legal experts who believe that under the racketeering statute something can be done in responding to terrorism and exposing this kind of illegal activity. Again, Senator, you gave one example about the PLO duty-free shop approach. Some PLO financial activities are known and some are not known. But, according to various reports, you are dealing with probably the richest terrorist movement in the world today.

Senator DENTON. Could you tell us, from your knowledge, which is as comprehensive as that of any individual with whom I have been associated, what evidence has been discovered that the Soviet Union is involved in the coordination of overall terrorist policies among the radical entente nations or in the actual planning or training for a given terrorist attack?

Dr. ALEXANDER. If I may give you just a quick example. In January 1985, a meeting was conducted between the Foreign Ministers of Libya, Syria, and Iran, at the initiation of the Soviets, in order to develop a common front directed against the United States. The Soviet Union encouraged them through their propaganda and other support. We were talking earlier this morning about the training camps in East Europe and the Soviet Union as well. Moscow is actually involved in terrorism for decades. The first camp, as you know, Senator, was established in 1920 in Tashkent when the Soviet Union brought in revolutionaries from Egypt and India in order to undermine the British empire at the time. And the Soviet Union continues with similar activities today. It is a very important element in their strategy which is unlike the strategy in democratic societies.

So the Soviets are involved and they are trying to develop new infrastructures elsewhere. As I mentioned earlier, according to various reports, they are active today in various countries such as Australia. And it is for this reason, Senator, that the Australians, both governmental and nongovernmental bodies, have approached us to have a conference in Australia this coming June in order to deal with the problem. If you or your colleagues would like to participate at this meeting, it would be a great honor for us.

Senator DENTON. Do you know when that is?

Dr. ALEXANDER. Yes, sir, between June 8 and 10, in Melbourne. Some other events are scheduled in Sydney. Lord Chalfont will probably participate as will other colleagues from Georgetown CSIS, and some other people.

Senator DENTON. In view of the time now, sir, I will submit the rest of my questions to you in writing. I want to commend you for your work in this field and acknowledge the tremendous help you have been to us as we pursue this subject matter. I ask that you answer my additional questions in writing within a week or so. Rest assured that we want to continue our liaison with you outside of these hearings and other official functions.

Thank you very much.

Dr. ALEXANDER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DENTON. This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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